

**US Engagement with Egypt, Libya, and/or Sudan**

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## **Two Page Summary**

### **US Engagement with Egypt, Libya, and/or Sudan**

#### **Proposed Resolutions**

The following resolutions are ranked in terms of preference:

1. The United States federal government should substantially increase its foreign assistance to Egypt, Libya, and/or Sudan.
2. The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with Egypt, Libya, and/or Sudan.
3. The United States federal government should substantially increase its engagement with Egypt, Libya, and/or Sudan in one or more of the following areas: natural resources, migrant and displaced populations, and regional stabilization
4. The United States federal government should substantially increase its development aid, humanitarian aid, and/or political aid to Egypt, Libya, and/or Sudan

See Appendix 1 for examples of definitions for proposed terms.

Research revealed a rich ground of issues and a deep literature base. The top-level issues regarding Egypt, Libya, and Sudan center on ongoing civil wars, instability, economic challenges, and regional tensions, all of which are very real and occurring in the present. The nature of the region poses some challenges for a stable topic, while also providing advantages for debaters willing to do ongoing research. The range of affirmative options for cases that deal either with the immediate challenges, or for investing in elements of the economy, stability, infrastructure, or civil society as a method of addressing more root-level issues is wide.

The list of possible affirmative cases addresses many of these issues, with the core controversy of whether additional US engagement in the region is a good path forward. Possible affirmatives include regional security and stability, especially around ending the conflict in Sudan and mitigating the ongoing tensions in Libya. The ongoing conflicts in the region are often breeding grounds for terrorism, both in the region and extending internationally. Counter terrorism affirmatives offer a direct way of addressing these issues. Energy availability and development issues plague all three countries, while Egypt and Libya are both strong candidates for developing robust renewable energy industries. Libya is invested in upgrading and expanding its fossil fuel industry, seeing

this as essential to its economic and national future. Human rights concerns are prevalent throughout the region. The ongoing conflicts have sparked waves of migration, with many regional inhabitants eventually making their way to Libya with the goal of getting to Europe. The stress on local, regional, and national governments caused by this displacement, and the concerns of European countries about an influx of refugees, offer substantial affirmative ground. Addressing resource issues such as agriculture and food production, as well as water rights and interests, offer affirmatives a chance to address existential material needs. There is a particularly interesting issue around Ethiopia's development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which is being built on the Nile River and is raising serious concerns in Egypt. The US and Egypt enjoy a strong partnership, though with divisions between them about Gaza and Palestine. The US choosing a different approach from its current position by partnering with Egypt could be highly interesting.

This topic offers a vast array of negative arguments to create in-depth debates over core controversies that creates balance on this topic. Negative case debating can discuss whether or not increased US intervention in these issues is escalatory or de-escalatory, a debate applicable to all affirmatives on this topic. This is especially true in North African politics with the Obama Administration's intervention in the Libyan civil war contributing to the country's current malaises. There are also on-case debates about whether or not US engagement can support local governance or subsume it, forcing long term dependence. Negative ground offers a range of disadvantages, counterplans, and kritiks. Backlash disadvantages regarding nations like the United Arab Emirates, China, Russia, and Israel are supported with a rich literature base as all of these nations have developed competing interests in these three countries in the face of US disengagement in the region. Links to said backlash disadvantages can be generic or affirmative specific. Diplomatic capital trade off disadvantages are a classic with clear links to regional focus, time, and resources and are made more interesting in the wake of the Trump Administration's cuts to the State Department. Disadvantages about potential mission creep are fresh and nuanced given the frequency of it in US North African engagement. Actor counterplans with the UN, EU, AU, and the World Bank are both widely applicable and teeming with a complex literature base both for and against different styles of multilateral engagement. Critical teams can access generic links to US influence, democracy, human rights, and securitization but can add more nuance to their kritiks over the course of the season. These kritiks can be based in critiques of imperialism, colonialism, anti-blackness, securitization, capitalism and more.

**Synopsis:** North Africa is at a critical juncture. Egypt, Libya, and Sudan face substantial and in some cases existential challenges. Egypt is trying to balance its role as a regional power while dealing with a wide range of pressing issues. Libya is a divided

nation in the aftermath of multiple civil wars, and there are ongoing negotiations about reunification. Its economy is in shambles, and much of its future development hopes lie on restoring its fossil fuel industry, with Libya highly prioritizing generating resources and revenue from oil and natural gas over climate concerns. Sudan is in the middle of a civil war, with high levels of documented atrocities and spillover effects for the region from the displacement of millions of people both internally and externally as well as the risk of trained militias in Sudan going abroad. All of these issues threaten the stability of the immediate countries as well as the broader region. The core question is whether engagement by the US is either necessary or sufficient to address these challenges, and whether US engagement might worsen the geopolitical situation. These topics are worthy of debate, engagement, and research by high school students.

# **Proposal Narrative**

## **History and Context of the Problem Area**

Definitions of the region of North Africa agree on the core countries, with some definitions including one or more other countries. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt are included in all definitions found. Sudan is usually though not always included. Mauritania, Western Sahara, and the Sahrawi Republic are included in at least one definition. (World Atlas, No Date; African Union, No Date; United Nations Statistics Division, No Date.)

Egypt, Libya, and Sudan stand out in this group for their core pressing issues, relationships with the US and each other, and geographic contiguity. The trio of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have historical and cultural ties to Europe and especially to France, which have continued into the modern era. While the US has some influence and relationships there, its role is not as significant as it is with Egypt, Libya, and Sudan. The trio of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia do face some common challenges such as water and food scarcity driven by climate change, authoritarian political trends, stagnant economies, and regional political tensions, but the issues presented by Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, of governance and humanitarian crises, similar political re-entrenchment, similar resource questions plus energy issues, and access to Middle East topics through Egypt brought the focus of this paper to these three nations.

South Sudan was also considered, given its recent ties to Sudan and similar humanitarian and governance issues, but it is generally not included in definitions of North Africa, and doesn't offer a different set of issues to debate that aren't included by debating US-Sudan engagement.

North African history and culture are ancient, especially with the inclusion of Egypt, in which the Pharaonic era lasted for some 3000 years. More recently, North Africa has been shaped by the spread of Islam throughout the Middle East and North Africa, its inclusion in the Ottoman Empire, and the European colonial era of the 19th and 20th centuries. France was the dominant European power in North Africa during colonization, with strong and lasting influences in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. England colonized Egypt and Sudan, with Italy colonizing Libya. The history of colonization is inextricable from modern North African history.

The US has a long-standing relationship with Egypt, dating back to the Camp David Accords signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 1978, with President Jimmy Carter playing a leading role in the

negotiations. The Camp David Accords established annual US contributions to Egypt, primarily for military and security purposes, totalling some \$1.5 billion in 2026, of which about 90% was for those purposes with a little for economic and human development. US engagement with Egypt plays an important role in both North African and Middle Eastern policy, especially around security issues. Egypt is relatively stable, following the 2011-2014 period of revolution and coups, followed by the assumption of the presidency by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who is now generally regarded as a dictator.

Libya is currently a divided nation, and arguably a failed nation, dating back to the fall of the Gaddafi government in 2011 during a civil war in which US and NATO airstrikes played a critical role in the overthrow of the government and death of its leader. A subsequent civil war from 2014-2020 resulted in the current divided nation. Prior US engagements with Libya focused on concerns about Libyan support for terrorism, including US airstrikes against the country in 1986.

Sudan is the site of what is probably the largest ongoing humanitarian crisis in the world, with civil war, famine, and mass displacement resulting in widespread destruction of civil society, including health care and education, with some 30 million people in need of ongoing assistance amid regular outbreaks of violence. US engagement with Sudan primarily focuses on three areas: mediating and attempting to bring an end to the civil war, sanctioning actors for human rights violations, and providing substantial quantities of humanitarian aid. The US is the largest donor to Sudan, through various UN agencies like the World Food Program.

## **Egypt**

Egypt lies at the geographic, geopolitical, economic, religious, and cultural crossroads of North Africa and the Middle East, making it an important actor in both regions and providing access to a wide range of debate arguments. It has important relationships with neighbors and near-neighbors in both regions.

Egypt and the US have a longstanding security and economic relationship with the United States, dating back to the Suez Crisis of 1956 when the US backed Egypt in opposition to Britain and France for control of the Suez Canal. This relationship survived the multiple stresses of the conflicts between the Arab world and Israel, leading to an enduring situation following the 1978 Camp David Accords brokered by President Carter where the US supported both Israel and Egypt economically and militarily, relationships that continue through the present day. The US-Egypt security relationship has strengthened since the 2023 Gaza invasion, and much of the US engagement with Egypt is focused on Israel and Palestine.

Internationally, Egypt also maintains a significant role in North African security and economic issues, for example, cooperating with Libya on economic development issues and trying to support stability in Libya and Sudan. The regional instability posed by current conditions in Sudan and Libya are of great importance and concern to Egypt. Immigration issues from Sudan and into Libya, for example, are a current concern. Egypt's relationship with Ethiopia, especially the development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia, are contentious. Egypt depends on the Nile for more than 90% of its water and sees the GERD as an existential risk. More broadly, Egypt continues its balancing act between the United States and Israel while managing relationships with other Middle Eastern countries. It is also balancing relationships with the US, China, and Russia, joining BRICS in an effort to enhance its global influence.

Domestically, Egypt faces economic challenges highlighted by rising inflation and debt, migration and refugee pressures, high degrees of political and social control and repression, and environmental and pollution risks.

## **Libya**

Libya is largely a failed state, currently divided into two areas, the Western and Eastern Regions. The Western Region is controlled by the UN-backed Government of National Unity. The Eastern Region is led by the Government of National Stability, formed in March 2022 and backed by the Libyan House of Representatives and the Libyan National Army.

Libya's current issues date to the 2011 Libyan Civil War. US and NATO bombing played a significant role in the outcome of the civil war, which saw the death of former leader Muammar Gaddafi and the destabilization of the country, followed by a subsequent civil war a few years later.

Libya faces several important issues around its future as a nation, the creation and development of a functional administrative state, development of natural resources, especially oil, that offer the potential for an economic lifeline, its role as a nexus of immigration from Africa to Europe, and the broader regional and geopolitical implications of Libya's ongoing difficulties.

## **Sudan**

Sudan has been in a state of instability and violence since its founding in 1956 following the end of the joint Egypt and United Kingdom protectorate status known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. Divisions between the northern and southern parts of the country ran along religious, cultural, and economic lines, with the more developed and wealthier north largely Arab and Muslim, while the poorer south tended to be Christian or Animist. The 2011 creation of South Sudan as a separate country was preceded by a 22 year civil war, from 1983-2005.

A coup led by Omar al-Bashir in 1989 established a dictatorship. Bashir had served in the Egyptian military during the protectorate era, then joined the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). He oversaw both the second civil war and the secession of South Sudan. His leadership was marked by strict interpretations of sharia, including morality policy, private militias, and stringent intolerance towards and persecution of members of other religions.

Pro-democracy protests led to a coup in 2019 by the SAF and Rapid Security Forces (RSF), which evolved from Janjaweed militias that operated in South Sudan and Darfur.

Abdalla Hamdok was chosen as prime minister following the coup, and was ousted by a second coup jointly led by the SAF and RSF in 2021. Sudan has not had civilian leadership since then, with military officers General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the SAF and Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo of the RSF serving as joint heads of state.

Attempts in 2022-2023 to transition to a democracy and integrate the SAF and RSF into a single body failed due to protests and violent crackdowns amidst a power struggle between the two men. Violence has continued in a civil war, with mass atrocities including ethnic cleansing, arson, sexual violence, and war crimes occurring on both sides. The RSF has made substantial gains in Darfur since 2025, including occupying El Fashur, the capital of North Darfur in October of 2025.

An estimated nine million people have been displaced, with another four million having fled to neighboring countries, none of which are prepared for such a sustained influx. Infrastructure, especially public health and medical infrastructure, is in a state of collapse.

In February 2025, the RSF attempted to create a parallel government with a new charter and constitution calling for secularism, democracy, decentralization, and a single national army. In a diplomatic counter, the Sudanese government filed suit with the

International Court of Justice against the United Arab Emirates for providing the RSF with weapons.

### **Status of Current Policy Addressing the Problem Area**

US policy towards North Africa in general falls into a range of categories. These include:

- Counter-terrorism and Security Cooperation, with an emphasis on groups like ISIS and the Islamic State
- Regional Stability and Conflict Management, which are ongoing concerns especially around Libya and Sudan, with Egypt as the primary US partner and power in the region.
- Humanitarian support, including substantial food aid to Sudan, has seen significant cuts under President Trump, with the US reducing its contribution by more than half.
- Democracy Promotion has declined as a US priority, though has been a primary focus in the past, especially after the Arab Spring movements in the early 2010s, including specific efforts in Tunisia. Democracy Promotion is at times at odds with Regional Stability priorities.
- Economic Development and Trade, both to support US interests and access and also to strengthen and expand national and regional economies.
- Strategic Competition and Geopolitics: Russia and China both have presences in the region and seek influence and resources there. Private militaries like the Wagner Group also operate in North Africa. China's Belt and Road Initiative focuses on infrastructure projects, telecommunications networks, and industrial zones and manufacturing. Russia tends to focus more on security cooperation and arms sales, building political and military influence through clients and supporting private military groups like the Wagner Group.
- Migration and European Interests: There is a steady flow of migrants seeking to leave Africa through North Africa and especially Libya with the goal of reaching Europe. This pressure is destabilizing for both North Africa and Mediterranean Europe.

## **Egypt**

The primary material US engagement with Egypt takes the form of arms sales, totaling about \$1.3 billion annually in military assistance, most of which is used to purchase American weapons. US military support for Egypt is tied to regional strategy and security efforts in both the Middle East and North Africa, with Egypt serving as the primary US partner in the region. Egypt itself has close ties to neighboring countries, and despite its own instability and economic challenges, is seen as a more reliable partner than, for example, Libya or Sudan.

Congress has regularly attempted to link US aid to Egypt with improvements in human rights conditions in the country, but those links are generally waived by the White House. Extensive reporting documents ongoing repression, the suppression of civil liberties, and the taking and holding of political prisoners and dissidents.

On economic issues, the US tends to work through organizations like the International Monetary Fund to promote stabilization and growth efforts in the face of persistent Egyptian inflation, high debt, high unemployment, and a growing population.

## **Libya**

**Political Stability and Unification:** The US supports the UN-led mission to negotiate a political settlement to the stalemate that has currently divided Libya. The US goal is for there to be a single Libyan government and military with sovereign authority. Part of this involves efforts to establish a unified national budget and economic cooperation between the two regions.

**Counter-Terrorism and Stability:** The US is concerned about the expansion of ISIS and the Islamic State, taking advantage of the instability in Libya to establish presences. The US also trains Libyan military troops to promote stability and protect infrastructure.

**Geopolitics:** Multiple countries have interests in Libya and have established presences there, including Russia, Turkey, the UAE, and Egypt. Some of these are friendly to the US. Others are not, or have interests that run counter to US interests.

**Energy and Economics:** Libya's economic future is largely dependent on oil revenues, of which it has some of the largest reserves in Africa. Successful expansion and development of those reserves is essential to Libya's economy.

Migration: The US generally supports European efforts to minimize migration through Libya into Mediterranean Europe. It also supports efforts to disrupt human trafficking and smuggling from Libya into Europe. Humanitarian concerns around the conditions of migrants are real and under-addressed. The US believes that stabilizing Libya is essential to mitigating increased migration flows through Libya.

## **Sudan**

### **Civil War and Reconstruction**

The primary US goal is to bring an end to the civil war in Sudan, between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. These efforts have included sanctions against individuals and organizations connected to the war, though the US has generally avoided direct diplomacy. The US also supports investigations into war crimes and atrocities.

US aid to Sudan has been extensive in prior years, comprising 44% of total global aid to Sudan as of 2024. With last year's cuts to US humanitarian assistance, US aid to Sudan has been severely cut, with the result that, by some accounts, the majority of the food assistance programs and health centers in Sudan have been closed due to a lack of supplies. These cuts come at a dire time in Sudan due to the ongoing and numerous humanitarian crises (Ferragamo 2025).

### **Analysis of status quo cooperation and the role of the US compared to other interested nations**

Intissar **Fakir**, Senior Fellow, 3-24-2025, "Sovereignty First: Reshaping International Cooperation." Middle East Institute.

<https://mei.edu/publication/sovereignty-first-reshaping-international-cooperation-north-af-rica/> //;D

**These targeted, single-issue deals are becoming a more dominant feature than broader mechanisms like the association agreements, which were ostensibly centered on a shared vision of political and economic reform** based largely on European models. Despite being nominally tailored to each country, those older frameworks imposed similar reform requirements and governance standards across different North African countries, at times with limited appeal to local constituents and priorities. **North African governments often found these frameworks too rigid and insufficiently responsive to their specific needs. The newer, more transactional agreements allow these countries to secure concrete benefits while maintaining greater control over their domestic policy choices. Beyond its relations with Europe, North Africa faces both risks and opportunities from a simultaneously**

**unfolding global phenomenon: the weakening of multilateral institutions by the growing unilateralism of its member states, which frustrates international cooperation.** For example, while this trend may reduce external financial support, it also creates space for more independent policy choices. Thus, international financial institutions increasingly face challenges to their legitimacy on two fronts. First of all, **countries like Tunisia and Egypt, which have long relied on assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), find themselves in a bind because available loans from those institutions come with restrictive economic and political conditions. Such loan requirements force painful reforms that cause domestic backlash against the ruling governments and accumulate debt, putting long-term constraints on national sovereignty.** Second of all, more governments have been willing to look at other options, including ones involving business-minded partners. In 2023, the Tunisian president rejected an IMF loan package in favor of bilateral alternatives and domestic borrowing. Another example has been Morocco's gradual shift toward Gulf investment and funding rather than relying on EU development aid, which came with strings attached or never materialized. Other policy areas also reflect these changes, with governments emphasizing sovereignty by pursuing bilateral negotiations, prioritizing domestic production, reaching out to a more varied set of international partners, and seeking more immediate concrete benefits. Morocco has diversified its foreign weapons purchases as part of the country's new, bilateral engagement with Israel stemming from the 2020 Abraham Accords. In turn, Algeria is boosting key arms imports from Turkey and China to balance its long-standing Russian partnership. Countries like Tunisia have adopted nationalist economic policies, such as placing restrictions in 2022 on a number of consumer goods imports. **For the region, domestic backlash against the imbalanced relationship with the West plays a considerable role in shaping public opinion toward sovereignty. North African countries are increasingly viewing Sino-Russia cooperation as a preferable model because it appears as more equal. Algeria and Egypt have each deepened their relations with China, drawn by Beijing's lack of political conditions on loans and arms deals. These transactional arrangements offer what those regional countries often need — infrastructural investment, trade, and military technology — without an obligation to carry out difficult political or economic reforms in return. While this strategy may create long-term dependencies, it does provide tangible benefits without immediate sovereignty costs.**

## List of Probable Affirmative Case Areas

### Regional Security: Ending the Civil War in Sudan

The Civil War in Sudan is a major humanitarian crisis that is worsening amidst cuts to US humanitarian aid. Engagement can include diplomatic engagement as a mediator between the SAF and RSF groups, humanitarian assistance to civilians, military engagement by sending troops to shift the conflict to a certain side, or economic engagement to invest in energy supplies in the region. Such affirmatives can have advantages about political unity, deterring extremism, alliance building, or energy security.

### Solvency advocate for US led engagement with Sudan through the Quad

Donald Booth, 1-28-2026, "Breaking the Deadlock in Sudan", Washington Institute, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/breaking-deadlock-sudan> //;D

#### Achieving a Sustainable Solution

The notion that cutting off support for one side in the conflict so that the other can prevail is misguided and will not deliver peace and stability in Sudan. **Instead, reaching a sustainable solution will require intensive U.S. engagement at the highest level. This engagement should proceed in three phases: (1) reconciling the competing interests of Quad partners; (2) bringing the leverage of a united Quad to bear on Sudan's other neighbors, who are still sustaining the combatants' ability to fight; and (3) convening a broad spectrum of Sudanese factions and figures to facilitate agreement on a political architecture that enables them to live in peace with each other.**

**Reaching Quad consensus through direct engagement by President Trump.** Overcoming the differences between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE requires understanding their respective spheres of influence in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. For example, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi both seek regional allies who can provide them with access to agricultural land, mines, ports, and military outposts. **The United States should convince them that negotiating a division of these interests in Sudan would benefit them more than zero-sum competition there; indeed, their feud is resolvable because they share more common interests in the area than points of disagreement (e.g., containing Iranian and Turkish influence; securing the investments needed to transition away from being petrostates).** Even the Islamist issue might be more amenable to resolution than it currently appears. SAF leader Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan recently criticized Islamist militias and leaders; **if the Quad offers him united support, he may be willing to cooperate in removing pro-Islamist officers from the SAF and disarming Islamist militias currently allied with his faction, thereby accommodating the UAE's red line while still meeting Egyptian and Saudi interests.**

To change Cairo's hesitation about civilian governance in Sudan, Washington should reemphasize the proven fact that stability along Egypt's southern border cannot be achieved by backing an unpopular Sudanese military government that is incapable of fully defeating the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and uniting the country. This type of centralized control may be workable in Egypt, where the country's population is homogenous and concentrated along the Nile, but the diversity and dispersion of Sudan's population preclude that model. To be sure, offering full support to Burhan without pushing for widely inclusive transition efforts could result in an untenable military-Islamist form of governance reminiscent of the former Omar al-Bashir regime, so U.S. officials would need to tread carefully in this regard.

Egypt will have further incentive to compromise if Washington helps it address concerns about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and Nile water access. The solution here should involve two elements:

Negotiating an agreement on Sudan's Nile water usage now that the GERD has regularized the flow from the Blue Nile tributary, since the expansion of irrigated agriculture in Sudan poses the top threat to Egypt's water supplies.

Negotiating a GERD management agreement (perhaps with neutral third-party oversight) to ensure equitable tradeoffs between Egypt's water needs and Ethiopia's electricity needs, especially during extreme droughts.

Achieving consensus on most or all of the above issues will likely require direct presidential engagement. In a November post on X, Senior White House advisor Massad Boulos stated, "As [President Trump] declared today, the United States is committed to ending the horrific conflict in Sudan," noting that "we are working with our partners to facilitate a humanitarian truce and bring an end to external military support to the parties, which is fueling the violence." Yet only the president himself can overcome the thus-far intractable issues that drive both unproductive Saudi-Emirati competition in the region and Egypt's security and water concerns. The most expeditious approach might be to convene Quad leaders for a Camp David-type summit, since only national leaders can muster the political will needed to make trade-offs on their perceived national interests.

Securing support from neighbors. Material support to the combatants mainly passes through Sudan's immediate neighbors, all of whom believe their national interests are best served by facilitating such transfers. A united Quad can change those calculations—the UAE has

leverage in Ethiopia, Chad, and South Sudan, while Egypt can sway Eritrea and Libya (via Khalifa Haftar's faction). Other actors further afield may still try to fuel the conflict, but their ability to do so would be extremely limited without the support of these states.

Of course, getting Sudan's other neighbors on board will require further compromises between the differing local interests of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. It will also involve finding solutions to related regional disputes—for example, Ethiopia has longstanding disagreements with Egypt (over Nile water) and Eritrea (fueled by the status of Somaliland and Addis Ababa's quest for port access, both of which are tied to Emirati interests).

Engaging a broad spectrum of Sudanese factions to work toward lasting peace. Any U.S.-led diplomatic initiative in Sudan should take into account both the actual status of territorial control and power on the ground and the expectations of the people—otherwise, this effort will fail to restore peace or preserve territorial integrity. Discerning the aspirations of Sudan's diverse population will be difficult because existing political institutions have lost public support. Hence, Washington and its partners will need to engage the country's diffuse set of armed actors, popular local figures (e.g., leaders of the Emergency Response Rooms and Neighborhood Resistance Committees), tribal leaders, and, perhaps, business leaders, each of whom should be challenged to figure out what peaceful, unified governance in Sudan looks like and how authorities can implement it.

**The United States is in a very strong position to mediate such discussions. It is still viewed as the most neutral party in the Quad, and it has the resources and ability to exert pressure.**

With support from fellow Quad members, it could organize a meeting similar to the Dayton framework that helped achieve peace in the Balkans in the 1990s. This would involve the Trump administration bringing 60-80 participants to a secluded neutral location (possibly a military base) and keeping them there until they come up with a generally agreed framework for governing Sudan. Notably, U.S. or regional military assets may be needed to transport some participants to such a meeting.

#### Conclusion

**Decisive U.S. leadership is essential to align regional actors, neutralize spoilers, and ensure that Sudanese civilians—not just armed factions—shape their country's future. Success would help end one of the world's worst humanitarian crises while denying space to extremists and U.S. rivals. Most important, taking the lead on Sudan would align the interests of America's major Gulf partners and advance broader U.S. strategic interests across the Middle East—from undermining Iran's increasingly brutal**

**regime to expanding the Abraham Accords and keeping energy supplies safe from disruption by Yemen's Houthi movement.**

## **Libyan Reunification**

Libya is currently a divided nation between the East and the West which has geopolitical implications for energy security, counterterrorism, European stability, democracy, and diplomatic credibility. Engagement can include military engagement in exercises, bilateral cooperation over humanitarian assistance to Gaza, and collaboration with Europe to support refugees.

### **Example of US diplomatic and military engagement for Libyan reunification**

The Arab Weekly, 1-26-2026, "US officials meet Saddam Haftar to push Libya political, energy agenda",

<https://the arabweekly.com/us-officials-meet-saddam-haftar-push-libya-political-energy-agenda> //;D

**Senior US officials held high-level talks with Libya's eastern military leadership on Sunday, as Washington continues to engage with Libyan actors across the political and economic spectrum.**

Deputy Commander of the Libyan National Army Major General Saddam Haftar received Senior Adviser to US President Donald Trump Massad Boulos and Chargé d'Affaires at the US Embassy to Libya Jeremy Brent, along with their accompanying delegation at the General Command headquarters in Benghazi.

According to a statement from the Libyan army's media office, **discussions focused on the latest political developments in Libya, regional and international dynamics, and ways to enhance bilateral cooperation, alongside support for international efforts to achieve lasting stability.**

Boulos arrived in Benghazi earlier on Sunday, travelling from Tripoli after attending the fifth edition of the Libya Energy & Economic Summit. During the summit, several memoranda of understanding and energy agreements were signed between American firms and the National Oil Corporation (NOC).

Speaking at the event on Saturday, Boulos announced the unprecedented expansion of the partnership between ConocoPhillips and the NOC, emphasising American companies' commitment to Libya's ambition of increasing oil production to three million

barrels per day while bringing advanced technologies and specialised expertise to the sector.

These meetings are part of a broader US engagement strategy, involving consultations with multiple Libyan stakeholders to reconcile differing perspectives and advance the democratic process. This engagement coincides with preparations for the Flintlock 2026 military exercises, which Libya is set to host in the near future.

In parallel, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Hanna Tetteh met Boulos at UNSMIL's Tripoli offices on Saturday. The meeting focused on Libya's economic and political developments and underscored the importance of implementing the roadmap submitted to the UN Security Council on August 21, 2025.

The UN mission highlighted the ongoing structured dialogue facilitated by UNSMIL, aimed at bridging political divides, restoring national unity, and preparing for national elections. Both Tetteh and Boulos stressed that Libyan political actors must translate their commitments into tangible actions to advance the roadmap, signalling continued US and UN support for Libya's political and institutional stabilisation.

**These engagements illustrate the dual-track approach of the United States and the United Nations in Libya: supporting economic development, particularly in the energy sector, while simultaneously pushing for political reconciliation and institutional unification, in a country still divided between rival administrations in Tripoli and eastern Libya.**

### **US engagement key to Libya, some potential advantages, and some solvency mechanisms**

General James L. Jones (Ret.), USMC February 2026 , "Libya and the Return of Strategic Leadership in the Mediterranean – The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune", Jerusalem Strategic Tribune,

<https://jstribune.com/libya-and-the-return-of-strategic-leadership-in-the-mediterranean/>  
//;D

There are four strategic interests at stake.

First, counterterrorism. Ungoverned or weakly governed spaces have historically provided fertile ground for extremist networks. While major terrorist organizations have been degraded in Libya, the absence of consolidated national security institutions leaves open the possibility of resurgence.

Second, alliance stability. European partners continue to bear the immediate pressures of irregular migration flows across the Mediterranean. Persistent instability in Libya contributes directly to these flows and, by extension, to political volatility within allied democracies.

Third, energy security. Libya possesses significant hydrocarbon resources whose reliable production contributes to global market stability. Fragmentation and insecurity undermine consistent output and discourage long-term investment.

Fourth, geopolitical competition. Strategic competitors understand the importance of positioning along the Mediterranean littoral. Military access, port facilities, and political leverage in North Africa carry implications far beyond Libya's borders.

A more coherent U.S. approach to Libya would not require large-scale military intervention. It would require leadership. Such leadership could include the appointment of a senior-level envoy empowered to coordinate interagency policy and align closely with European allies. It would involve shifting diplomatic emphasis toward security-sector integration as a prerequisite to national political reconciliation. It would require calibrated engagement with existing security structures in both eastern and western Libya, encouraging gradual unification under civilian authority rather than perpetuating parallel systems. Importantly, **engagement must be conditioned and purposeful. Support for security consolidation should be tied to measurable steps toward national integration, professionalization of forces, and respect for basic governance norms. The objective is not to empower a faction indefinitely, but to create the foundation upon which a unified Libyan state can emerge.** Critics may argue that Libya's divisions are too entrenched, its political class too fragmented, and its regional dynamics too complex to justify renewed American focus. Yet history suggests that prolonged strategic neglect often proves more costly than disciplined engagement. The longer fragmentation persists, the more entrenched external influence becomes and the harder eventual stabilization will be. The United States retains significant diplomatic credibility and alliance networks in the Mediterranean. It has relationships with European capitals, dialogue with regional actors, and experience in security-sector reform. What has been lacking is not capacity, but sustained prioritization. Libya will not be stabilized by rhetoric alone. Nor will it be stabilized by attempting to bypass those who command forces and territory. **Durable peace requires the integration of security structures into a national framework — one that reflects Libya's sovereignty and is supported, rather than shaped, by external partners.** The alternative is continued drift: periodic ceasefires, stalled elections, fragmented institutions, and opportunistic interference by outside powers. That path leads not to resolution, but to normalization of instability. The Mediterranean has long been a central arena of strategic competition. It remains so today. **The United States must decide whether it intends to help shape Libya's trajectory toward unified statehood, or whether it will remain a**

**distant observer as others define the outcome.** Strategic leadership does not demand perfection. It demands engagement guided by realism, alliances, and long-term national interest. Libya's future is ultimately for Libyans to determine. But **whether that future unfolds within a stable sovereign framework — or within a fractured landscape vulnerable to external manipulation — will depend in no small part on whether the United States chooses to reassert steady, disciplined leadership in the Mediterranean.**

## **US-Egypt Partnerships for Regional Stability**

North Africa: Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea

Middle East: Gaza, Israel

US-Egypt partnerships can be built through economic, diplomatic, and military engagement in a variety of areas affirmative teams can explore. These areas range from promoting stability between neighboring countries like Libya and Sudan who face internal stability that may escalate if radical militias sow further tensions or supporting human rights in the region.

The Egypt-Gaza Rafah Border Crossing serves as the sole channel for humanitarian aid to enter Gaza which gives Egypt significant leverage regarding Israel's occupation. In fact, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty is currently interested in increased US engagement over this issue. Affirmative teams interested in Gaza stability can call for a US-Egypt push for humanitarian aid and regional stability. These affirmatives can have advantages about territorial integrity, regional stability, and human rights. Negative teams can read disadvantages about Israeli backlash and politics disadvantages because the Gaza Strip is a highly contentious region in US politics.

### **US-Egypt cooperation key**

**The Voice of Africa**, 1-26-2026, "Egypt and the US: Inside Cairo's Diplomatic Push for Stability Across the Region,"

([https://thevoiceofafrica.com/2026/01/26/egypt-and-the-us-inside-cairos-diplomatic-push-for-stability-across-the-region/#google\\_vignette/](https://thevoiceofafrica.com/2026/01/26/egypt-and-the-us-inside-cairos-diplomatic-push-for-stability-across-the-region/#google_vignette/)) //;D

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty welcomed US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau for a series of discussions aimed at strengthening bilateral cooperation and aligning positions on Gaza, Sudan, the Horn of Africa, and regional security. **The meeting underscored Egypt's role as a central diplomatic actor in regional affairs, balancing humanitarian concerns, security interests, and long-term stability in one of the world's most complex political landscapes.** Gaza:

Reconstruction and Regional Stability On Gaza, Egypt reiterated its support for advancing the next phase of international peace efforts. **Cairo emphasized the urgency of: Deploying an international stabilization force Reopening the Rafah border crossing in both directions Ensuring Israeli withdrawal to allow reconstruction and sustained humanitarian aid** Egypt framed its position around two core priorities: protecting civilian lives and creating the conditions for long-term political resolution rather than temporary ceasefires. Sudan and the Horn of Africa **Sudan also featured prominently in the talks, with Egypt calling for: A humanitarian truce, The creation of safe corridors for civilians, A Sudanese-led political process preserving national unity and state institutions** On the Horn of Africa, Abdelatty warned that any international recognition of Somaliland would undermine Somalia's sovereignty and threaten stability in both the Red Sea and East Africa — a region increasingly critical to global trade and security. The Nile and Regional Power Balance **The Nile remained a strategic focal point. Egypt reaffirmed that the river is a matter of national survival and called for cooperative engagement with Nile Basin states over the disputed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).** Cairo continues to push for negotiated solutions that protect downstream water access while maintaining regional cooperation. Egypt's Diplomatic Positioning **The Cairo talks reflect Egypt's evolving role as a regional power broker — not merely reacting to crises, but actively shaping diplomatic frameworks across Africa and the Middle East. By engaging Washington directly on multiple fronts, Egypt positions itself as both a security partner and a diplomatic stabilizer at a time when global alliances are increasingly fluid. Rather than symbolic meetings, these discussions represent realignment around influence, infrastructure, humanitarian leadership, and long-term regional order.**

## **Solvency advocate for US-Egypt diplomatic engagement and its impact on Israel and Gaza**

Akshara Santoshkumar, 8-30-2024, "The U.S. Must Rethink Its Aid Strategy with Egypt — Columbia Political Review", Columbia Political Review, <https://www.cpreview.org/articles/2024/8/the-us-must-rethink-its-aid-strategy-with-egypt//;D>

**While Egypt gains the alliance and financial support from Western powers to aid in war recuperation efforts, more resources should be made to encourage structural reforms within Egypt rather than allocating funding for military purposes.** Egypt's autocratic governance under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and the resulting dissatisfaction among Egyptians necessitate foreign assistance beyond financial means. **Through humanitarian engagement with Egypt, the U.S. can promote political stability given President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's autocratic governance style.** Beyond this, Egypt is part of an essential strategy for the political and economic stability of the greater Middle East. **Western powers, particularly the**

**United States, have a responsibility to push for smarter governance and adherence to human rights commitments in Egypt to ensure political stability within Egypt and the greater Middle East for years to come. The United States should substantively engage with Egypt to both alleviate the region's direct impact from the war in Gaza and further its security interests in maintaining a regional foothold.** Throughout the war, Egypt's economic conditions have rapidly declined, further exacerbated by political divisions between the Sisi administration and Egyptian citizens. Sharing a border with the contentious Gaza Strip through the Rafah Border Crossing, Egypt's geographical proximity directly places them in the center of the war's immediate impact. Due to the conflict, **the crossing has grown in significance, serving as the sole gateway for humanitarian aid and evacuees from Gaza into Egypt.** While the Egyptian government previously controlled the crossing, the Israeli government seized control of the crossing on May 7 as an escalation of Israel's invasion of the city of Rafah. Israel's invasion of the border crossing bears major repercussions on Egypt, in turn blocking the full extent of aid into Gaza and undermining Egypt's territorial integrity.

## Egypt and Ethiopia Tensions

Egypt also has significant concerns about the development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile River, which it views as a potentially existential threat. It has taken steps to reduce its reliance on Nile waters, through developing desalination plants and alternative sources, but tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia remain high. Ethiopia also views the GERD as essential to its national future and geopolitical standing, while rejecting Egypt's claim to supremacy over Nile water as a relict of the colonial era (Morsy and Girmay 2025).

## Counter Terrorism

Counter terrorism refers to actions to combat the spread of and impact of terrorism. In North Africa, counter terrorism will be primarily focused on groups like ISIS and the Islamic State that are taking advantage of socioeconomic disparities and internal divides to gain traction in Libya and Egypt. Affirmatives focused on counter terrorism can have advantages about terrorism threats, democracy promotion, and US influence (US Senate Foreign Relations Committee 2026). The Trump Administration is taking steps to target terrorism in North Africa, but there is much work still to be done, especially as the ongoing conflict in Sudan generates trained militia and other potential dangerous actors. Egypt also remains a site for potential anti-American terror, or at least hosts organizations that have been designated as such by the Trump administration. There

are concerns about official US policy regarding counter terrorism in North Africa as being driven by alignment with Israeli interests (Harb 2026). The State Department maintains an ongoing travel advisory, rating terror risks in Egypt as high (US Department of State 2025).

Libya has a long history of supporting terror organizations, with Libya held responsible for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland in 1988, killing 270 people. Gaddafi denied direct responsibility, but accepted that agents of his government organized the attack, paying compensation of \$2.7 billion to the families in 2003 (BBC 2013). There are concerns that the ongoing instability in the country is potentially a source for producing and training a new generation of terrorists (Fengler 2025).

Sudan was removed from the State Department state-sponsored terrorism list in 2020 (BBC News 2020), but the ongoing civil war has opened a plethora of opportunities for terror attacks on civilians, foreigners, infrastructure, and essentially anything else of value. While the damage wrought to Sudan is extreme, there are also risks of Sudanese terrorist violence spiralling into actions in other countries as well, risking the creation of escalating cycles of violence (Hudson 2025). There are direct calls for the US to engage in Sudan, or work with partners like Egypt. The United Arab Emirates is accused of sponsoring much of violence in Sudan through the provision of arms and other material.

Many of these affirmatives will be able to discuss the ability of the US or US partners to engage with regional terrorism, and claim advantages from both reducing regional terror attacks and preventing an escalation of terror attacks beyond the direct region. Negative ground will come from agent counterplans and disadvantages linked to a backlash against US engagement.

## **Energy and Resource Development and Extraction**

### **Renewable Energy**

North Africa is significant to the renewable energy transition because these regions possess many of the rare earth minerals needed for green technology. Affirmatives focused on economically supporting North African renewable development can discuss advantages such as climate change and economic diversity. This can be done with increasing US investment into renewable energy industries like biofuels. North Africa possesses the largest energy market in Africa, and Libya and Egypt are both considered strong candidates for wind and solar development (Khaleel et al 2026).

Affirmatives would be arguing in favor of renewable development as addressing climate change, driving economic development, and providing resiliency against energy instability and fluctuations in global fossil fuel markets, which can be particularly onerous for developing countries. Negative ground would be similar to many of the possible affirmatives here, regarding the role of the US in the region and potential backlash, linking to multiple kritiks including capitalism, and open to agent counterplans.

### **Potential cooperation affirmatives**

Intissar **Fakir**, Senior Fellow, 3-24-2025, "Sovereignty First: Reshaping International Cooperation." Middle East Institute.

<https://mei.edu/publication/sovereignty-first-reshaping-international-cooperation-north-af-rica/>

Given these changes, North African countries now favor limited deals with specific advantages over open-ended partnerships. Past experiences with conditional aid and broad political agreements that failed to deliver tangible results have made North African governments more pragmatic. Rather than long-term commitments tied to required reforms, they now seek specific result-oriented agreements — whether on energy, infrastructure, or trade. If the US and EU are willing to adjust how they work with the region, several areas will remain promising for future cooperation. The US, EU, and North Africa share interests in reliable energy — whether that includes natural gas or solar and wind power — as well as minerals for electric vehicle (EV) batteries and manufacturing capabilities. These overlapping needs provide a clear basis for project-based cooperation. Cross-border infrastructure within and to North Africa presents another opportunity. Projects connecting the region through transportation corridors, energy networks, or water management systems are attractive. They facilitate access and movement for all. These are just some examples of practical mutual interests that could provide a solid foundation for joint activities in the coming years. As countries focus more on transactional benefits, they can also be clearer about what they truly need from each other. Cooperation in these specific domains may be more durable when each country can clearly see the gains.

### **Libyan Fossil Fuels**

Libya has a vast reserve of oil and potentially natural gas which can support its economy if developed. Affirmatives discussing Libyan oil can have advantages about the fuel economy or competition with China who is also seeking influence over Libyan oil through actions like the Belt and Road Initiative. They can spark engagement over this area with economic engagement.

Libya is economically chaotic and struggling, due to the ongoing instability. Its economic future largely depends on the success of developing its energy resources, which are primarily oil and natural gas - fossil fuels. Libya's position on the Mediterranean coast offers easy access to Europe and its oil is considered to be "light, sweet crude," the easiest kind to process for use. Libya's energy infrastructure is in poor shape following

years of unrest and strategic shutdowns of fossil fuel production in the service of political and regional tensions. There are claims that stability in the country is more likely to occur with investment in its resources and the increases in foreign trade and revenue as well as decreasing the need to import foreign energy supplies. (The Geopolitical Desk 2026 and Mills 2025).

Affirmatives along these lines will be advocating for economic development and resource use as the key to political stability and eventual reunification and for dealing with mass migration through Libya. It also links to climate and environment disadvantages, and potential EU or other actor counterplans

### **Sudan & South Sudan tensions over oil reserves and pipelines**

While this proposal calls for engagement with Sudan, not South Sudan, it is impossible to fully decouple the two especially regarding tensions over oil. Prior to the 2023 war, Sudan had a thriving oil industry that has largely collapsed due to strikes and sabotage to pipelines. Port Sudan has called for the shutdown of oil companies in Heglig in the face of RSF threats which has disrupted the exporting of South Sudan's oil that is a lifeline for the South Sudanese economy. This dependence is heightening tensions over oil and Heglig.

The Obama Administration attempted to increase engagement with Sudan diplomatically over this issue prior to the 2023 war however the briefness of said engagement limited its effectiveness. This in combination with the civil war's instability makes engagement over these oil reserves a prime issue for affirmative teams to tackle. There have been attempts at resolving these tensions between Sudan and South Sudan without external intervention but those have largely collapsed (Alabi 2025).

Affirmatives in this area can affirm the United States as a diplomatic mediator over these reserves or call for development of oil reserves. That can give affirmatives access to advantages about regional Sudanese stability and reinvigorating Sudan's oil industry. Negative teams can respond to these affirmatives by discussing the effects of US engagement on Sudan's relations to UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

### **Human Rights**

Human rights concerns persist in all three countries proposed here. Ongoing violations are well-documented in all three countries, with Sudan in particular being the site of daily aggressions. The US Congress has repeatedly tried to tie human rights improvement to the annual US aid contribution to Egypt, but that linkage is generally

waived by the White House. Amnesty International, for example, documents a laundry list of ongoing human and civil rights issues in Sudan, including violations of international law, arms trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence, refugee and migrant rights, and others (Amnesty International 2025).

Affirmative teams can discuss different mechanisms for human rights promotion like sanctions or humanitarian aid. This can include advantages about human rights, democracy, or internal stability. Negative teams can question the efficacy of increased US engagement in the long run given historical waiving of human rights mandates. There are also links to imperialism kritiks and kritiks of the Western conception of human rights, as overly prioritizing the individual over group or community-level considerations.

### **Democracy/Governance Promotion**

Egypt, Libya, and Sudan all have issues regarding their governments and a failure to uphold democratic ideals. These issues include fractured governments and violent suppression of dissent. Specifically, the Egyptian army ousted Muslim Brotherhood president Mohammed Morsi—Egypt's first democratically elected president—to establish a new oppressive military government that has violently suppressed freedoms and pro-democracy movements. Sudan attempted to have a civilian-led democratic transition that was suppressed by the UAE sponsored RSF. This history of failed democracies in all three countries makes this a core area of the topic (Horner 2025).

Affirmatives in this area can promote diplomatic engagement to spread democratic ideals or economic aid to stabilize the region. Negative teams can question the efficacy of the United States' ability to effectively promote democracy especially in the midst of the Trump Administration or read disadvantages about potential backlash from the United Arab Emirates. There are also links to kritiks of the Western conception of democracy historically being a smokescreen for imperialist expansion.

### **Solvency advocate for US engagement promoting democracy**

Sarah Yerkes and Thomas Hill, 2-23-2021, "A New Strategy for U.S. Engagement in North Africa: A Report of the North Africa Working Group", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

<https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2021/02/a-new-strategy-for-us-engagement-in-north-africa-a-report-of-the-north-africa-working-group>

The Biden administration should consider new ways to support agents of change in the region, in particular those actors advocating for the rule of law, transparency and

accountability, and institutional effectiveness. In some instances, **US support may entail increasing foreign assistance program budgets, but that alone is unlikely to produce the fundamental reforms the region requires.** Instead, the Biden administration should increase engagement in multilateral organizations and initiatives that focus on political reform, especially initiatives led by regional actors. Furthermore, the United States should be explicit that the demands of many of the region's people are in line with US interests. Promoting a greater voice for the people and more government accountability and greater transparency will aid stability in the region and help counter violent extremism. It is in the direct interests of the United States to rhetorically and diplomatically support calls for reform. Here in particular, modest investments of time and energy can have substantial payoffs in supporting those pushing for change.

Unfortunately, many multilateral initiatives and organizations have been under-resourced and politically marginalized. **The United States can enhance the stature and effectiveness of these initiatives and organizations with rhetorical support, engagement, and technical assistance.** Pushing these initiatives and organizations to fulfill their mandate and accede to the expectations envisioned during their establishment lessens the financial burden on the American taxpayer. In addition, creating local ownership over local problems increases the likelihood that interventions and programs will be sustainable and locally supported.

#### Why Democracy Matters to the United States

Improving governance in North Africa should be a priority of the Biden administration. While the Biden administration must devote significant attention to repairing democracy at home and restoring faith in our own institutions, this should not come at the cost of simultaneously advocating for human rights and increased freedoms abroad. There is a clear connection between poor governance and instability, which can undermine US national security interests. The region today is at a breaking point, and without serious and sustained efforts to improve governance, the region is likely to further devolve into instability. However, the issue of governance is often approached as a secondary concern, with few diplomatic or financial resources devoted to promoting good governance. Many critics of US foreign assistance funding have adopted the straw man argument that any support for good governance is a slippery slope leading to direct intervention, military occupation, and state-building. This line of argument is often used to justify a laissez-faire foreign policy strategy that favors autocrats in the name of stability and a perception of democracy as a uniquely American and Western form of governance.

The 2011 uprisings across the MENA region came about in large part because of abusive, corrupt, and unaccountable governance and continued erosion of the social contract. Citizens were willing to accept some level of government inefficiency and corruption as long as basic needs and services were provided. When governments were unable to deliver on their end of this social contract, a failure manifested in rising rates of unemployment, low economic growth, and expanding, rampant corruption, public frustration ensued. Today, ten years after the 2011 uprisings, not only are regular protests continuing throughout the more stable countries of Tunisia and Morocco but a massive grassroots uprising is under way in Algeria (and in other Arab states, such as Lebanon and Iraq). These actions show that the people of this region will not stay quiet while their governments fail to deliver.

The social and economic failings of North African governments have also bred a high level of mistrust with public institutions, which are benignly dysfunctional at best and malevolently corrupt at worst. This is particularly acute at the local level, where states have failed to devolve power adequately to ensure that local governments are empowered and resourced enough to meet local needs. This lack of progress in economic reform or providing a voice for citizens makes North African states vulnerable to social unrest.

In addition, the hopelessness and despair of those who suffer from corrupt and ineffective regimes provides a fertile context for terrorist recruiters. When people are unable to feed themselves or their families or remain without jobs for years on end, they become easy targets for recruitment by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and other terrorist groups and networks that are able to convince vulnerable people they will have a better life as fighters.<sup>4</sup> As we discuss in section IV, terrorism-promoting groups based in North Africa represent a direct threat to Americans and American interests.

#### State of Democracy in the Region

There is no question that good governance is a major challenge in North Africa. However, it is also an area where US support and engagement have the potential to play a positive role. While the subregion is home to the only “free” country (Tunisia) in the Arab world, according to Freedom House, the remainder of North Africa performs poorly on all indicators of governance. For example, according to the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators, the countries in North Africa range from the 45th percentile (Tunisia) to the second percentile (Libya) when it comes to voice and accountability. While each individual country has its own challenges, across the region some **common trends are evident, such as erosion of freedom of the press and of expression (in 2018 alone, thirty journalists in the region were imprisoned,**

twenty-five of them in Egypt)—which has worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic, with increased repression in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt—and a shrinking space for civil society and other forms of grassroots activism. These are issues that the US government has experience helping to mitigate and where effective and committed US leadership could make a real difference in the lives of people across the region.

## **North African Migration**

Migration is a critical issue for North Africa with migrants leaving North Africa due to the effects of internal instability and climate change or migrants passing through the region. Currently, migrants are facing critical issues regarding mass human rights abuses, difficulty going through the migration process, or migrants struggling to find economic opportunities. The International Organization for Migration notes that nearly one million irregular migrants are seeking refuge in Europe due to Libya's instability. These migrants are susceptible to human trafficking, sexual and non-sexual violence in migrant detention centers, European xenophobia, and slavery,

US engagement can involve facilitating discussions on mitigating brain drain or providing humanitarian assistance to migrants suffering from human rights abuses. These affirmatives can have advantages about human rights, the economy, and regional stability. Negative teams can question whether or not affirmatives solve for the root cause of current migration or read disadvantages about Russian backlash as Russia has leveraged the current migration issue in Libya to gain influence in the region.

## **Solvency advocate for US engagement regarding North African migration**

Sarah Yerkes and Thomas Hill, 2-23-2021, "A New Strategy for U.S. Engagement in North Africa: A Report of the North Africa Working Group", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

<https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2021/02/a-new-strategy-for-us-engagement-in-north-africa-a-report-of-the-north-africa-working-group> //;D

Three Reasons the United States Should Care about Migration

**The issue of migration should resonate with US policymakers for three reasons:**

**humanitarian concerns, stability, and assisting our allies.** First, both migration through and migration from North Africa is becoming a growing humanitarian issue. While there are far larger refugee crises with greater humanitarian costs (such as the ongoing Syrian civil war), the North African migration issue is associated with severe human rights abuses and has contributed to the deaths of migrants. As migrants become trapped in North Africa and unable to get to Europe, they are more likely to take

drastic measures, such as engaging in deadly sea voyages or paying human traffickers, which delivers them into slavery at the hands of those who seek to exploit their desperation. In early 2018 the UN and the European Union raised alarm over the horrific conditions for migrants transiting in Libya, calling attention to the practice of slavery that persists there.<sup>115</sup>

**Second, the influx of people into North Africa both reflects the paucity of good governance in sub-Saharan Africa and has the potential to create further instability as local residents and migrants fight over scarce resources. Nearly all countries in the region suffer from economic malaise, with rising inflation, declining purchasing power, and official figures putting unemployment** at 15.5 percent in Tunisia (a figure that is expected to rise to 20 percent because of the COVID-19 pandemic), 11.1 percent in Algeria, 9.8 percent in Morocco, and 11.4 percent in Egypt.<sup>116</sup> People across the region, particularly youth, feel excluded from the political process and, in the cases of Egypt and Algeria, have taken to the streets in recent months to demand their voices be heard. Furthermore, structural inequality has left certain regions marginalized, such as Morocco's Rif, which experienced significant popular unrest in 2016, or the interior and the south of Tunisia, which have seen recurring bouts of protests that have caused direct economic harm to the state, creating frustration and anger. Additionally, **regular migration, particularly by highly skilled workers, leaves North African states with a dearth of qualified professionals, leading to a further decrease in the quality of services.** For example, since the revolution, more than 94,000 highly skilled Tunisians have left the country.<sup>117</sup>

Finally, while the migration issue has a more direct impact on Europe than on the United States, **it is imperative that the US government continue to work closely with our European friends and allies both to protect the human rights of asylum seekers and refugees and to ensure that North African and European governments have the resources they need to support refugees and asylum seekers and provide adequate border security to decrease irregular migration.** The United States and Europe must also invest in good governance and economic progress throughout the African continent to improve the conditions for Africans in their home countries and prevent the need for migration in the first place. Such investment should also be directed toward mitigating the effects of climate change.

### Policy Recommendations

While the challenges of managing migration will continue to be a top priority for European governments, the United States can play an important supporting role, addressing both the causes and consequences of migration. First, the United States should augment European efforts to provide financial support for North African

countries, particularly Morocco and Tunisia, by providing humanitarian assistance to existing migrant populations within their borders. This assistance should include regularizing some migrants, as Morocco has begun doing, and providing access to education, health care, and employment for both regular and irregular migrants. One way to address the underlying economic causes of migration is to work toward “integrating skilled labor from sub-Saharan Africa to address the Maghreb’s own brain drain.”<sup>118</sup>

Second, the United States should engage both the US private sector and local private sectors in MENA region countries to provide employment, job training and financial assistance to migrant populations. Several large US companies were founded by migrants, who could serve as role models and help with building capacity of local migrant populations in the region.

Third, the United States can work with the UN, as well as with local human rights and humanitarian groups, to communicate the perils of the journey across the Mediterranean, particularly for unaccompanied minors.

Fourth, the United States can assist North Africa and Sahel governments in working together to collaboratively address the irregular migration coming from sub-Saharan Africa. While Africans will need to lead on addressing the push factors that send migrants north of the continent, the United States and Europe can help facilitate conversations among relevant stakeholders.

Finally, the United States should work to ensure that migration policy programming is integrated into ongoing efforts at security sector reform and criminal justice reform to ensure that migrants are afforded appropriate protections and are not subjected to human rights abuses at the hands of police and military officials.

## **Regional Agriculture**

North Africa’s current agricultural output is rapidly growing but the impact of said output on food security is limited when there is limited distribution of food resources throughout nations. Many staple foods like wheat, dates, grapes, legumes, sheep, olives, and barley are grown in this region. In fact, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) found that 8.2 million Sudanese people are struggling with food security and livelihood sector needs due to regional instability and climate change. When food is produced, it is not always received by those in need due to limited food transport infrastructures, making foods perish before they are consumed.

US engagement can involve subsidizing Libya's fertilizer production, engagement with food transport to ensure that agricultural production translates into economic gains, or investment into agricultural infrastructure. These affirmatives can have advantages about food security and mitigating civil unrest. Negative teams can read advantage counterplans about different ways to support agriculture and disadvantages about regional economies. They can also read kritiks about food colonialism.

### **Water Desalination (likely Egypt-focused)**

Safe, drinkable water is a critical issue for Egypt, not just for personal consumption, but also for agriculture and resource conflicts. Issues of water scarcity are currently worsened by climate change, making this an inherent issue. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty has even referred to the Nile River as an "existential" issue for Egypt. Limited water desalination infrastructure and climate change induced droughts are also exacerbating water security issues in Sudan.

Affirmatives interested in supporting water desalination can engage by developing desalination plants or integrating more efficient water management practices like harvesting rainwater. These affirmatives can have advantages about water security and agriculture. Negative teams can read disadvantages about environmental damage and SRF backlash.

### **Inherency card for US engagement regarding North African water resources**

The Horn Bulletin, November-December 2024, "The West's Relative Absence in the Sudan Conflict ", The Horn Institute,

<https://horninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/HORN-Bulletin-Vol-VII-%E2%80%A2-Iss-VI-%E2%80%A2-November-December-2024.pdf> //;D

**The absence of Western engagement and the lucrative geostrategic position of Sudan has attracted other regional actors who quickly filled the gap left by Western powers.** Middle Eastern actors, culturally and religiously close to Sudan, have taken on significant roles in the conflict by supporting either the RSF or the SAF. One of the most important influencers in this regard is Egypt. Egypt's primary geopolitical interest in Sudan revolves around the Nile River, which supplies over 90% of Egypt's fresh water. The control and management of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile, which flows through Sudan, is critical to Egypt's water security (Hassan, 2007). Sudan's role as a middle riparian country in this conflict is key to Egypt's Nile strategy. Historically, Egypt has sought to maintain a stable government in Sudan that aligns with its critical water interests, particularly in opposition to Ethiopian control over Nile waters. Freshwater supplies are critical infrastructure for Egypt and are crucial for maintaining and scaling up the country's agriculture.

Therefore, ensuring continued access to Nile water is a strategic priority for Egypt. Consequently, Egypt has provided military and diplomatic support to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to ensure Sudan's stability and safeguard its own interests (Cafiero, 2023). Egypt views a stable SAF government as a buffer against both domestic instability and Ethiopia's ambitions (Swain u. a., 2009). This support includes training SAF personnel and potentially offering logistical support during the current conflict.

## **Public Health**

Public health issues in North Africa include poverty, HIV, AIDs, and hunger which are currently exacerbated by the Trump Administration's major cuts to USAID. The civil war in Sudan has a direct negative impact on public health, especially children, because conflict limits access to medical supplies, food, and hospitals. It also puts displaced populations at risk of injury or death from warfare with 21 million in need of health assistance according to the IPC Alert. In fact, the WHO has verified 217 attacks on Sudan's health care during the conflict, making this a critical issue.

Affirmatives about public health can invest in public health infrastructure or sending medical supplies to support health, economic security, and soft power. Negative teams can read counterplans that attempt to solve for alternative factors to public health like water and food security.

([https://sudan.un.org/en/313911-after-three-years-conflict-sudan-faces-deeper-health-crisis /](https://sudan.un.org/en/313911-after-three-years-conflict-sudan-faces-deeper-health-crisis/))

## **List of Probable Negative Strategies**

### **Disadvantages**

### **Backlash to increased US presence/influence/engagement**

#### **China and Russia**

In the face of limited US engagement with North Africa, Russia and China have been increasing their influence in these countries as of late. Negative teams can discuss how reinvigorating US engagement with North Africa can disrupt relations with Russia and China who have competing interests in the region, sparking potential tensions. Novices can start off with simple versions of this argument with generic links of "the affirmative works in the same country China cares about" to more nuanced and affirmative specific

arguments like “China is specifically interested in Egyptian wind infrastructure in the midsts of disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz because of its logistical efficiency - the affirmative starts a competing wind infrastructure project with the Egyptian government that requires China to backlash against the United States because they need to in order to maintain energy resilience.”

## **Uniqueness and Link card for China DA against affs about Egyptian cooperation over energy, oil, and/or climate change**

Kaitlyn Hashem, 3-27-2026, "How Iran War Is Reshaping China's Geo-Economic Cooperation with North Africa • Stimson Center", Stimson Center,

<https://www.stimson.org/2026/how-iran-war-is-reshaping-chinas-geo-economic-cooperation-with-north-africa/> //;D

As the world's largest crude-oil importer, China has confronted the challenges of its partial energy dependence on the Gulf region, where roughly 40–50% of its seaborne imports traditionally transit the Strait of Hormuz. The effective closure of this chokepoint since late February 2026 has not only triggered sharp price spikes but also exposed the risks posed by concentrated supply chains amid heightened geopolitical volatility. In response, Beijing has accelerated a dual-track strategy of multi-source procurement and accelerated green transformation, deliberately broadening its oil and gas import footprint while fast-tracking the development of new-energy technologies. Within this recalibration, North Africa — geographically proximate, politically stable in key partners, and richly endowed with both hydrocarbons and renewable potential — has emerged as a pivotal arena for deepened geo-economic cooperation. This shift is not a sudden pivot but a pragmatic intensification of existing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) linkages. North African nations offer China a compelling combination of reliable access routes that largely bypass Hormuz risks and opportunities to co-develop low-carbon supply chains that serve both immediate energy security needs and longer-term decarbonization goals. The result is a subtle but measurable strengthening of geo-economic ties that appears to position the Maghreb and Egypt as a strategic “second-tier” buffer. Far from being a peripheral theater, North Africa is becoming a new fulcrum for China's energy resilience.

Algeria: A Modest but Timely Channel for China's Energy Import Diversification Amid Geopolitical Pressures Algeria is likely to stand out as an immediate beneficiary of China's quest for diversified crude supplies amid the Hormuz crisis. The country's political stability, long-standing diplomatic warmth with Beijing, and status as an OPEC member with expansion capacity make it a natural partner. This escalating geopolitical pressure has created an opportunity to deepen Sino-Algerian energy relations, transforming the agreements reached in 2025 into a more substantial partnership. The framework agreement for oil and gas exploration and development, signed in July 2025 between Sonatrach, the Algerian national oil company, and Sinopec, aims to secure alternative supplies, and its momentum is further strengthened as the project progresses and investment commitments increase. Recent developments indicate that SINOPEC Engineering (Group) Co., Ltd. secured new contracts worth RMB 101.248 billion in 2025 — a modest year-on-year increase of 0.6% — while its order backlog surged 18.1% to RMB 203.850 billion. Against the backdrop of tight global oil and gas supplies, Algeria intends to increase its oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports while supporting the expansion of its upstream operations. Deepening energy cooperation between China and Algeria would not only help mitigate the direct risks posed by a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz but also align with China's long-term strategy to build a resilient, diversified energy network within the Belt and Road Initiative framework through technology transfer and joint ventures. Morocco: Emerging as China's Key Green Hydrogen Hub While Algeria could offer a modest supplementary option for addressing some of China's short-term hydrocarbon requirements, Morocco exemplifies the longer-term green transformation dimension of Beijing's strategy. The impact of the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates that China's priority in developing green hydrogen energy, long-term energy storage, and smart grids in its 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) is even more important. Morocco's world-leading solar resources, ambitious renewable targets, and supportive policy framework make it an ideal partner for scaling these technologies. Morocco has

served as China's green-energy bridgehead in Africa since at least 2025 when billions of dollars in projects covering green aluminum, green hydrogen, solar power, and wind were signed. Chinese firms — State Grid, SPIC, Shanghai Electric, and others — have taken leading roles. The conflict is likely to accelerate implementation. Green-hydrogen and electric-vehicle battery initiatives in Morocco have attracted enormous Chinese financing and technical support, moving beyond equipment exports toward full value-chain integration. Egypt: Building a Safe Alternative Route and Full-Chain Integration **Egypt completes the triangle of China's North African engagement, offering a balanced blend of logistical security and industrial scale. Viewed by Beijing as a "safe alternative route" that largely sidesteps Hormuz vulnerabilities, Egypt has seen accelerated cooperation in grid interconnection and green-hydrogen pilot projects. The relationship is evolving from simple equipment exports toward comprehensive industry-chain development.** A landmark early-2026 agreement — valued at \$18 billion and involving Norwegian partners alongside Chinese firms — underscores the potential for such partnerships. The deal encompasses Sungrow's photovoltaic expansion, multiple wind farm projects, and local manufacturing bases. Chinese enterprises are leading the upgrade of the iconic Benban solar park while advancing a number of wind initiatives. **This full-chain approach not only mitigates immediate energy-security risks for China but also positions Egypt as a manufacturing and logistics node within Beijing's broader African strategy.** Conclusion: North Africa as China's New Energy Fulcrum The US-Israeli war with Iran has not merely disrupted global oil flows; it has prompted a quiet but profound geo-economic reorientation in China's relations with North Africa. **By exposing the fragility of Gulf dependence, the conflict has propelled Beijing toward a more resilient, diversified, and greener energy posture.** Algeria has the potential to provide more near-term hydrocarbon buffering, Morocco anchors the green-hydrogen frontier, and Egypt supplies scalable renewable infrastructure and logistical depth. **Together, these partnerships are transforming North Africa into a new fulcrum for China's energy security —** one that blends traditional oil diplomacy with forward-looking clean-technology collaboration. **In an era of persistent geopolitical uncertainty, this subtle shift may prove one of the conflict's enduring implications. For China, it represents a pragmatic hedge that safeguards growth while advancing decarbonization. For North African states, this brings valuable investment and advanced technology at a time when they are actively seeking to diversify their economic partnerships and accelerate broader economic development.**

### **Internal link to Russia and China competition over Africa**

John J. Chin, Spring 2024, "Rethinking U.S. Africa Policy Amid Changing Geopolitical Realities", Texas National Security Review,

<https://tnsr.org/2024/05/rethinking-u-s-africa-policy-amid-changing-geopolitical-realities/>

**Africa has become a major site of great-power competition. U.S. efforts to promote democracy and enhance security in Africa are complicated by rising regional great-power competition with China and Russia.<sup>49</sup> This global competition pits liberal against authoritarian states with differing visions of international order.<sup>50</sup>** After the Cold War, linkage to and leverage of the democratic West were associated with greater advances for democracy, whereas weak Western leverage opened the door to "competitive authoritarianism" and democratic backsliding across the developing world.<sup>51</sup> Now **Africa's new juntas and would-be strongmen are seeking to rely on autocratic major power patrons for regime security. Russia and China,**

in turn, have an interest in making the world and region “safe for autocracy.”<sup>52</sup> **Russia and China have cultivated friends and influence on the continent as part of a broader geopolitical struggle with the United States over power and influence in the developing world.<sup>53</sup> Indeed, Africa may be a testing ground for the resilience of the liberal international order.** For example, Gen. Laura Richardson, the commander of U.S. Southern

Command, believes that rising competition with Russia and China in Africa may be a harbinger of things to come in the Western Hemisphere in the next five to seven years.<sup>54</sup> **The influence of powerful Western states is now**

**contested or in decline across much of Africa.** During the Cold War, France and the United Kingdom had predominant economic and military influence in their former colonies on the continent. However, China’s exploding economic and diplomatic engagement in Africa in recent decades has enabled its influence on the continent to grow rapidly, in many cases now exceeding that of the former European colonial powers or the United States.<sup>55</sup> For example, China surpassed the United States as Africa’s largest trade partner in 2008. China’s \$300 billion in trade with Africa in 2023 was four times the U.S.-Africa trade.

**Similarly, French and U.S. outward investment in Africa dwarfed China’s until 2017, but since then China has become the largest source of investment on the African continent.<sup>56</sup> As a result, China has more leverage to potentially subvert democracy or prop up autocrats in Africa.<sup>57</sup>** The influence of France — America’s closest external

partner on the continent in recent decades — in Francophone Africa is now in freefall. France’s condemnation of coups led to diplomatic fallout with the new juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. These three countries created the Alliance of Sahel States, a mutual defense pact, in September 2023.<sup>58</sup> In August 2022, the last of several thousand French troops withdrew from Mali, marking the end of Operation Barkhane, a decade-long counter-insurgency campaign.<sup>59</sup> In February 2023, France withdrew its troops from Burkina Faso.<sup>60</sup> On Sept. 27, 2023, two months after Niger’s coup, France agreed to withdraw its ambassador and 1,500 troops.<sup>61</sup> France has been forced to shift the base of its counter-insurgency operations in Africa to Chad.<sup>62</sup> In December 2023, Mali and Niger revoked tax cooperation treaties with France.<sup>63</sup> In April, Burkina Faso expelled French diplomats.<sup>64</sup>

**Russia has capitalized on anti-French sentiment and French withdrawals in the Sahel.<sup>65</sup> The new Sahel alliance — Africa’s new “holy alliance” — is poised to become “a vehicle for Russian influence in the heart of Africa.”<sup>66</sup> Russia’s Africa policy has emphasized military engagement, drawing from its historical role as one of the largest arms suppliers to Africa. Since 2018, Russia has also deployed private military contractors to 31 African countries.<sup>67</sup> The most prominent of these is the Wagner**

**Group**, which moved into the Central African Republic in 2018 and expanded its presence across Africa in subsequent years.<sup>68</sup> In return for a “regime survival package,” the Wagner Group — recently rebranded the Africa Corps or Expeditionary Corps — is seeking access to strategically important natural resources such as timber, gold, uranium, and lithium.<sup>69</sup> In May 2023, only months after expelling French troops, Burkina Faso’s military leaders hailed Russia as a strategic ally.<sup>70</sup> Last December, Russia re-opened its embassy in Burkina Faso, which was shuttered in 1992.<sup>71</sup> Moscow also struck a new military cooperation deal with Niger. In April 2024, 100 instructors from the Africa Corps arrived in Niger.<sup>72</sup> Africa Corps personnel reportedly hope to take over the U.S. base in Agadez, which U.S. troops must now vacate.<sup>73</sup> **Unlike Russia, China has focused on economic**

**engagement in Africa — like it has elsewhere — and funding infrastructure development through its Belt and Road Initiative. China’s investment and aid without attaching conditions such as political and economic reforms — unlike some powerful Western countries — have attracted many African leaders who have come to resent what is perceived as Western meddling in internal affairs.<sup>74</sup>**

Beijing may also have greater ambitions for military engagement and security cooperation on the continent.<sup>75</sup> China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017 and seeks another base in west Africa on the Atlantic coast.<sup>76</sup> China has deployed private security contractors in 15 African states since 2018.<sup>77</sup> **China has been ambivalent toward the coup trend**

**in Africa and has sought to reinforce its existing influence.<sup>78</sup> In** response to the 2017 coup that ousted Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, for example, Chinese President Xi Jinping backed Emmerson Mnangagwa, invited

him to Beijing for a state visit in April 2018, and increased investment in Zimbabwe.<sup>79</sup> **China also seeks to promote its norms and values through professional military education in Africa.**<sup>80</sup> **The rise of Russian and Chinese influence and decline of democracy in the region over the last decade are mutually reinforcing.**<sup>81</sup> The number of disinformation campaigns in the region quadrupled from 2022 to 2023, with foreign state sponsors led by Russia and China responsible for most. Russia alone has sponsored disinformation to undermine democracy in 19 African states, more often than not with the Wagner Group directly involved. For example, Russian networks “helped prime and promote” the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, whose new military juntas have in turn also become major sponsors of disinformation in west Africa.<sup>82</sup> China’s propaganda in Africa likewise perpetuates anti-U.S. and anti-democratic narratives.<sup>83</sup>

### **Egypt key to Russia geopolitical positioning**

Amr Yehia, 6-8-2026, Ahram Online, "Egypt key regional partner to Russia as SPIEF 2026 concludes with \$84 billion in deals",

<https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/570259.aspx> //;D

**Egypt featured prominently in discussions on regional economic cooperation during the forum.** Responding to a question from Ahram Online at the closing briefing, Kobyakov highlighted Egypt’s strategic position as a leading regional power and stressed the importance Moscow attaches to its relationship with Cairo. “Egypt occupies a central position in the Middle East, and our relations with Egypt are unique,” Kobyakov said, noting that Russians maintain strong interest in Egypt both as a tourism destination and as an important economic partner. His remarks came as Russia seeks to strengthen trade and investment links with countries beyond its traditional Western markets, placing increasing emphasis on partnerships with emerging economies and regional hubs. The forum’s central theme, “Pragmatic Dialogue: The Path to a Stable Future,” reflected what Russian officials described as a changing global economic landscape in which emerging economies are playing a larger role in shaping growth, investment and trade flows. Kobyakov argued that the world economy is increasingly shifting toward what he called the “global majority,” referring to developing and emerging economies that are gaining greater influence in international economic affairs. A major focus of discussions at SPIEF 2026 was the future of the global economy amid growing geopolitical tensions, economic fragmentation and the emergence of alternative centres of economic power. Despite continuing tensions between Russia and Western countries, Kobyakov said international interest in Russia remains significant and pointed to what he described as cautious optimism among some Western investors regarding a possible return to the Russian market. One of the forum’s most notable developments was the participation of an official United States delegation for the first time in a decade. Kobyakov credited US President Donald Trump with helping reopen channels of dialogue between Moscow and Washington after years of strained relations. “We

expect our American counterparts to fulfil the agreements already reached,” he said. Russian officials used the forum to reiterate Moscow’s readiness for international cooperation while emphasizing that the country remains prepared for a variety of geopolitical and economic scenarios. “Russia has never closed the door to dialogue, but we are carefully monitoring global trends and are prepared for different developments,” Kobyakov said. The scale of participation and the volume of agreements signed during SPIEF 2026 highlighted Russia’s continuing efforts to expand economic partnerships across the Global South and strengthen ties with countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. **For Egypt, the forum offered another indication of Cairo’s growing importance in Russian strategic thinking, both as a major regional actor and as a potential gateway for trade, investment and economic cooperation across North Africa and the broader Middle East.**

### **Uniqueness and link for Libya military affs**

Beau **Chapman**, Catherine **Word**, Sarah **Coffey**, Seth **O'Brien** and Kim **Nguyen**, 6-3-2026, “Libya: Russia Develops Air Base Infrastructure Likely to Secure Military Foothold in North Africa and Sahel,” The University of Texas at Austin, [https://www.tearline.mil/public\\_page/libya-russia-develops-air-base-infrastructure-likely-to-secure-military-foothold-in-sahel-region](https://www.tearline.mil/public_page/libya-russia-develops-air-base-infrastructure-likely-to-secure-military-foothold-in-sahel-region) //;D

**Kremlin-supported private military security companies (PMSC) first arrived in Libya around 2016, when a military consulting company, Russian Security Systems (RSB-Group), conducted de-mining operations in northeastern Libya, a region under control of the Libyan National Army (LNA).** [1] [2] In May 2018, a separate Russian PMSC known as the Wagner Group began to assist the LNA operations during the Libyan Civil War. [3] [4] By May of 2023, the Wagner Group established its presence at least four Libyan air bases. [5] **After the death of Wagner’s leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, the Kremlin announced that Wagner’s African networks would be replaced with the “Africa Corps,” which utilizes much of Wagner’s former personnel and equipment [6] [7] [8] and is under direct control of Russia’s Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU) and supervision of the Deputy Defense Minister. Africa Corps aims to consolidate Russia’s influence on the African continent through an official military presence in the region.** [10] **In Libya, Wagner personnel were gradually integrated into Africa Corps, and Russian military officials assumed a more prominent role in securing military bases and supporting eastern-based LNA forces.** [3] In April 2024, flights containing between 1,000 and 1,500 Africa Corps personnel arrived to support operations in southern Libya. [11] By August 2024, there were a reported 2,000 to 2,500 Africa Corps personnel deployed at various military sites in Libya. [12] **The collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024 further accelerated Russian investment in Libya, as they aimed to fill the tactical void left by Syria’s collapse.** [13] In May 2025, General Khaled Haftar (son of the LNA general commander General Khalifa Haftar), signed an agreement in Moscow with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov.

**Further formalizing Russian engagement with eastern Libyan forces, the two parties aimed to “develop the strategic partnership and expand the areas of military and security cooperation and coordination,” framing the agreement as a contribution to regional stability and mutual interests**

### **Uniqueness and link for Libya military affs**

Beau **Chapman**, Catherine **Word**, Sarah **Coffey**, Seth **O'Brien** and Kim **Nguyen**, 6-3-2026, “Libya: Russia Develops Air Base Infrastructure Likely to Secure Military Foothold in North Africa and Sahel,” The University of Texas at Austin, [https://www.tearline.mil/public\\_page/libya-russia-develops-air-base-infrastructure-likely-to-secure-military-foothold-in-sahel-region//;D](https://www.tearline.mil/public_page/libya-russia-develops-air-base-infrastructure-likely-to-secure-military-foothold-in-sahel-region//;D)

In addition to air base infrastructure expansion, Russia seeks to continue expanding its presence in Libya through access to the LNA-controlled Tobruk Naval Base and Tobruk Port. Because the Russians are experiencing delays in the development of a naval base in Port Sudan and their previous access to the Tartus naval facility in Syria remains uncertain, [26] the Tobruk Port is especially significant to the Kremlin as a warm water port in the Mediterranean. LNA’s General Khalifa Haftar and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov met in Benghazi five times between 2023 and 2024 to discuss cooperation on enhanced security and stability in Libya.

[12][39] Following the meetings, Russian naval vessels were reported unloading towed artillery, armored personnel carriers, and rocket launchers at Tobruk.[40] Equipment unloaded at this port is suspected to build Russia’s military presence in Libya and/or to supply other African countries, such as Sahelian nations Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso where coup leaders have aligned with Russia. [40]

In January 2026, the US-sanctioned Russian cargo vessel Mys Zhelaniya was spotted at Tobruk on satellite imagery, possibly delivering military equipment. [41][42] We have seen no additional signs of Russian activity at Tobruk Port on satellite imagery. Conclusion Since April 2024, six air bases with reported Africa Corps presence (Al-Khadim, Al-Jufra, Tamanhint, Matan al-Sarra, Al-Qardabiyah, and Brak al-Shati) experienced new construction and renovations of buildings, hangars, barracks, aprons, and runways. Imagery analysis of 21 additional Libyan airports found new construction at eight air bases, though we were unable to confirm Africa Corps activity at any of them, and many are working to repair damage from conflicts in prior years. A Russian foothold at Libyan air bases creates a launch point for shipments and operations in the North Africa and Sahel region, especially as Russian access to key bases in Syria are in question.[26] [43] Furthermore, the flow of Russian (and Russia-allied) military personnel, weapons, and equipment to Libyan air bases provides protection for Russia’s resource interests in Africa and a more permanent Russian military presence on NATO’s southern flank.

### **ISIS and the Islamic State**

Groups like ISIS and the Islamic State are engaged not only in terror attacks, but also in nation-building and developing deep and engaged bases of support within the communities and regions in which they operate, including such basic municipal tasks as garbage collection in an effort to build popular support and entrench them in parts of the

region. The Islamic State is highly active in Libya, serving as a threat to Libyan stability and moving associates throughout the region, building ties in the migrant communities and seeking to expand its power base. US policy has been chaotic, with a combination of military strikes, in Nigeria for example, coupled with a general disengagement from the region and varying levels of focus on the risks posed by groups like ISIS and the Islamic State. The disadvantage here is that increased engagement by the US in the region, especially affirmatives focused on Libya, would provoke a violent backlash by competing regional organizations like these two, who are entrenching themselves in the area and are bitterly opposed to US activities and have the ability to strike internationally

### **Uniqueness card for Libya affs and IL card to backlash against migration affs**

**ADF, 3-24-2026**, "Islamic State Group Quietly Gaining Momentum in Libya", Africa Defense Forum,

<https://adf-magazine.com/2026/03/islamic-state-group-quietly-gaining-momentum-in-libya/> //;D

The Islamic State group is threatening Libya's fragile peace and gaining ground in the country by aligning with human smuggling networks, according to experts. These relationships could facilitate the movement of terrorists into Libya through smuggling routes used by irregular migrants in Chad, Mali, Niger and Sudan into southern Libya. Lebanon's An-Nahar newspaper reported. While the Islamic State (IS) group is present throughout Libya, it is more of a danger in the south, with links to the Sahel, according to The Jamestown Foundation. Its presence is most consistent in the southern Fezzan region, where its logistical networks are used to transport people, vehicles and weapons from Sudan, through Chad, to the tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Local authorities have "serious concerns about the return of the organization, like any state seeking to establish security and stability on its territory," Libyan military analyst Adel Abdel Kafi, told An-Nahar in late January. **Kafi characterized Libya as "safe haven" for terror groups that cooperate with criminal and irregular migration gangs "to recruit members, expand their bases, and coordinate cross-border movement operations."** Abdel Kafi said the group has modified its strategy in Libya. "After dismantling its core structure, its elements turned to hiding, awaiting an opportunity to establish a new foothold and renew funding sources to become active again," he told the newspaper. **Migrants, particularly from Syria and Iraq, arrive in Libya at airports through legal means, but smuggling gangs then take charge of them.** IS and al-Qaida leaders also use sea routes to move from Iraq and Syria to Libya and other African nations. Political tensions exacerbate the situation. Eastern Libya is governed by Gen. Khalifa Haftar, who heads the Libyan National Army (LNA) in Benghazi, while the Government of National Unity (GNU) led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah governs western Libya. Both factions claim legitimacy, but neither has been able to hold long-promised national elections, originally scheduled for December 2021. Analysts began noting the IS resurgence in Libya last year. In August, the Libyan Intelligence Service

dismantled three IS-linked cells in southern Libya that had international connections in Africa and Europe. According to media reports, the first cell recruited fighters and transferred them from North Africa to Somalia and the Sahel using forged passports and safehouses. The second managed money laundering operations that support IS members fleeing from Syria to Libya. **This cell used front companies disguised as humanitarian organizations.** The third cell handled cross-border financial transfers through cryptocurrency and investments, and was described as the most dangerous. The arrests followed the discovery of an IS weapons cache in Sabha, where authorities found mortars, anti-aircraft guns, explosives and large quantities of ammunition, according to the Libya Review online newspaper. In September 2025, the IS wrote an editorial in its publication al-Naba in which it characterized Libya as a “launching platform” for its comeback, and explicitly called for a renewed jihad in the country.

### **The Islamic State leverages Western fears of migration to exploit its position in Libya, heightening the need for more counter-terrorism efforts**

**Cristiani 2025**

Dario Cristiani, Senior Visiting Researcher at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at King's College London and an Associate Senior Researcher at Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome, “Weakened Islamic State Eyes Resurgence in Libya.” Jamestown, October 22, 2025.

<https://jamestown.org/weakened-islamic-state-eyes-resurgence-in-libya/>

Over the past few years, the immediate terrorist threat in Libya has declined. A decade ago, the Islamic State (IS) was gaining ground across the country, having established itself in Sirte by the end of 2014 and launched attacks in the following months. These attacks targeted critical locations within Libya—such as energy installations—as well as cross-border sites, with IS using Libya as a logistical platform for the attacks carried out in Tunisia (Jeune Afrique, July 1, 2015). These days, **IS in Libya is degraded, but still maintains a presence.** In early August, the Libyan Intelligence Service announced the dismantling of three IS-linked cells operating in the country's south. According to the Service, **these IS networks had international connections in Africa and Europe and were involved in recruitment, financing, and logistics. Three significant cells have been active in Libyan territory.** Local media reported that the first cell recruited fighters and transferred them from North Africa to Somalia and the Sahel using forged passports and safehouses. The second cell managed money laundering operations through front companies presented as humanitarian organizations, which were used to support IS members fleeing Syria's al-Hol (Arabic: **الھول**) camp and to provide accommodation in Libya. The third cell was described as the most dangerous, handling cross-border financial transfers through cryptocurrency and investments (Al Arabiya, August 2; Libya Review, August 2). The announcement of these arrests followed the

discovery of a weapons cache in Sabha (Arabic: سبها), where authorities found mortars, anti-aircraft guns, explosives, and large quantities of ammunition (Libya Review, August 2). On top of these developments, IS also returned to target Libya rhetorically. In a September 11 editorial in its publication *al-Naba* (Arabic: النبأ, “The News,” also a surah of the Quran), **IS described Libya as a “launching platform” for its comeback, issuing its first explicit call in three years for a renewed jihad there. The group cited Libya’s porous borders and strategic position as gateways to other jihadists across the region, while stressing its international relevance: proximity to southern Europe could threaten “crusader plans,” or at least force Europe to deplete its resources by playing on migration fears** (islamway.net, September 13). The recent arrests reveal the presence of individuals tied to IS’s logistics and financial networks who are linked to the Sahel region, while the *al-Naba* editorial is a sign of IS’s renewed ambition to strengthen its operational profile in Libya. **Developments in Libya point to the continued risks in the country’s south, where a weak state presence and porous borders have allowed armed groups and illicit networks to continue to operate. IS thus maintains a foothold in the south, primarily through the organization’s integration within transnational organized crime networks involved in arms and goods smuggling, as well as the movement of fighters from North Africa to the Sahel. IS is present throughout Libya, although more of a danger in the south**, with links to the Sahel, than in the north. According to the UN, while IS remains active in northeastern Libya, reportedly conducting kidnappings for ransom (including the abduction of traffickers), it is in the southern Fezzan (Arabic: فزان) region, which includes Sabha, where its presence is more consistent (Sahifat al-Shahid al-Libiya, August 20). An estimated 200 to 400 fighters are also reportedly active along the Chad–Niger axis. Meanwhile, IS logistical networks in Fezzan are being used to transport individuals, vehicles, and weapons from Sudan, through Chad, to the tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (Sada Al-Sahel, March 23, UN Report on Daesh, August 2025). IS in Libya maintains around 400 fighters in Sudan, where the ongoing war and its consequences are creating opportunities for the organization. In January, IS returned to the topic of Sudan with a message in a publication titled “*The Forgotten Sudan!*” (Arabic: السودان المنسي!). In the message, IS called on its members in neighboring countries to re-establish themselves, rebuild their presence, and revitalize the group’s activities within Sudan (Al-Ain Al-Ikhbariya, August 8). **Despite the obvious degradation of its operational capabilities, IS continues to pose a threat in Libya, particularly through its integration with transnational criminal networks to its south. The group’s logistical and financial ties to the Sahel and the exploitation of regional instability—especially in Sudan—have allowed it to sustain a presence and facilitate the movement of fighters, weapons, and money across borders.** Recent arrests and intelligence reports confirm the existence of active cells engaged in recruitment, financing, and arms trafficking. Moreover, the *al-Naba* editorial points at a

renewed ambition to strengthen IS's operational profile in Libya again. As such, **Libya remains a critical node in IS's broader regional strategy, underscoring the need for sustained counterterrorism and border control efforts.**

### **Generic uniqueness card**

Scott Newman, 12-16-2025, NPR, "Recent attacks have been 'inspired' by Islamic State. What does that mean?",

<https://www.npr.org/2025/12/17/nx-s1-5645825/isis-islamic-australia-syria> //;D

**The Islamic State was declared wiped out by the U.S., but recent attacks linked by officials to the group suggest it continues to be viable,** experts say. At its peak, the group, also

known under its Arabic acronym Daesh, had more than 40,000 foreign fighters from 120 countries, according to an estimate by the Wilson Center, a congressionally chartered think tank. But by 2019, the ISIS "caliphate" that briefly ruled millions of people in Iraq and Syria over an area about the size of Kentucky, had largely collapsed, following years of U.S.-led operations aimed at

dismantling its leadership, reclaiming its territory, and crippling its ability to launch attacks. **When the U.S. announced the death of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi that year, President Trump proclaimed, "we obliterated his caliphate, 100 percent."** Yet recent attacks believed to be inspired, at

least in part, by ISIS raise questions. Krissy Barrett, Australia's federal police commissioner, said a mass shooting Sunday during a Hanukkah celebration at Sydney's Bondi Beach was "a terrorist attack inspired by Islamic State." The father and son gunmen traveled to Davao, on the Philippine island of Mindanao — long a hotbed for Islamist extremist groups — before returning to Sydney in late November, according to the Philippines Bureau of Immigration. Trump, in a Truth Social post, blamed ISIS for another attack over the weekend near the city of Palmyra, Syria, that killed three Americans, including two U.S. service members, although the group has not claimed responsibility. And in January, the FBI said the assailant in a vehicle attack in New Orleans that killed 14 people was inspired by ISIS. Demonstrators chant pro-Islamic State group slogans as they carry the group's flags in front of the provincial government headquarters in Mosul, Iraq, on June 16, 2014. National The attack in New Orleans reveals ISIS' influence lingers, experts say Despite the group's loss of territory six years ago, Aaron Zelin, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, says it never really went away. **There's been "more dispersion of leadership" since the**

**collapse of the caliphate, he says. "ISIS never gives up. As long as they continue to have the will to fight ... they'll use any means necessary to accomplish what they're trying to do."** Last year, the Pentagon estimated that there were still 2,500 ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq. As

recently as last month, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said it had worked with the Syrian government to locate and destroy 15 sites containing ISIS weapons caches. **"The terrorist group's conventional threat has been degraded**

**since its territorial defeat in 2019, and ISIS fighters are dispersed,"** CENTCOM said. The Congressional Research Service defines the Islamic State's ideology as "a uniquely hardline version of violent jihadist-Salafism—the group and its supporters are willing to use violence in an armed struggle to establish what they view as an ideal Islamic society."

**"Enormous amounts of propaganda" disseminated via social media, have always been a key element of Islamic State's recruitment strategy and that hasn't changed since the**

**fall of the caliphate,** according to Daniel Byman, the director of the Warfare Irregular Threats and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Their son joined ISIS. Then they learned he had kids in a Syrian detention camp He says **that strategy, while effective, has always had "a degree of spaghetti on the wall" to it.**

**In other words, ISIS is reliant on a receptive audience to be inspired to carry out its own attacks. Anger over the war in Gaza, which has killed more than 70,000**

**Palestinians, according to the United Nations, has helped fuel the propaganda.** The

brutal conflict began in the wake of the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on Israel that killed about 1,200 people, according to Israel. Despite the extremist rhetoric though, militant groups linked to the Islamic State have struggled to reestablish themselves in the

Philippines, says Sidney Jones, an adjunct professor of international relations at New York University who has also served as a consultant to the U.N. Office of Counter-Terrorism. That makes the possible link between the Bondi Beach assailants and ISIS-affiliated groups in Mindanao surprising, she says. **"We haven't had a serious ISIS attack in the region for a long time,"** Jones says. In a five-month campaign in 2017, U.S.-backed Philippine forces laid siege to the southern city of Marawi to drive out militant groups affiliated with the Islamic State and, according to Jones, the Philippine government "has been going after them with all guns blazing for the last several years. ... the army has been involved in systematic operations against the remnants of ISIS across Mindanao." That means it's very unlikely that the Bondi Beach attackers would have found anything resembling a fully operational terrorist training camp there, says Joshua Kurlantzick, a senior fellow for Southeast Asia and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. **"You're talking about groups and small cells of people hiding in the shadows,"** he explains. Byman says that while the most recent attacks inspired by the Islamic State are tragic, **the number of attacks is declining**. He says that goes for would-be attacks, too, such as the arrest earlier this year of a Michigan man who was allegedly planning an attack on a military base there on behalf of ISIS. "The FBI and others are making arrests. But both **the actual plots and the actual attacks are declining over time,**" Byman says.

## Israel

US engagement with Egypt presents an ongoing source of concern to Israel, especially around Egyptian military buildups. While Egypt-Israeli relationships date back to the Camp David Accords, Israel is highly sensitive to perceived US favoritism towards Egypt (Daily News Egypt 2025). Tensions over Gaza in recent years have also exacerbated tensions between Israel and Egypt, which are on opposing sides of the conflict while also maintaining close relationships with the US. Israeli reactions to the US appearing to side with Egypt on issues regarding Gaza and other regional security priorities could be extreme, as Israel has recently and repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use its military to further national objectives (El Bendary 2025).

### Uniqueness and link card for Egypt Gaza affs

Mohamed Nabil, 4-18-2025, "Egypt's Delicate Balance: Maintaining US Support While Confronting Gaza Challenges • Stimson Center", Stimson Center, <https://www.stimson.org/2025/egypts-delicate-balance-maintaining-us-support-while-confronting-gaza-challenges/> //;D

Meanwhile, **Egypt is seeking to balance its strategic interests by maintaining its historic close relationship with Washington, which includes substantial military and economic aid, while strongly opposing displacement plans that conflict with Cairo's support of Palestinian rights.** This challenge comes at a particularly sensitive time for Egyptian-Israeli relations, which are also witnessing heightened tensions along their border, potentially threatening the stability of the 46-year-old U.S.-brokered peace agreement between the two countries. **Egypt's relations with the U.S. and Israel have faced numerous challenges since the outbreak of the Gaza war. Differences have intensified over Israeli tactics as well as Trump's plans, which include the possibility of the United States "taking control" of Gaza before transforming it**

**into the “Riviera of the Middle East.”** During an extraordinary Arab summit held in Cairo on March 4, 2025, Arab leaders endorsed an alternative Egyptian plan for the reconstruction of Gaza – a \$53 billion proposal which aims to enable the enclave’s 2.1 million Palestinians to remain in their homes while repairs take place. Cairo presented the plan in an effort to counter Trump’s idea and to retain the possibility of a two-state solution, the international consensus for resolving the Israel-Palestine dispute. However, the Trump administration swiftly rejected the Egyptian plan. National Security Council spokesperson Brian Hughes said in a press release that “[t]he current proposal does not address the fact that Gaza is currently uninhabitable and that the residents cannot live in a humane manner in an area covered with rubble and unexploded ordnance.” Trying to bridge the gap, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty met on April 8 in Abu Dhabi with Morgan Ortagus, U.S. Deputy Special Representative for the Middle East, and Tim Lenderking, a senior official in the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. Abdelatty reiterated Egypt’s rejection of Palestinian displacement. Egypt did not initially go beyond political statements after the outbreak of the Gaza war. However, tensions escalated after Israel took control over the Salah al-Din (Philadelphia) corridor on the border with Egypt in an effort to enhance its control and prevent the infiltration of fighters and weapons into Gaza. The move angered Egypt, which has stated that it will not accept an Israeli presence at the Rafah crossing or the Philadelphia Corridor, according to a senior source quoted by the state-owned Cairo News Channel. Yet Israel has escalated its offensive in southern Gaza, seizing an area that had held 250,000 Palestinians and cutting it off from Rafah and the Egyptian border. Egypt has also bolstered its military presence in the Sinai desert. On April 7, 2025, Israeli media reported that Egypt had deployed Patton and Abrams tanks in Sinai in violation of the 1979 peace treaty. **Israel requested that Egypt remove the tanks, while Egyptian officials warned that Egypt would defend its security and sovereignty if Israeli troops invaded its territory. These developments represent the most serious threat to date to the peace treaty and Egyptian-Israeli relations.** In February 2025, Egyptian officials informed the United States that the peace treaty would be at risk if Israel and the United States carried out threats of mass displacement of Palestinians from Gaza. It is worth noting that a leaked Israeli intelligence document, dated October 13, 2023, proposed relocating Gaza’s civilian population initially to tent cities in northern Sinai before building permanent cities and establishing a security zone to prevent displaced Palestinians from re-entering. **Egypt has a long-standing position against the displacement of Palestinians in general, and from Gaza in particular. This position is rooted in Egypt’s consistent support for the Palestinian people’s right to establish an independent state in Gaza and the West Bank with East Jerusalem as its capital.** This principle has been articulated by successive Egyptian presidents, starting with President Gamal Abdel Nasser and continuing under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. During a meeting in Cairo on April 7, President el-Sisi, alongside French President Emmanuel Macron and Jordanian King Abdullah II, called for the need to restore a ceasefire in Gaza and immediately release all hostages and detainees. The leaders of Egypt, France, and Jordan reaffirmed this position in a joint phone call with President Trump that took place on the same day Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Washington. **Egypt’s position is rooted in its commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, which promised diplomatic recognition of Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Egypt also seeks to safeguard its national security and prevent potential threats that could arise from allowing large numbers of Palestinians, including Islamic militants, to enter Egypt.** In addition, popular sentiment in Egypt strongly supports Palestinian rights. If Egypt were to accept hosting Palestinians in Sinai, even on a temporary basis, this decision would likely trigger widespread public protests that could destabilize Egypt internally and undermine Cairo’s role as a mediator between Hamas and Israel. Egypt has played a key role during military confrontations between the Israel and Palestinian resistance factions in Gaza since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. Egyptian mediation has led to agreements between the parties to restore and maintain calm for extended periods and support reconstruction efforts. In January 2025, Egypt, in collaboration with Qatar and the United States, succeeded in facilitating a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel. However, the truce did not last long, and fighting resumed. As a result, Egypt is once again working to mediate an end to the war. **Egypt’s mediation role underscores its desire to prevent an escalation of tensions with Tel Aviv as well as to preserve its historic**

strategic relationship with the United States. This is a highly sensitive position, requiring Egypt to skillfully navigate complex regional and international dynamics while maintaining its national interests and diplomatic credibility. Reflecting Israel's recognition of Egypt's role, on March 4, then-Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant affirmed Israel's commitment to the 1979 peace treaty and stated that Tel Aviv would not allow any "violation" of the accord. **Collapse of the treaty would not only remove the first and most important Arab Israeli peace agreement but would likely jeopardize Israel's diplomatic ties with other Arab countries under the Abraham Accords.** Still, **Egypt finds itself in a delicate position, striving to maintain strategic relations with the Trump administration and remain the recipient of \$1.3 billion in annual aid, while retaining a firm commitment to Palestinian rights. The future will show whether Cairo possesses the political and diplomatic tools necessary to de-escalate the conflict, safeguard its strategic interests, and reject arrangements that would threaten its national security or redraw the regional map at its expense.**

## **Appeasement**

Appeasement refers to a strategy where nations attempt to mitigate potential conflict by appeasing an aggressor's desires with concessions or beneficial cooperation. The Obama administration leveraged a strategy of appeasement in its engagement with the Morsi-led Egyptian government. The administration forgave part of Egypt's debt and sent aid which emboldened Morsi to flagrantly further human rights violations. Negative teams could argue that affirmative teams' engagement is a form of appeasement that repeats the failures of appeasement under the Obama administration in North Africa. (<https://www.commentary.org/jonathan-tobin/what-egypt-wants-more-u-s-appeasement-mohammed-morsi/>)

## **Generic Egypt link card for an appeasement DA**

Seth Binder, 5-20-2026, "What Are U.S. Military Dollars Buying in Egypt?", Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/05/20/egypt-military-aid-congress/> //;D

But Israel is not the only relationship that deserves scrutiny. **Egypt has received \$1.3 billion in U.S. military financing every year—and has for nearly four decades—despite bribing a U.S. senator, imprisoning Americans, and ranking among the world's worst human rights abusers.** If the U.S. Congress is finally asking the hard questions about what U.S. military dollars buy, then Egypt belongs in that conversation. At least since the 2013 military coup led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, U.S. military aid to Egypt has failed to deliver a meaningful return on investment, advance U.S. interests, or meet the principled and strategic standards embedded in U.S. laws. Instead, **assistance to Egypt has become an exercise in inertia: requested, appropriated, and obligated with little consideration beyond tired bromides about promoting regional stability and supporting long-standing partnerships.** U.S. military aid to Egypt began in 1979 after the signing of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, not as a legally binding and formal part of the treaty, but as an informal understanding to sweeten the deal and overcome security concerns. Despite pushback, the

Reagan administration signed an agreement in 1987 with Egypt's powerful defense minister, Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, to coproduce the M1A1 Abrams tank in Egypt. Every year since then, the U.S. president has requested and Congress has appropriated \$1.3 billion in foreign military financing (FMF) for Egypt, making it one of the largest recipients of U.S. military aid in history. Proponents of the assistance have advanced several myths about U.S. aid to justify and sustain its continuation. They have argued that U.S. aid is necessary to maintain the peace agreement with Israel, keep Egypt from turning toward U.S. adversaries, and ensure U.S. access to Egyptian airspace and priority passage through the Suez Canal. Yet none of these arguments inherently require U.S. military equipment and training to maintain. In fact, each argument cuts the other way. Egypt maintains peace with Israel out of its own national security interests, not because Washington is writing it a check—and the two militaries already cooperate directly on shared threats. No adversary, including Russia or China, is lining up to replace U.S. cash transfers, nor do they have any incentive to do so. As for Suez access, U.S. vessels already pay transit fees—which Cairo depends on—independent of any military assistance package. These aren't strategic levers that Washington holds over Cairo; they are relationships that Egypt maintains because it also benefits. Meanwhile, over the past decade, Egyptian policies have repeatedly conflicted with publicly stated U.S. interests and deepened relations with U.S. adversaries. In 2017, Egypt sought to covertly buy more than 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades from North Korea, which was in violation of international law. In 2023, Egypt tried to secretly provide 40,000 rockets to Russia to support its war on Ukraine. Both plans were eventually thwarted after being exposed. Egypt has also supported controversial actors in regional conflicts, including backing Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar and the 2021 military coup in Sudan. Most brazenly, the Egyptian regime has repeatedly targeted Americans and U.S. institutions directly. Between 2018 and 2022, it bribed then-Sen. Bob Menendez, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for favors, including the release of conditioned military aid. In 2025, Egyptian security agents attacked two Americans outside one of Egypt's diplomatic facilities in New York City on the orders of Egypt's foreign minister, and, in 2022, it unleashed an unregistered spy to target dissidents on U.S. soil. **Even where U.S. assistance is intended to support shared security goals, such as Sinai security and border security, its effectiveness has been questionable. Egyptian military operations have repeatedly been marked by credible reports of gross human rights violations, including mass graves, extrajudicial killings, and collective punishment, undermining claims that U.S. assistance is advancing its stated security objectives.** In other cases, U.S.-supplied equipment has been implicated in tragic incidents, such as the 2015 attack on a tourist convoy in the Western Desert that left 12 dead and one American survivor severely injured. Egypt's procurement choices also raise questions about the value of U.S. assistance. Roughly half of U.S. aid supports the maintenance and sustainment of legacy systems—such as those M1A1 tanks—that are ill-suited to Egypt's security threats and are increasingly obsolete. At the same time, while the United States provides billions for military hardware through FMF, Egypt chooses to use its national funds to purchase arms from other countries. It even pursued purchasing Su-35 fighter jets from Russia until U.S. authorities threatened to levy sanctions under the 2017 Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. More recently, it has been reported that Egypt is considering purchasing advanced Chinese fighter jets, which were flown over Egypt during the two countries' first joint air force exercise. **Under Sisi, Egypt's military has expanded its grip on the economy, controlling critical industries and driving economic policy. This has brought unsustainable debt, systemic corruption, and repeated financial crises. In response, fearing mass migration and regional instability, the international community has continued to step in and bail out Egypt, including \$57 billion in 2024. U.S. military aid policy has done nothing to interrupt this cycle. In fact, by empowering the Egyptian military, it is undermining Egypt's stability.** But most concerning is Egypt's human rights record, which ranks among the worst globally. The government's widespread repression, arbitrary detentions, and restrictions on civil society have become defining features of Sisi's regime. These abuses have denied Egyptians their fundamental freedoms,

destabilized society, and thwarted economic development. They have also repeatedly affected U.S. citizens and their families. Egyptian authorities have wrongfully detained Americans, including three currently. One American died in Egypt in 2020 after six years in wrongful detention, suffering through horrible prison conditions, ill treatment, and medical neglect. Countless others have experienced transnational repression by the regime, including retaliatory arrests in Egypt of family members of exiled activists, regional extraditions, and digital and physical harassment. Under U.S. law—including Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act—such patterns of gross human rights violations should trigger restrictions on military aid to Egypt. Yet these provisions have been repeatedly ignored by Democratic and Republican administrations, undermining U.S. rule of law. Congress has never genuinely questioned ending assistance as the law should require.

However, in 2008, Congress for the first time placed conditions on a portion of Egypt's military assistance in response to its deteriorating human rights record. Nearly every year since, Congress has maintained human rights conditions, and for the better part of a decade, it has continued to strengthen them each year to demonstrate its growing concerns. Nevertheless, except on rare occasions, each U.S. administration waived those conditions, claiming that preserving the assistance advanced U.S. national security interests. Following the 2013 military coup, U.S. President Barack Obama ended cash flow financing, which allowed Egypt to commit not-yet-appropriated U.S. military aid to pay for arms purchases on a predetermined schedule instead of the full amount upfront. This is a privilege that only Israel now maintains. But after a temporary pause, the Obama administration resumed aid in violation of a U.S. law, commonly referred to as the “coup clause,” that prohibits assistance to any country that overthrows its democratically elected government. In 2017, the Trump administration reprogrammed \$65.7 million in FMF and withheld \$195 million more over human rights and national security concerns. Within a year, the administration released the withheld aid and, shortly thereafter, U.S. President Donald Trump admiringly referred to Sisi as his “favorite dictator.” The Biden administration withheld \$130 million in each of its first two years over human rights concerns and \$85 million in its third year, only to fall back on releasing all aid in its final year, including somehow certifying that the Egyptian government had made “clear and consistent progress” on releasing political prisoners, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Conditionality was never a silver bullet that would bring systemic reform to Egypt, but when it was applied, it did deliver tangible results, including the exoneration of individuals ensnared in the infamous “foreign funding” case and the release of hundreds of political prisoners. **None of the administrations sustained the pressure, sending a clear signal to Cairo that U.S. red lines are negotiable. The cumulative result is an aid program that operates less as a strategic tool and more as an entitlement. Repeated administrations’ willingness to continue assistance despite the legal constraints and strategic pitfalls has created a moral hazard in which the Egyptian regime has frequently ignored U.S. concerns and directly challenged U.S. interests.** It is only in the rare instances when Egypt has been held accountable that we have seen its regime change behavior. Importantly, on the occasions when the Trump and Biden administrations did withhold aid, or even when Congress blocked some assistance over human rights concerns, it never led to tangible consequences for U.S. national security or the bilateral relationship. Over the past 47 years, the United States has provided Egypt nearly \$60 billion in military aid. The result is a military, which, on a number of indicators, has the equipment and capabilities to provide for its own security. In fact, Egypt has recently provided fighter jets to the United Arab Emirates to help it repel attacks from Iran. At the same time, with no other country willing or able to provide Egypt with a \$1.3 billion annual check, it will force the regime to more critically assess its security priorities. Ending military aid to Egypt does not mean abandoning the relationship. Instead, it would create an opportunity to recalibrate it on more sustainable and effective terms. A structured, conditional phase-out of FMF over the next two fiscal years—aligned with the expiration of the current U.S.-Israel memorandum of understanding (MOU)—would better align U.S. policy with U.S. interests than the Republican-controlled House Appropriations Committee's push to have the Trump administration sign an MOU with Egypt. Further, the United States can preserve targeted security cooperation in areas of mutual interest, including joint exercises such as Bright Star, and intelligence-sharing. These tools allow for continued engagement without the distortions created by large-scale arms transfers. And FMF is not the only source of U.S. leverage. The United States’ economic and political clout, as well as its ability to use targeted sanctions and human rights designations, provides incentive or coercive avenues for influence. In many ways, **the continuation of military aid has hindered the effective use of these tools, signaling a tolerance for behavior that would**

**otherwise carry consequences.** As U.S. policymakers reconsider long-standing commitments to Israel, the time has come to apply the same scrutiny to Egypt. **Ending the annual \$1.3 billion in military aid is not a radical departure but a necessary adjustment—one that aligns U.S. policy with its laws, interests, and principles.**

## **Basic impact and internal link card for appeasement DA**

**Amnesty International, 4-21-2026, "States must stop predatory, anti-rights order taking hold",**

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/04/amnesty-international-calls-states-to-stop-predatory-era-taking-hold/> //;D

**The world is on the brink of a perilous new era, driven by powerful states', corporations' and anti-rights movements' assaults on multilateralism, international law and human rights.** Amnesty International warned today upon launching its annual report, **The State of the World's Human Rights. States, international bodies and civil society must reject the politics of appeasement and collectively resist these attacks to prevent this new order from taking hold,** the organization said in its assessment of the human rights situation in 144 countries. "We are confronting the most challenging moment of our age. **Humanity is under attack from transnational anti-rights movements and predatory governments determined to assert their dominance through unlawful wars and brazen economic blackmail.**" said Amnesty International's Secretary General, Agnès Callamard. "For years, Amnesty International has denounced the gradual disintegration of human rights in every part of the world, warning of the consequences of flagrant rule-breaking by governments and corporate actors. We've also demonstrated time and again how **double standards and selective compliance with international law have weakened the multilateral system and accountability.** "What marks this moment as fundamentally different is that we're no longer documenting erosion around the system's edges. This is a direct assault on the foundations of human rights and the international rules-based order by the most powerful actors for the purpose of control, impunity and profit." "The spiralling conflict in the Middle East is a product of this descent into lawlessness. Following the initial unlawful US-Israeli attacks in violation of the UN Charter, which triggered Iran's indiscriminate retaliation, the conflict has quickly morphed into an open warfare against civilians and civilian infrastructure, exacerbating the already catastrophic suffering of people across the region. It is now engulfing countries around the world, impacting populations everywhere, and threatening the livelihood of millions. This is what happens when the norms, institutions and legal framework painstakingly built to safeguard humanity are hollowed out for the purpose of domination." "Amnesty's 2025 annual report moves **beyond warning of imminent breakdown to documenting a collapse now underway, and exposing its devastating consequences for human rights, global stability and the lives of millions in 2026 and beyond. It calls on states around the world to urgently reject the politics of appeasement embraced in 2025, overcome fear, and resist in words and actions the construction of a predatory world order.**"

Predatory attacks are accelerating the destruction of international law. The State of the World's Human Rights, and Amnesty International's documentation so far this year, detail pervasive crimes under international law and mounting attacks on the international justice system, which are gravely harming the foundations that underpin human rights globally. Israel has maintained its genocide against Palestinians in Gaza, despite the October 2025 ceasefire agreement, and its system of apartheid over Palestinians, while accelerating the expansion of illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and taking steps toward annexation. Israeli authorities have increasingly allowed or encouraged settlers to attack and terrorize Palestinians with impunity, and prominent officials have praised and glorified violence against Palestinians, including arbitrary arrests and the torture of detainees. The United States of America has committed over 150 extrajudicial executions by bombing boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific, and carried out an act of aggression against Venezuela in January 2026. Russia has intensified its aerial attacks on critical civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, while Myanmar's military used motorized paragliders to drop explosive munitions on villages last year, killing dozens of civilians, including children. The United Arab Emirates has fuelled the conflict in Sudan by providing advanced Chinese weaponry to the Rapid Support Forces, who seized control of El Fasher last October after an 18-month siege of the city and committed mass civilian killings and sexual violence. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the M23 armed group, with the active support of Rwanda, captured the cities of Goma and Bukavu and unlawfully killed civilians and tortured detainees. In early 2026, the USA and Israel's unlawful use of force against Iran, in violation of the UN Charter, has triggered retaliatory Iranian strikes on Israel and Gulf Cooperation Council countries, while Israel has escalated its attacks on Lebanon. From the killing of over 100 children in an unlawful US strike on a school in Iran, to the devastating attacks by all parties on energy infrastructure, the conflict has endangered the lives and health of millions of civilians and threatens to inflict vast, predictable and long-term civilian and environmental harm, impacting access to energy, healthcare, food and water across an already turbulent region and beyond. In Afghanistan, the Taliban escalated its predatory policies against the female population, with further bans prohibiting them from education, work and freedom of movement, while in Iran, the authorities massacred protesters in January 2026, in what was likely the most lethal such repression for decades. The USA, Israel and Russia further undermined international accountability mechanisms, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in particular, last year. The Trump administration enacted sanctions against ICC staff, collaborators and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, while Russian courts issued arrest warrants against ICC officials. Several other states withdrew or announced their intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute and treaties banning cluster munitions and anti-personnel mines. The vast majority of states have been unwilling or unable to

consistently denounce predatory acts by the USA, Russia, Israel or China, or to chisel out diplomatic solutions. The European Union and most **European states appeased US assaults on international law and multilateral mechanisms.** They have failed to take meaningful action to stop Israel's genocide or end the irresponsible arms and technology transfers fuelling crimes under international law around the world. They have

also been unwilling to enact blocking statutes to protect the targets of US sanctions, including on ICC judges and prosecutors. Italy and Hungary declined to arrest individuals subject to ICC warrants in their territory, while France, Germany and Poland implied they would do the same. "World leaders have been far too submissive in the face of attacks on international law and the multilateral system. Their silence and inaction are inexcusable. It is morally bankrupt and will bring nothing but retreat, defeat and the erasure of decades of hard-fought human rights gains. To appease aggressors is to pour fuel on a fire that will burn us all and scorch the future for generations to come," said Agnès Callamard. "Some may be tempted to dismiss the system built over the last 80 years as nothing but an illusion. This is to ignore the hard-fought achievements towards the recognition of universal rights, the adoption of multiple international conventions and national laws protecting against racial discrimination and violence against women, enshrining the rights of workers and trade unions, and recognizing the rights of Indigenous Peoples. It is to forget the poverty addressed, the reproductive rights strengthened and the justice delivered when states chose to uphold the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. "The political and economic predators, and their enablers, are declaring the multilateral system dead not because it's inefficient but because it's not serving their hegemony and control. The response is not to proclaim it an illusion or beyond repair, but to confront its failures, end its selective application and keep transforming it so that it's fully capable of defending all people with equal resolve."

## Mission Creep

Mission creep refers to how initial success of an intervention can spill up into unintentional broadening of the goals of an intervention until it causes a domino effect of regional or even global instability. This has historically occurred with the Obama Administration's intervention to overthrow Gaddafi in Libya leading to a massive power vacuum that persists to this day. Negative teams can discuss how increasing US engagement in regional conflicts can lead to mission creep that causes more instability than it solves.

## Generic description of what mission creep is and generic link card

Ivan Eland, 3-31-2026, "Why Do U.S. Presidents Keep Risking Foreign Quagmires?: News Article", Independent Institute,

<https://www.independent.org/article/2026/03/31/presidents-keep-risking-foreign-quagmires/> //;D

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solves. During the past three-quarters of a century, beginning in 1950 and continuing right through to the current war with Iran,

**U.S. presidents repeatedly have risked involvement in conflicts that resulted in military quagmires with disappointing endings.** Why do presidents keep repeating the same mistakes

in the name of "national security"? By 1950, the U.S. government had taken then-poor South Korea out of the U.S. defense perimeter. The United States had withdrawn its forces after the Second World War, because the Joint Chiefs of Staff became resigned to the fact that non-strategic South Korea would eventually come under the influence of the Soviet Union because of its proximity to the opposing superpower. This exclusion North Korea took as a green light to invade the South. In response, President

Harry Truman panicked and, without getting a congressional declaration of war or any congressional approval, rushed U.S. air and naval forces to help the South Koreans and then later added large ground forces. The American and South Korean forces repelled the invasion back to roughly the 38th parallel, the original boundary between North and South. Then the worst mission creep in American military history occurred. Bedazzled with success, Truman then succumbed to General Douglas MacArthur's plan to go north of the 38th parallel to liberate North Korea from communism, despite Chinese warnings not to come near the Yalu River, the border between China and North Korea. As the U.S. military disregarded the clear signals, the threatened Chinese launched a massive invasion of Korea, pushing allied forces back to close to the 38th parallel. Truman, unable to extricate himself for two long years of continuing slaughter on both sides, chose not to run for re-election because of the unpopular war. He then turned the tar baby over along with the presidency to General Dwight Eisenhower, who wisely called it quits. Military quagmires in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s, the 20-year loss to the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the debacle in Iraq are fresher in the public mind. Virulent anticommunism—after China fell to the communists in 1949 and after the Korean War—pressured the Democratic Party to fear losing Vietnam, as Truman had been blamed for losing China. President Lyndon B. Johnson escalated war in an economic and strategic backwater that he knew in advance would probably end poorly. Again, a president's political career suffered from the lingering pointless slaughter. When Richard Nixon took over, he delayed fulfilling his pledge to withdraw until after his reelection because he didn't want to be blamed for the first losing American war; tens of thousands of American and Vietnamese lives were lost in those four years. The long failures in Afghanistan and Iraq are even fresher in the public mind. Instead of merely trying to hunt down Osama bin Laden and degrade Al Qaeda after 9/11, President George W. Bush, disregarding British and recent Soviet failures to remodel the "graveyard of empires" through military force, engaged in a nation-building Afghan war that he had purported to despise. He also peddled the lie that Saddam Hussein in Iraq was somehow involved in 9/11 and would likely give his alleged (but nonexistent) weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, all as an excuse to invade. The invasion turned into a counterinsurgency nightmare that created more terrorists, including the even more virulent ISIS, which rampaged across the region. Again, it was very difficult for subsequent presidents to get out of military tar pits once the U.S. military was in them. So, the lesson for U.S. presidents should be to be wary of intervening in places where an escalation trap exists—that is, where the president must escalate or be blamed for losing the war when things don't initially meet stated expectations. Although we don't know for sure, it seems that President Donald Trump—bedazzled by the quick attack on Venezuela to kidnap Nicolas Maduro and favorable publicity received for plinking boats in the drug war—was convinced by Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that starting a massive air campaign against Iran would avenge alleged Iranian attempts to assassinate Trump and that decapitating the leadership would lead to regime change. Trump has seemed surprised that the 47-year-old institutionalized regime was more entrenched than he thought and that, when threatened with regime change, it would pull out all the stops to save itself by threatening oil shipments to the world through the Strait of Hormuz and attacking Israel and the Gulf Arab states with drones and missiles. Now, Trump is escalating by sending thousands of Marines and Army troops to join the 50,000 already in the region—threatening to conquer Iranian oil facilities on Kharg Island to pressure Iran to open the strait, or perhaps to use them directly on the shores to open it. Trump has now entered the escalation trap. He can't credibly say he won the war unless the strait is opened. But attempts to eliminate the threat to the waterway and keep it open near a hostile Iran may result in a long war involving higher American casualties in an already unpopular war or blowback from Iranian-linked terrorism against U.S. targets for a long time, including on American territory.

## **Generic mission creep link and internal link card for engagement affs**

Haley Fuller, 11-23-2025, "Mission Creep: How Limited Missions Become Open-Ended Wars", Military.com,

<https://www.military.com/feature/2025/11/16/mission-creep-how-limited-missions-become-open-ended-wars.html> //;D

### **Mission creep describes the steady expansion of a military or political mission beyond its initial goals.**

The term entered U.S. policy vocabulary after the Somalia operation, when the Pentagon acknowledged aid delivery had broadened into armed confrontation without explicit reauthorization. Scholars have since used it to explain why many U.S. interventions begin with narrow intent and end far larger, costlier, and more ambiguous than originally promised. Why Missions Expand **Open-ended or vague**

**mandates create the most obvious opening.** In Somalia, the U.S. initially entered under a humanitarian authorization, but UN Security Council Resolution 814 expanded the mission from delivering relief to taking necessary measures in order to stabilize the country, including disarming militias. That wider mandate allowed military planners to reinterpret the mission without Congress issuing a new authorization. **Political**

**incentives also drive expansion.** During Vietnam, President Johnson repeatedly promised the U.S. sought only to "assist" South Vietnam, even while secretly authorizing large-scale bombing in Laos under Operation Barrel Roll, a covert campaign later documented in declassified Air Force histories. Public messaging created an image of restraint while operational reality shifted. Institutional momentum often accelerates this process. The Government Accountability Office warns that once the Department of Defense establishes infrastructure such as logistics hubs, airfields, intelligence sites, pressure builds to sustain and expand the mission rather than scale it back (GAO). Bases create commitments; commitments create justifications. Case Study:

Somalia and the Birth of the Term One clear textbook example is Somalia. The U.S. entered in 1992 to secure aid corridors under Operation Restore Hope. President George H.W. Bush described it as a having "limited objective" solely to protect humanitarian deliveries. Within months, forces were pursuing Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid under a broadened UN mandate. By 1993, U.S. troops were engaged in the Battle of Mogadishu – an intense urban fight dramatized in later accounts like Black Hawk Down, but originally documented in after-action reports released through the DoD. Mission creep was so

clear that Pentagon officials openly used the term in testimony before Congress. Case Study: The War on Terror The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provide modern examples. When President Obama announced Operation Inherent Resolve against ISIS in 2014, he stressed the U.S. would not return to large-scale deployments and framed the mission as a limited air campaign. By 2016, the Pentagon confirmed around 5,000 U.S. troops were in Iraq conducting raids, advising Iraqi brigades, and providing fire support.

**Congressional reporting noted the mission had expanded into a multi-theater campaign with operations in Iraq, Syria, and across North Africa.** The gap between initial assurances and actual engagement exemplifies the structural pull of mission

creep. Afghanistan followed a similar pattern. The Washington Post's Afghanistan Papers, based on hundreds of internal interviews obtained through FOIA litigation, showed senior officials admitting the mission drifted from targeting al-Qaeda to nation-building, counterinsurgency, and reconstruction without coherent strategy or benchmarks. One Army colonel said, "every data point was altered to present the best picture possible," revealing how perception management and mission expansion often work in tandem. Contemporary Signs of Mission Creep Recent reporting shows how easily limited missions can widen in today's conflicts. In Israel, the United States has deployed roughly 200 troops to staff a civil-military coordination cell supporting the Gaza cease-fire and overseeing

humanitarian aid. The Pentagon says this mission will not place American personnel inside Gaza, yet the infrastructure being built would allow deeper involvement if the agreement collapses or ground operations resume. A similar dynamic is emerging in the Caribbean, where U.S. naval forces have surged near Venezuela. What began as a counternarcotics deployment now resembles a broader strategic posture, and analysts warn that the buildup risks sliding into confrontation through escalation pressures and operational drift. **These cases demonstrate how quickly humanitarian, advisory, or deterrence missions can evolve into expanded commitments, long before Congress debates or authorizes any change in scope.** Warning Signs of Mission Creep Policy analysts track several **indicators of early mission creep.** • **Sudden logistical build-ups:** surges in refueling aircraft or medical evacuation units, which GAO repeatedly identifies as signs of broadened operational scope (GAO). • **Reclassification of deployments:** shifting personnel from “advisors” to “combat support,” documented in multiple reports on Iraq and Syria. • **Expanded rules of engagement** • **Construction or expansion of military facilities:** typically signal long-term intent rather than temporary presence. Each measure may be legally permissible under existing authorizations, which is why mission creep often occurs without new votes in Congress. Why It Matters Today **Mission creep erodes democratic accountability.** In Vietnam, Laos, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, major expansions occurred without new authorizations. Congress has repeatedly warned executive branch interpretations of older Authorizations for Use of Military Force allow operations far beyond their original design. **Without clear definitions of mission scope and end conditions, policymakers drift toward escalation.** This is done sometimes intentionally, sometimes passively. **History shows how easily humanitarian or advisory missions become security operations, then counterinsurgency, then long-term stability campaigns.** The Lesson Mission creep rarely appears in dramatic leaps. It moves through quiet increments: a few more advisors, a broader target list, a new “temporary” base. The pattern is consistent across decades of U.S. foreign policy. Transparent goals and realistic end-states are the only defenses against sliding from limited engagement into open-ended conflict.

## Diplomatic Capital and Regional Tradeoffs

Time, capital, and focus are inherently limited in diplomacy especially after the Trump Administration’s cuts to the Department of State. Negative teams can read disadvantages about how shifting US engagement from one region to another impacts the overall efficacy of the United States’ diplomacy and global stability.

### Generic link card

**Walt, Harvard University, 2009**

Stephen, Professor, Harvard University, “Nibbled to death by ducks?” 7-27-09, Foreign Policy, [http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/27/nibbled\\_to\\_death\\_by\\_ducks](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/27/nibbled_to_death_by_ducks).

Moreover, **trying to advance the ball on so many different fronts simultaneously carries its own risks.** In particular, it provides governments that are opposed to some or all of Washington's agenda with an obvious way to respond: they can "just say no." In Taming American Power, I labeled this strategy "balking," (a term suggested to me by Seyom Brown)

and I argued that it was a common way for weak states to prevent a dominant power from imposing its will. In a world where the United States remains significantly stronger than any other power, few states want to get into a direct test of strength with Washington. But American power is not so vast that it can simply snap its fingers and expect everyone to do its bidding. Why? Because exercising leverage is itself costly, and the more you do in one area, the more latitude that opponents somewhere else are likely to have. **There are still only 24 hours in a day, and the White House can't devote equal attention and political capital to every issue.** So states that don't want to do what Obama wants can delay, dither, obfuscate, drag their feet, or just say no, knowing that **the United States doesn't have the resources, attention span, staying power, or political will to force their compliance** now or monitor it afterwards. An even better tactic (perfected by a number of close U.S. allies) is to pretend to comply with American wishes while blithely going ahead with their own agendas. So NATO allies promise to increase their defense efforts but never manage to do much; Israel promises to stop building settlements but somehow the number of illegal settlers keeps growing, the Palestinians pledge to reform but make progress at a glacial pace, Pakistan suppresses jihadis with one hand and subsidizes them with the other, Iran agrees to negotiate but continues to enrich, China says it will crack down on copyright violations but the problem remains pervasive, and so on. In *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz famously described what he termed the "friction" of warfare; the accumulated set of minor obstacles and accidents that made even the simplest of objectives difficult to achieve. The same problem can arise **in foreign policy**: even when everything is simple, **"the simplest things are very difficult."** States that oppose what the United States is trying to do have lots of ways of increasing that friction without triggering an actual crisis. In other words, Obama's foreign policy may fail not because he loses some dramatic confrontation, but simply because a whole array of weaker actors manage to grind him down. In this scenario he doesn't get vanquished, just "nibbled to death by ducks." Obama took office with energy, a new vision, an experienced team, and lengthy "to-do" list. But one can already sense the forward motion slowing, which will encourage opponents to dig their heels in deeper and throw more obstacles in his path. **If the administration keeps trying to do everything at once, there is a real danger that their actual foreign policy achievements will be quite modest. The sooner they decide which goals they think they can actually bring off, and focus their energies there, the more likely they are to succeed. And a few tangible successes now might actually make the other items on their agenda easier to accomplish later on.**

## US Politics

Both people in Congress and Trump's base find African politics to be a minor issue. In fact, Senior Bureau Official Nick Checker said "To put it bluntly, Africa is a peripheral – rather than a core – theatre for US interests that demands strategic economy ... Framing Africa as 'strategic' has often historically served bureaucratic and moral imperatives, not hard interests," regarding Africa (Gedeon 2026). This allows negative teams to discuss the potential effects of increasing US engagement with North Africa on US politics.

More broadly, Democrats and Republicans place different emphasis on global affairs and the types of foreign engagement. For example, Republicans tend to think the US should focus on domestic rather than international issues, while Democrats tend to prioritize the US being active in world affairs. Democrats also favor taking the views and

interests of other countries into account, while a slight majority of Republicans think the US should prioritize its own interests and not make compromises (Wike et al 2025). This offers different link stories to different versions of a US politics disadvantage, depending on the focus of the affirmative and the likely partisan responses, though that will also be shaded by President Trump continuing to be in office during the 2027-28 debate season.

## **Counterplans**

Most of the counterplans likely to be read on this topic are agent counterplans, with international organizations like the UN, EU, African Union, and World Bank, as well as countries such as France and China, having vested interests in the stabilization and development of Egypt, Libya, and Sudan. Net benefits linked to US action, which describes a significant part of the core generic disadvantage ground, would likely be a common strategic pairing with one or more agent counterplans.

Each of the possible alternate agents have their own upsides, downsides, and efficacy challenges. None are a perfect solution and there is good ground for offense against each of the agents, providing for debates about solvency deficits of the counterplan versus the affirmative plus offense against the case versus the counterplan.

## **UN and UN agencies**

Egypt has a unique and strong relationship with the UN, regularly contributing peacekeeping missions and other UN operations. Despite its decline in relevance in recent years, the UN remains an important and capable actor in the region. For example, the UN is engaged with Egypt on several of the possible affirmative cases discussed here, around Libyan and Sudanese stabilization and governance, Nile water issues with Ethiopia, regional security efforts, and migration. Some of these issues are linked, for example, Egypt's interest in stabilizing Sudan is partly due to the influx of refugees entering Egypt as a result of the conflict.

There are good advocates for working through the UN rather than the US in engaging with these three countries, and there is also fertile ground for solvency debates about the efficacy of the UN. The cuts to USAID and other American foreign aid have also cast the ability of the UN to accomplish its missions in North Africa into doubt (Mahmoud 2025). Any disadvantage linked to US action provides a potential net benefit, which also opens the door for debates about the role of the US in the region and the primacy of US international influence and hegemony.

## **European Union**

European nations such as France and various Mediterranean European countries have deep ties to North Africa from the colonial to the contemporary. These connections make them an alternative actor with a rich literature base for both negative and affirmative teams. This can include an internal net benefit about European leadership or a net benefit of a US specific disadvantage like an agenda politics disadvantage.

## **Solvency card for counterterrorism**

Dina **Mansour-Ille**, February **2022**, "Counterterrorism policies in the Middle East and North Africa: A regional perspective", International Review of the Red Cross, <https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/counterterrorism-policies-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-916> //;D

The EU, on the other hand, has progressively developed its own counterterrorism strategy and architecture, particularly since the 9/11 attacks. Its initial understanding of terrorism as an essentially external threat slowly changed to capture the home-grown terrorist phenomenon as it took the first steps to develop and build its own strategy that aims to foster cooperation, adopt a proactive and cooperative approach with third countries, and enhance a common strategic vision.<sup>119</sup> **In February 2015, the European Council declared that it “needs to engage more ... on counter-terrorism, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa”,<sup>120</sup> and following a series of terrorist attacks in 2015, the EU has adopted a number of measures to combat terrorism in various key areas, including: prevention of radicalisation; the terrorist list; information exchange; the EU counter-terrorism coordinator; cutting terrorist financing; firearms controls; digital justice; stopping foreign fighters; cooperation with non-EU countries.**<sup>121</sup>

Furthermore, within this framework, “the EU has constantly sought to develop the international dimension of counterterrorism, with an increasing emphasis on the need to provide aid to specific targeted countries from which major concerns stem”.<sup>122</sup> This has raised questions over the effectiveness of EU aid policy when framed within the context of securitization and counterterrorism. Within the context of the EU counterterrorism strategy, Tunisia “represents one of the most sensitive cases when facing the issue of the EU's action in cooperation with third countries in the field of counter-terrorism”.<sup>123</sup> As the country in which “radicalisation and terrorism have spread most clearly”, Tunisia was one of the key partners in the region for the EU, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings and Tunisia's relative success in transitioning to democracy.<sup>124</sup> In response to the threat of terrorism, Tunisia and the EU committed to intensifying their cooperation in security and counterterrorism, with a focus on migration and mobility,<sup>125</sup> reflecting the EU's perception of terrorism as being a traditionally external threat and of migration and mobility as being serious security concerns.

## **African Union**

The African Union (AU) is continental body consisting of the 55 member states that make up the countries of the African Continent. The AU aims to further Pan-Africanism and promote the prosperity and stability of the region. While this counterplan won't be the most effective against affirmatives about international issues like China and Russia, this counterplan can be effective against affirmatives tackling more local issues. Teams

reading this counterplan can read internal net benefits about reinvigorating local sovereignty and independence. At the same time, this counterplan is vulnerable to a variety of solvency deficits. These deficits can discuss how having the AU do another policy will trade off with its current initiatives of water security and Agenda 2063 and its historical inefficiency.

### **Solvency advocate for an African Union CP for affirmatives who attempt to resolve the Sudan civil war**

The Horn Bulletin, November-December 2024, "The West's Relative Absence in the Sudan Conflict ", The Horn Institute,

<https://horninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/HORN-Bulletin-Vol-VII-%E2%80%A2-Iss-VI-%E2%80%A2-November-December-2024.pdf> //;D

To effectively address the conflict, it is crucial to build conflict resolution capacities on the African continent. The African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have the potential to lead peace negotiations and resolution efforts in Sudan. These initiatives require solid institutional frameworks and sufficient funding to impact the conflict and enhance peacekeeping capabilities. **Strengthening regional security mechanisms, such as AU peacekeeping missions and providing IGAD with necessary resources**, is vital for effective peace dialogue. Finding local solutions for tensions **will offer a more sustainable approach than reliance on non-African actors, which could create dependencies.** Supporting regional peacekeeping efforts with multilateral (including non-African) assistance is essential. Sustainable resolutions require collaborative efforts from regional and other African powers, focusing on inclusive peace agreements ensuring that economic and military support is tied to peacebuilding and good governance initiatives.

### **China**

China has strong interests in three countries discussed here and the wider North African region, engaging in trade, infrastructure development, and political stabilization. Chinese foreign policy remains opaque to many Western observers, but is consistently focused on building China as a strong partner while avoiding entanglement risks. Chinese economic and trade interests also drive much of China's diplomatic engagement, with China enjoying a heavy trade advantage in its relationship with Egypt in particular. Concerns about the development of Chinese hegemony are real as China seeks to establish itself as a world leader. Egypt and China in particular enjoy close cooperation, and is a locus for competing interests between the US and China. The China counterplan (and also disadvantage) would discuss the ability of China to execute the affirmative, with net benefits from better solvency and Chinese versus US engagement in the region

(Fulton 2025). China also has a leading interest in Sudan, and has partnered with the ruling body of the Sudanese Armed Forces as a major part of its Belt and Road Initiative, with China seeking logistical, resource, and trade advantages through its relationship with Sudan (Boccia 2025).

## **World Bank**

The World Bank is a coalition of 189 countries that lend loans and consultation to developing nations. This counterplan can tackle affirmatives about education, health,, infrastructure, economic development, agriculture, and environmental and natural resource management. Evidence discussing this counterplan is bountiful and recent because the World Bank has been rather active in North Africa with initiatives like the “Improving ECD Outcomes in Rural Morocco” and railroad development in Egypt. This counterplan can discuss whether or not a multilateral organization like the World Bank which has internal fragmentation and logistical barriers, or a unilateral actor like the United States is more effective.

### **World Bank CP for public health**

Maram Gamal Katoue, Arcadio A Cerda, Leidy Y García, Mihajlo Jakovljevic, 11-28-2022, "Healthcare system development in the Middle East and North Africa region: Challenges, endeavors and prospective opportunities", PubMed Central (PMC), <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9815436> //;D

**The World Bank has been providing support to several governments in the MENA region to establish fair and sustainable health systems** that can be transparent and accountable to the population of these countries (2). This has been **achieved through providing expert advice and by financially supporting policies, reforms, processes, mechanisms, and tools that support transparency and quality of health care** (2). It has also been supporting government initiatives aimed at enhancing the quality of healthcare services provided to the citizens, as actual purchasers at the point of service, or as tax or premium payers (2). The World Bank has been supporting initiatives to engage citizens and patients in deciding efficient ways for spending their money to provide more value and to become fully informed for active and purposeful engagement (2). It has also been providing countries financial and technical support in establishing health management information systems to help them improve accountability of payers (2). This can be mediated by decreasing costs through developing strategies aimed at promoting primary and preventive care, pharmaceutical reform, or addressing gaps in health care delivery (2). There has been increasing number of health system assessment and review reports describing the World Bank efforts in the support of health systems in different countries in the MENA region.

especially middle- and low-income countries like Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Palestine and Yemen (44–48).

## Engagement Bad

Some counterplans could argue that increasing US engagement in the region can actually worsen tensions and issues due to disempowering local governments and giving greater credence to terrorist groups. These counterplans could then call for a decrease in US engagement in the region to provide uniqueness to this discussion. This can spark deep clash over whether or not interference is good or bad in the long term.

### **Solvency advocate for a CP that reduces US engagement with Africa against a counterterrorism affirmative**

William Walldorf, 8-31-2023, "Overreach in Africa: rethinking U.S. counterterrorism strategy", Defense Priorities,

<https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/overreach-in-africa-rethinking-us-counterterrorism-strategy/> //;D

**The United States has been conducting counterterrorism in Africa for nearly two decades. It is time to face the fact that this well-intentioned policy has not only been disappointing in its results but counterproductive, bringing unintended negative consequences.** Counterterrorism in Africa needs re-thinking and significant rightsizing if the United States wants to avoid unnecessary conflict and strategic overstretch at a time when new challenges abroad demand more attention.

There are two problems with U.S. counterterrorism in Africa today. First, the United States is applying too much force against too little threat. Terrorist groups that pose a threat to U.S. national interests are those with global reach, meaning a demonstrated intent—notably, by an attack or attempted attack—to strike the United States and its closest democratic allies in Europe and Asia.

Today, very few Islamist terrorist groups meet this global reach threshold of intent. The main exceptions are ISIS central in Iraq/Syria (which attacked Paris, Brussels, and San Bernardino), Al-Qaeda central in Afghanistan (which attacked New York City; Washington, DC; London; and Madrid), and ISIS-Libya (which attacked Manchester, England). In short, ISIS-Libya is the only global reach terrorist group operating in Africa.

All other terrorist groups in Africa are essentially local insurgencies with exclusively local interests—they have no intent to attack the United States and hence are no threat to U.S. national security. Nonetheless, U.S. military personnel are engaged in an

expansive array of military (including combat) operations across Africa to target these non-threatening terrorist groups. This is the definition of too much force against too little threat.

**The second problem is that the United States's force-based approach to combatting terrorism is arguably helping to make the problem of Islamic terrorism worse, not better. This is especially evident in Africa where current U.S. counterterrorism inadvertently fuels anti-Americanism.** It also aids the non-democratic and repressive tendencies of local regimes, which experts find is the primary driver of terrorist recruitment in Africa. As terrorists continue to gain ground in Africa and local African partners become less popular, the dangers of overexpansion and mission creep expand for the United States.

U.S. policy should change. Washington needs to draw down from virtually all African conflict zones, significantly reduce U.S. military bases in Africa, and use force only against global reach terrorists from over-the-horizon.

## Kritiks

### Imperialism & Cultural Imperialism

It's practically impossible to ignore the implications of historical and present imperialism on this topic. This is especially true given the fact that all three of these nations have been under direct imperial control by Western countries. Negative teams interested in critiques of imperialism can explore the implications of how extended Western influence in the name of American ideals like democracy has and is being used to subjugate colonized peoples and their cultures.

#### Basic thesis card for a potential Imperialism K

Matteo Capasso and Essam Abdelrasul Bubaker Elkorghli, 10-2-2024, "Imperialist terrorism in Northern Africa", ScienceOpen,

<https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.62191/ROAPE-2024-0027> //;D

Egyptian Marxist thinker Samir Amin (1976) argued that under the imperialist mode of production an unequal transfer of value exists, where value and profit are extracted from the periphery to the core in the form of cheap labour and natural resources.

Peripheral countries, therefore, do not simply represent new markets for the manufactured goods of the core; rather, their seemingly developmental failures embody the structural and necessary conditions for capitalist accumulation to continue. The developmental model of the periphery is predicated on the political and economic exigencies of the global North. It is export-oriented and, most importantly, prevented from accessing technological resources or harnessing their internal resources for the purpose of regional or popular development. The terrorist nature of this process lies in the historically established undermining of the national sovereignty and developmental autonomy of the periphery. This situation is replicated at the monetary and financial levels, where the 'terrorism of money' reigns supreme (Alami 2018). **By functioning as a key vector of class struggle at the geopolitical level, Ilias Alami argues that money-capital flows mediate international trade and financial transactions. Through balance of payments, exchange rate regimes and funding conditions, this flow ultimately determines the degree of exploitation and domination of the periphery of the world. It generates and follows the necessary conditions for capital accumulation, both mobilising and exacerbating an unequal geography of development between the North and South in the global capitalist system.** This explains why loans from international financial institutions or foreign investments are given to peripheral states with conditions that facilitate the privatisation of public assets or the exploitation of labour. Similarly, the degree of control that imperialist actors possess over the financial system allows them to decide whether to impose an embargo or freeze economic assets, if a country fails to abide by imperialist diktats. To wish for a degree of national autonomy over economic policy can often turn into a call for economic warfare (Capasso 2023a). The financial dimension of imperialism should not be approached without considering its military aspects, and vice versa. As posited so far, the social reproduction of imperialism occurs through the consumption of the developing world; that is, profits for capital have always depended on economising the living conditions of workers, and therefore nature. As Ali Kadri (2023) points out, the political economy of dollarised financial imperialism is predicated on a specific logic of waste, which annihilates the lives of the working masses of the global South at higher rates, as per the requisites of financialisation. This process takes places protractedly and cumulatively through financial and monetary means – austerity policies and environmental pollution. However, Wars, militarism and repression play a unique role because they respond almost

instantaneously – via killing – to the needs of capital. In this historical moment, where US-led imperialism is in retreat (Desai 2022) and a nascent polycentric world order threatens it further (Yeros 2024), there has been an escalation of NATO-led wars and expansion across Northern Africa, since at least the 2011 assault on Libya. This process is indicative of the intensified and merging expansion of militarism and finance (Duffield 2007) that has become a major terrain of social reproduction for imperial capital and a paradigmatic form of unequal development through which the global South is being (re)integrated into the circuits of capital via destruction. For these reasons, we pay careful attention to this expanding development of the forces of destruction in Northern Africa and how they contribute, both dangerously and decisively, to the underlying logic of waste that US-led imperialism upholds. Furthermore, the article approaches imperialism as a sociological phenomenon (Capasso and Kadri 2023) operating as both a material and ideological process to shape the totality of social relations. This historically established unequal relation of dominance entails the mass of ideas sustaining the imperialist mode of consciousness. Imperialism generates and follows historically specific ways of thinking about and organising the world that imbricate and perpetuate the unequal development of the periphery. In this regard, as we show below, liberalism represents a unique ideological apparatus that directs the masses away from socialism, offering instead individual palliatives to structural problems. Hence, to acknowledge the existence of a Western-led historical and cumulative process of capital accumulation, subjugating the masses of the developing world, is a direct challenge to the status quo, often labelled as 'ideological' in academia. As Rodney argued, the bourgeoisie will not provide the masses with the tools required to undo their privileges. This explains how neoliberal market-led academia and the 'racket of think-tanks' (Diesen 2023) on the so-called 'Southern Neighbourhood' of the EU – meaning Northern Africa – have worked relentlessly to convince the local Arab and African masses that cultural backwardness and institutional weaknesses are inherent features of their civilisation. **They propose that Africa is magically sitting at the margins of so-called globalisation, unexploited and struggling to catch up due to its own internal backwardness** (Wai 2007; Harrison 2010). Institutional weaknesses and fragilities are personified in the figures of crazy and evil dictators that, occasionally, must be removed via the imposition of sanctions regimes or NATO-led military interventions. In such a context, think tanks do a remarkable job in promoting the adoption of any policies that ultimately do not call into question the underlying structure governing the relationship between the imperialist nations and Arab and African countries. Hence, **when any political strategy is being promoted about partial greening the planet (Ajl 2021), recycling or striking imperialist-reared 'peace' deals or security-led solutions to migration issues (Ness 2023), these ultimately (and purposely) fail to address the holistic and totalising condition under which the developing world is clobbered: US-led imperialism**.

## Analysis of US imperialism in Libya and Egypt

Matteo Capasso and Essam Abdelrasul Bubaker Elkorghli, 10-2-2024, "Imperialist terrorism in Northern Africa", ScienceOpen,

<https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.62191/ROAPE-2024-0027> //;D

One of the most glaring cases is Libya. After 2011, the NATO-led regime-change war has stripped the country of its national sovereignty and autonomy over economic policy, while disempowering the Libyan working masses (Campbell 2018; Capasso 2020). This military intervention was the result of a Western-engineered and prolonged assault on Libya that changed the terms of the country's integration into the global economy. Libya has fallen into the hands of multiple armed groups backed by foreign patrons, each group vying to compete for the country's resources and political power. **Libya no longer has a national security apparatus that acts independently without foreign meddling**, while there are more than 20,000 foreign troops occupying different military bases (UN News 2020). Even though the country appears divided into two main political factions (Government of National Unity and Libyan National Army), these very heterogeneous political coalitions rely on similar economic practices to maintain their power and stability. The political economy of these coalitions suggests that

political actors in Libya all act as compradors, criminals and warlords (Rubinstein 2023). The country's national security has been completely privatised to private military security companies, mostly from US allies in the region (especially Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) (RFI 2024). **While Libyan resources – mainly oil revenues – flow out of Libya to acquire the necessary logistics, weaponry and military support for their local patrons to establish control** (ACSRT 2021), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has launched persistent calls to cut the country's social services, especially its food and energy subsidies (IMF 2023). In a similar move, **while the EU sanctions influential militias** (particularly those in charge of the Libyan Coast Guard) that are said to control smuggling and human trafficking economies, **they simultaneously provide them with funding and training** (Urbina 2021) as part of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) operation, **which is meant to control the flow of migrants through the Mediterranean** (Capasso 2020; Cross 2024, 491–508). What seemingly appears as a paradox is only the result of an expanding and intensifying financial–military nexus. On the one hand, public resources are increasingly being directed to sustain a mode of social reproduction that perpetuates violence and destruction. On the other, this process generates both a deterioration and securitisation of the living conditions of working masses. While Libya loses billions of public funds through illicit flows, private embezzlement and international sanctions, the costs of this resource drainage are offset to the Libyan popular classes. For US-led imperialism, the drainage of natural resources lays out the conditions for the premature deaths of people in the global South. **The increasing deterioration of key social sectors – education, health, nutrition, electricity, water, sanitation and hygiene services – that took place after 2011** does not simply have the potential for long-term negative repercussions on children's wellbeing and ability to reach their full potential (WFP 2023); it **manifested in** the devastating Storm Daniel in 2023 that unleashed a flood in Derna, causing the deaths of more than 10,000 people. In 2021, Libya's audit bureau reported that nearly €2.3 million had previously been appropriated by Libya's Ministry of Water Resources to maintain the dam (Megerisi 2023). While a company had been contracted to do the work, the project was never executed due to **a mix of corruption, negligence and institutional chaos that circles back to the NATO-parachuted democracy in 2011.** The integration of the periphery into the imperialist structure, coupled with the terrorisation and immiseration of popular classes, is not a feature unique to Libya. **This process lies at the core of imperialist control and can be easily found in neighbouring countries, such as Egypt.** Following President Anwar Sadat's **normalisation of the Zionist entity<sup>1</sup> in 1979, Egypt has become a beacon of imperialist-sponsored repression.** Despite being a country with a high rate of poverty and malnutrition, as well as a low respect for human freedoms, NATO bombs will not appear in the skies of Cairo because the ruling class acts at the behest of imperialist diktats. Similar to how the current wave of military coups in Central and Western Africa are being discussed, mainstream analyses on Egypt tend to identify the country's problem in the long-standing role that the army plays in the political arena. What they fail to consider is the political and ideological orientation that a socio-political formation can have, including the army, and how this sits (or not) with imperialist interests. Before Sadat's capitulation, the government of Gamal Abdel Nasser had launched several military operations in the hope of dismantling the Zionist entity that was considered a primary obstacle to the sovereign development of the Arab region. Abdel Nasser's government had also experimented in a unique form of Arab socialism (Kadri 2016) that aimed at providing for its own people, introducing land reform and food subsidies. It did so by accruing a total external debt – the sums owed to other governments, private multinational banks and multilateral agencies like the World Bank – of just over US\$2 billion by 1965 (Stork 1982). When Sadat came to power, US food and security aid resumed, and the country's external debt increased by an average of 28% per year, reaching – after Hosni Mubarak and Abdel Sisi – the current sum of almost US\$370 billion (Cook 2024). **Egypt is an exemplary case that has been subjected to monetary and financial terrorism. As the country progressively relinquished its control over national resources it acquired external loans (debt) in foreign currencies with high interest rates.** Financial terrorism continued with the imposition of several waves of IMF structural adjustment programmes under Mubarak, coupled with the removal of food subsidies (Ayeb and Bush 2019) and the increasing rise of a 'securocratic' state

(Abdelrahman 2017). The more the Egyptian state acted as a mediator for the financial and military diktats of US-led imperialism, abandoning its sovereignty and immiserating its popular classes, the more repressive its state apparatus became under the lavish funding of the USA and its European allies (Crowley and Yee 2023). Consequently, **every time Western mainstream media alarmingly remind us that Egypt is violating human rights, one should also be reminded that popular repression in the periphery of the world is a natural outcome of the US-led imperialist structure of financial and military terrorism.** The loss of national autonomy of Egypt is glaring when compared to its past. During the 1960s, when the Egyptian government exercised full sovereignty over its borders, it closed the Tiran Straits to the Zionist entity. Today, Egypt has not only sold Tiran Island to Saudi Arabia, but it has hardly any control over its borders with the Zionist entity, as the recent genocidal assault over Gaza has proven. Egypt's case encapsulates Lin Biao's remark that 'war brings destruction, sacrifice, but the destruction, sacrifice and suffering is much greater if no resistance is offered to imperialism as the people become willing slaves' (Biao 1965). Egypt's current rate of poverty, loss of political autonomy and child malnutrition bespeak tragedy incurred in wartime-like conditions (Bush 2023).

## Anti-Blackness

Anti-blackness is structural and systemic racism and prejudice against Black individuals of African descent which has deep implications for US engagement. Anti-blackness manifests in many forms in the topic's region including but not limited to the legacy of slavery, state-sanctioned violence against Black indigenous populations and Black Africans migrants, and colorism amongst Black African peoples. Critiques of anti-blackness can discuss how US engagement reinforces subjugation of African peoples or white saviorism.

## Basic thesis card about anti-blackness in North Africa

Jesse Benjamin, xx-xx-2025, "Report Part Title: North Africa and the Origins of Epistemic Blackness", UNESCO, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep72889.11.pdf> //;D

At some point in middle and later colonial history, with the colonization of historiography itself at its height, and concomitant with the post-nineteenth century rise of secular science as the hegemonic basis of late-modern Western epistemology, Africa's presence was rigidly demarcated and reduced. It was in both the topographical and the discursive senses cut off from adjacent and contiguous continents and oceans (the Mediterranean and Red Seas, Arabia, the whole Middle East and Asia, the Indian Ocean, southern Europe, and the Atlantic world). **This process ran parallel with the axiomatic goal of Hegel and others to deny African history and deny Africa rationality and agency in world history (Eze, 1997), in order to relationally bolster and enable the colonial-imperial basis of the supposedly civilized and superior West.** Further, whole portions of territorially African space, according to the new concept of planetarily discrete continents, were also excised by being redefined as externally oriented or originated. Ethiopia became Arab-derived, as did Egypt, Sudan and the whole of North Africa, now sectioned off as parts of the 'Middle East'; Somalis in this context claimed or

were ascribed more Arab origins. The Swahili Coast was reoriented toward its numerous real external Indian Ocean origins and identities (Shirazi, Omani, Hadrami, Arab, and so on) during the post-1830s rise of racialized European-governed plantation chattel slavery, contributing to the erasure of its more prodigious African points of origin and connection. Internal contradictions that were either wholly manufactured or hardened and exploited were a mainstay of colonial practice, in the well-known and broadly applied tactic of 'divide and rule', and also in what Mamdani (2012) has described as the invention of two profoundly asymmetric juridical and administrative spheres that demarcated citizenship, rights and power in the middle and high colonial periods and their aftermath Thus, North African societies and societies in contiguous portions of West and north-eastern Africa are plagued with ethno-racial hierarchies, invented or heightened, and often central to the dynamics of specific colonial occupations. As pastoralists whose mode of production is based on desert or semi-desert animal husbandry usually supplemented with small agricultural practices, water harvesting and trade, Berbers, Tuareg, and Bedouin usually find themselves statically codified and racialized as uncivilized and racially inferior, even though they can often articulate some of the lengthiest regional and cultural genealogies. Everyone in North Africa is sandwiched within racial continua that are central to, but still exceed, their fields of existence. Institutionalized forms of antiblackness in Libya, both before and then at significantly heightened levels after the 2011 invasion by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have been documented. Anti-blackness is found alive and well in all of northern Africa, under the most preponderant epistemology in human history, though it is heavily contested, as it is almost everywhere in the world today. Egyptian society exhibits virulently racialized anti-Nubian, anti-Sudanese (especially migrant labour), and anti-Bedouin repression and oppression, among other prominent instances of socially produced difference-based inequality. Similar issues exist within American-empire-friendly Morocco, and its occupation-like relationship with the Western Sahara. Today, every country in the region shows evidence of deep manifestations of Wynter's 'bourgeois mode of being' (1979, 1995), which is inherently race- and class- based. Every country exhibits substantial degrees of racialized behaviour toward peoples living to the (real or figurative) south, both within their national borders, and between their borders and neighbours in the Sahara and in West and southern Africa. Phenotype and regional perception, language and culture play major roles in these manifestations of racialized hierarchy – formulations of North/South unevenness are far from being abstractions here. Each of these countries have citizens and non-citizens who are almost universally racialized to varying but almost inescapable degrees, by the vast majority of those living to their (real and/or figurative) north, both within their territories in most cases, and especially between their national borders and those of Europe as a whole. Across centuries of structured political-economic inequality and epistemic colonization are laid the incendiary contemporary racial realities and discourses surrounding forced and coerced migrations, statelessness, refugees fleeing wars, transborder flows of people – what the language of Western epistemology juridically fashions on a transatlantic basis as 'illegal aliens', 'illegals', 'terrorists', 'non-citizens', with an endless linguistic

**litany of dehumanizing racial terminologies across all idioms and vernaculars. Race and anti-blackness remain central 500 years later with an alarming degree of consistency, even when account is taken of the constant variations, spatio-temporal re-articulations and seemingly omnipresent resistances.**

### **Anti-blackness K link to migration affs**

Leslie **Gross-Wyrtzen**, 6-13-2022, The Journal of North African Studies, "There is no race here': on blackness, slavery, and disavowal in North Africa and North African studies,"

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2022.2089124> //;D

Borders, migration, and (anti)blackness in contemporary North Africa As the opening vignette illustrates, local racial formations are animated by current migration politics in North Africa. The inverse is also true: the complex history of racial blackness in the region structures how governments and ordinary North Africans make sense of the mobility and presence of migrants in the region today. Blackness in North Africa is overdetermined by long and multiply-intersecting histories of inferiorization, enslavement, and spatial exclusion and by current transnational border and immigration policy that seeks to insulate European whiteness from the 'threat' of the illegalised 'African' or 'Muslim' migrant. This final section demonstrates how European anxieties and North

African racial hierarchies intersect in the domain of migration governance to impact migrants and black North Africans alike. Weaving together ethnographic data, North African migration scholarship, human rights reports and news, and analysis of black North African and migrant digital activism, I show how **blackness remains tethered to narratives of enslavement, signifying inferior status and not-from-here-ness that takes on a particular valence through transnational border enforcement practices.** The violence and racial logics of border enforcement rework blackness to mark certain people as illegal and fundamentally out-of-place, impacting migrants but also interpellating black North Africans. **The displacement of blackness from North Africa regardless of origin, legal status, religion, family and kin networks, and self-understanding has made the issue of race (and antiblack racism) visible and immediate, which in turn creates conditions for new political imaginaries and diasporic solidarities.** Postcolonial migrations

and racial bordering After decolonisation, the direction of migration between European metropolises and former colonial holdings reversed. North Africans moved to Europe to fill low-wage jobs and new elites sent their children to Europe for education. In the 1990s, as communist regimes collapsed and large numbers of Eastern Europeans began to migrate to Western Europe, European countries began to formulate asylum and migration policies to define and control the movements of people to and within Europe. Europe's 'border externalization' plan divided migration geographies into zones of greater or lesser desirability, providing pathways for Eastern European countries to integrate into the Schengen (free movement) zone and the European Union, while neighbouring countries in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa would constitute a 'circle of friends', enjoying trade and migration privileges in exchange for controlling undesirable migration from countries further south in Africa and from Southwest Asia (Gross-Wyrtzen 2020a).<sup>6</sup> Tellingly, the continuum from desirable to undesirable migration mapped onto longstanding racial categories, with white Europeans (and North Americans) at the top, and African and Muslim migrants toward the bottom (M'charek, Schramm, and Skinner 2014). Prior to the massive displacement of Syrians after 2011, the buildup of border fences and surveillance technologies in North Africa had been directed primarily against subSaharan migrant people, and this population remains a major focus of border enforcement efforts today. For North African countries cooperating with Europe's migration policies, there is a tension between the imperative to secure Europe's border (and thus investment and other incentives) and North African economic dependence

upon remittances from nationals working abroad. Further, North African governments approach the construction of Africa as a geography of undesirability with ambivalence. On the one hand, characterising sub-Saharan countries as the chief source of illegalised migration deflects attention from the significant unauthorised migration of North African nationals and the virulent anti-Muslim discourses dominating European politics. On the other hand, cooperating to sometimes violently prevent 'African' migrants from reaching Europe is in conflict with North African geopolitical efforts on the continent (Cherti and Collyer 2015). In Morocco, King Mohammed VI uses the language of Africanity to strengthen bonds among other African countries, rejoining the African Union in 2017 and pursuing a programme of 'religious diplomacy' to expand its influence in Muslim West Africa (Waincott 2018). Muslim migrants in Meknes perform their membership in the ummah by wearing religious clothing or begging outside of mosques. A young Guinean interlocutor called 'Arabe-noir' came by his nickname because he repeatedly had to explain, first in southern Algeria among Tuareg smugglers and then in Morocco when he entered the mosque to pray, that he was in fact a Muslim despite his very dark skin (see also Timéra 2011). The assumption that sub-Saharan Africans are non-believers echoes French colonial cultivation of the idea that non-Arabs were less authentically Muslim or devout than their Arab counterparts and therefore out-of-place within the Dar al-Islam (Lydon 2015; Young and Weitzberg 2021). Despite expressions of African and Muslim solidarity, many Maghribins are oriented north toward Europe rather than south toward the rest of Africa, even though anti-Muslim and anti-'Arab' discrimination is widespread in Europe (Beaman 2017; Silverstein 2018). Many Moroccans colloquially refer to people from West and Central Africa as 'Africans', reinforcing the racialized cartography in which Africa begins south of the Sahara.

**North Africa is projected as an exceptional space that is, in the words of a Moroccan college student I volunteered with in Meknes, 'a modern country, a white country.'** Moroccan journalist Karim Boukhari explained that 'Arab and Muslim societies' connect whiteness to modernity and blackness with primitiveness and slavery, which causes them to deny their own Africanity (cited in Menin 2016, 3). Reflecting on the pervasiveness of skin bleaching, British-Sudanese artist Rayan Al Nayal explained that **Arabs start to hate their own skin or their own culture – and that has an effect on how Blackness is treated in the Arab world. And it's this constant repetition – of always pointing the finger [at black people], like 'no, we're modern, but these people aren't'.** (quoted in Amin 2020, n.p.) In other words, **North Africans point to blackness as Other in order to claim belonging in the modern world from which they have also been excluded** (Stovall 2006, 359)

## Settler/Colonialism

Colonialism and imperialism are inherently intertwined yet they are distinct. Critiques of colonialism of both the settler and non-settler kind can discuss how the United States building infrastructure or extracting North African resources as a part of engagement perpetuates colonialism at the expense of North African peoples. Frantz Fanon's work like the books "A Dying Colonialism" and "The Wretched of the Earth" can be an excellent entry point for debaters interested in this argument as his analysis of colonialism in North Africa provided the bedrock for many writers in this literature base. Debaters can discuss the nuances of how different affirmative policies both parallel colonialism from European nations and are different given the current Trump Administration.

## Security

The majority of affirmatives will call for US engagement over a specific North African issue to securitize something whether it be a conflict, energy supplies, or terrorist

groups. Negative teams can discuss how these security logics create false threats, suppress marginalized peoples, and worsen the issues they are attempting to solve.

## **Orientalism**

Orientalism is a term coined by Edward Said in his book of the same name where he discusses how Western countries like the United States otherize non-Western nations as “backwards” and culturally inferior. Orientalist logics can further racist conceptions of non-Western countries and implicate the efficacy of diplomacy. Negative teams can criticize the implications of how affirmative teams represent North African nations as in need for United States intervention and cultural influence.

## **Capitalism**

Many of these affirmatives call for economic development through their engagement which is tied to a history of the United States engaging with other nations during the Cold War to promote capitalist ideals and economic structures. The Trump administration in particular is closely tied to the concept of international capitalist development, and there are real questions about how markets should be structured in developing economies. Affirmatives like agriculture or energy development - whether renewable or fossil fuel - would link to critiques of the capitalist nature of the markets they operate in and whether embedding capitalist market structures in emerging economies is a better or worse alternative. The unique questions posed by this region also offer new interpretations of the Cap K as it relates to developing economies rather than the US.

### **Link card arguing capitalism is the root cause of the Sudan civil war and humanitarian crisis**

**International Communist Current**, 5-8-2023 "Sudan 2023: a vivid illustration of the decomposition of capitalism",

<https://en.internationalism.org/content/17347/sudan-2023-vivid-illustration-decomposition-capitalism> //;D

**The horror show of imperialist war unfolding in Sudan is a continuation and extension of the decomposition of capitalism, which has been visibly accelerating since the beginning of the 2020s[1]. It expresses the profound centrifugal tendency towards irrational and militaristic chaos that will affect more and more regions of the planet. Whatever the specifics of the two military gangs fighting in Sudan – and we look at these a bit closer below – the major culprit in this latest outbreak of war is the capitalist system and its representatives in the major powers: USA, China, Russia, Britain, followed by all the secondary powers active in Sudan: the UAE, Saudi, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Libya, etc.** Towards the end of last year, December 5, the British

Foreign Office released a statement on the democratic future of Sudan which began thus: "Members of the Quad and Troika (Norway, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States) welcome the agreement of an initial political framework. This is an essential first step toward establishing a civilian-led government and defining constitutional arrangements to guide Sudan through a transitional period culminating in elections. We commend the parties' efforts to garner support for this framework agreement from a broad range of Sudanese actors and their call for continued, inclusive dialogue on all issues of concern and cooperation to build the future of Sudan." [2] Just weeks before heavy fighting broke out on April 8, the above "international partners" of Sudan were still talking about an "imminent return" to civilian rule and a democratic government involving the two main components of the Sudanese government: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fatah al-Burham and the Rapid Strike Force (RSF) [3] led by General Hamdam Dagalo aka "Hemediti". **It was**

**abundantly clear just days after the fighting between these two Sudanese military factions began, that this "democracy" – just as anywhere else – is an illusion and all of the immediate options and longer-term perspectives for the population of Sudan and the surrounding region are going to go from bad to much worse** This is

exemplified in Sudan with its capital, the relatively peaceful and bustling Khartoum, previously spared the horrors around it and filled with refugees from the 2003 "Darfur conflict" (i.e., ethnic genocide [4]) onwards, is now being reduced to ruins in a matter of days.

Lack of water, electricity, health services is accompanied by slaughter and rape from both sides of the ex-government forces. The "inner disintegration" of capitalism In 1919, the Communist International laid out its future perspectives for capitalism: "A new epoch is born! The epoch of the dissolution of capitalism, of its inner disintegration. The epoch of the communist revolution of the proletariat" [5]. The reality of this epoch of capitalism has been confirmed by over a century of ever-growing imperialist war, its only answer to its permanent economic crisis. We have now been through over 30 years in the final phase of this process of capitalist decadence, the phase of decomposition. And

since the Covid pandemic and even more with the war in Ukraine we are seeing a tragic acceleration. The profound putrefaction of this mode of production can be today measured by a veritable spiral of destruction on a global scale, and in particular through the multiplication of wars and massacres (Ukraine, Myanmar, Yemen, Tigray...). **In Sudan today we can see the breakdown of the "international community's peace process"; of the Sudanese state and the military government of Sudan, immediately demonstrating a wider tendency for these agents of the major powers to function as unreliable, irrational elements that are first of all motivated by "look after number one":** this is

demonstrated by the Russian Wagner Group [6] (active in Sudan, Chad and Libya under General Khalifa Haftar) which seems to be increasingly falling out with Moscow and taking on a dynamic of its own. And this tendency of each for themselves is further underlined by the fact that any one of the countries mentioned in the first paragraph is quite capable of taking their own unilateral actions that will further exacerbate the tendencies to further chaos in Sudan and the surrounding region. "Save our nationals"... and the devil take the hindmost Sudan was a British Crown Colony until 1956 when the US undermined the role of British imperialism in the wake of the Suez crisis As in many of its colonies the British had introduced the practice of divide and rule, using ethnic and geographic divisions in order to facilitate control. The long-term consequences of this policy could be seen in 2011 when the country was cut in half between an Arab-dominated North and an African South. Sudan, full of natural

resources, is adjacent to the Red Sea, borders Egypt and Libya in north Africa; Ethiopia and Eritrea in the Horn; the east African state of South Sudan and the Central African states of Chad and the Central African Republic. It is thus a focus for all the regional and global imperialist rivalries which are being played out across Africa and the Middle East. With the outbreak of the present conflict, the main concern of the hypocritical “partners” of Sudan was first to get their diplomats and then their nationals out of the country, burning and shredding evidence of their murderous culpability as they did so. Echoing capitalism’s “war of the vaccines” during the Covid-19 pandemic, we witnessed the scrabble of “each for themselves” as competitive “national interests” overrode any sort of co-operation; flights left half-empty because the necessary papers weren’t shown or they weren’t on the list of nationals of those controlling the flights. When other nationals were given places on evacuation procedures it was done as a cynical PR exercise or to gain some sordid diplomatic advantage. And what those fleeing powers left behind was a complete mess of their own making and a grim future for the region. It’s pointless quoting numbers of casualties or the destruction caused because the “official” figures are increasing exponentially every few days: tens of thousands killed and seriously injured and millions of refugees and displaced, with around 15 million already living on the scraps of the aid agencies (themselves an integral part of imperialism and warfare) and acute malnourishment among pregnant women and children, according to a UN statement on April 11. Those nationals lucky enough to get back to were met with flags and jingoistic press headlines while the vast majority in Sudan have no way out of war and famine and are condemned to their misery by the same flag-waving national interests of the capitalist states that came to bring “democracy” to the country. To add to the whole mess of Khartoum and beyond, around 20,000 prisoners have escaped or been let out of jail with some of these being convicted ex-government mass murderers and war criminals who, in their respective sides, will be welcomed back into the free-for-all at even more cost to the population and its forlorn hopes for any sort of “peace”. As well as staggering inflation, the organised looting of supplies, assaults and robberies by armed militias, the population has to deal with the ubiquitous and dangerous checkpoints that have sprung up on many streets. And to add to their emotional turmoil, cease-fires and truces are called one after the other making no difference whatsoever to the ongoing warfare[7]. **The decomposition of capitalism guarantees the military free-for-all** The two major warlords, Generals Dagalo and Hemediti, the west’s “democratic partners” and Moscow’s “friends and allies”, are locked into a ferocious battle between each other with the SAF having the advantage of air power. It’s not a great advantage in this sort of war but if the battle is to continue both sides will need re-supplying with weaponry soon: will the Russians supply the RSF with anti-aircraft missiles or more through Wagner? Will Russian-backed Haftar of Libya step up the supplies and support he is and has been providing for the RSF? Will Saudi and Egypt get more involved in stepping up the ante with weaponry to the SAF, and are Abu Dhabi and Riyadh at loggerheads over the issue? And will the backers of the RSF in the UAE – who see the former as part of their wider plan for control over the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa – consolidate and strengthen their support? Could Britain and America get further involved through some of these vectors? Given the deep instability of the situation and all the players involved, there are too many uncertainties to make any sort of predictions - except that the war will continue and the overall framework of decomposing capitalism will ensure that it will become more extensive. China is well involved in Sudan and in machinations with both factions of the army in order to maintain its “Belt and Road” thrust which has come to grief in neighbouring Ethiopia. The US is playing catch-up with China but President Biden has recently stepped up US military activity here with extra military

resources deployed in order to “fight terrorism”. But there’s no doubt it has been flatfooted in its response and embarrassed with its and the UK’s assertion that we were days away from “civilian rule” in Sudan. Russia has also dealt with both factions of the army and both have talked favourably about a possible Russian port on the Red Sea. Both factions are open to a deal with Russia but the whole region now resembles a highly volatile can of worms. The Sudanese evacuations are largely over to date and true to form the war is cynically relegated away from the headlines as the country sinks back into an even greater misery. Sudan is one example of capitalism’s dynamic and there are many others: dangerous imperialist fault-lines are opening up with military tensions rising in the Middle East, around ex-Yugoslavia and the Caucasus and generally over the globe as militarism is the main outlet left to the capitalist state. The war in Ukraine with its local and global effects rages on. In early April this year, Finland became the 31st country to join NATO and its 1300km border has doubled the front line with Russia. As it has done in other front-line states with Russia, NATO will be cautious at first and then build up its forces and weaponry along the border, forcing Russia to militarise its side. The longer-term perspective for imperialism is the growing confrontation with China being prepared by the United States, but there are uncertainties and variables here also. **In the meantime capitalism sinks into irrational war and barbarity and Sudan is one more example of its “inner disintegration”.**

## List of Proposed Resolutions

The following resolutions are ranked in terms of preference:

1. **Broad:** The United States federal government should substantially increase its foreign assistance to Egypt, Libya, and/or Sudan.
  - a. Pros: Clearly outlines affirmative areas with limits, gives the space for a variety of interpretations. Our personal favorite is number 1 because it's simple to understand and has enough built-in flexibility for a variety of interpretations throughout the season while not being too big.
  - b. Cons: Possibly too big of a topic, foreign assistance as an exact term isn't the most popular term in the literature base
2. **Engagement:** The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with Egypt, Libya, and/or Sudan.
  - a. Pros: Familiar language to debaters, clean division of ground, limited
  - b. Cons: Possibly too limited, basic mechanisms, possible issues with T-increase means pre-existing because of limited current engagement
3. **Subsets:** The United States federal government should substantially increase its engagement with Egypt, Libya, and/or Sudan in one or more of the following areas: natural resources, migrant and displaced populations, and regional stabilization.
  - a. Pros: Lots of literature about cooperation, interesting affirmative areas
  - b. Cons: May have to clean up the area wording to include the right kinds of debates, could be too large, possible issues with T-increase means pre-existing because of limited current engagement
4. **Aid:** The United States federal government should substantially increase its development aid, humanitarian aid, and/or political aid to Egypt, Libya, and/or Sudan.
  - a. Pros: Interesting subsets, central topic controversy of yes/no aid, deep lit base
  - b. Cons: Possibly too large, not the most stable neg ground, just aid affs aren't the most engaging

## **Application of the NFHS Criteria for Debate Resolutions**

### **Timeliness and Durability**

Current events regarding the civil war in Sudan and the ever-changing dynamics of foreign policy under the Trump Administration makes this topic timely. This timeliness does pose some durability questions, given the fluid nature of the civil war and humanitarian crises in Sudan and the ongoing tension between competing governments in Libya.

The US relationship with Egypt offers a good example of a durable element of this topic. The need for economic, infrastructure, public health, and other forms of development in the region will persist well beyond the '27-'28 debate year. For students who prioritize research and staying current with events, this topic potentially offers a research advantage.

### **Accessibility and Material**

The material is simultaneously accessible to novices and deep enough to engage varsity debaters throughout the season. While the total issue of North African foreign policy is complex, allowing novices to focus on a singular country's issue, or a single issue shared across countries, will be straightforward.

Our research has uncovered several regional research institutes and media organizations that focus on this part of the world from simplistic news sites to academic papers. These include the North Africa Initiative, the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, the German Council on Foreign Relations Middle East and North Africa Program, Horn Review, the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, and the Middle East Council, among others, as well as traditional foreign policy sources like CSIS, the Council on Foreign Relations, and Brookings. It is worth noting that many of the organizations that cover Egypt, Libya, and Sudan extensively are based in Africa, the Middle East, or Europe, and engaging with different regional perspectives enriches the available materials. A substantial majority of this paper's cards were found using basic Google searches, making research very accessible on this topic.

The three countries and the region do not get the same amount of coverage as some other debate topics do, including ones that will be presented at the 2026 topic conference. Nonetheless, there is sufficient material available for a wide range of research.

## **Student Interest and Engagement**

This topic has both a nuanced historical background that students can delve in and a flurry of current event updates to prevent the topic from getting stale. The lack of a previous topic dedicated to Africa will motivate students to cut their own files instead of regurgitating backfiles that wouldn't fully apply to this region. That makes research exciting for students over the season.

## **Educational Quality**

Africa has been neglected in policy debate. In fact, throughout 1928 to 2026 there has only been a single resolution about Africa and that one for the 2007 to 2008 was about public health assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa. That region excludes Libya and Egypt, meaning that they are ripe for fresh debates. This makes debating about it valuable. Egypt, Libya, and Sudan offer a harsh introduction to a world of nation-wide instability and resource scarcity, and challenges students to develop understandings of humanitarian aid, conflict mitigation, state building, and other issues that as Americans it is relatively easy to take for granted. Approaching broader global issues in the context of or through the lens of these three countries offers debaters plenty of opportunities to expand on familiar sets of arguments from innovative angles.

2007-2008 Debate Resolution. Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its public health assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa.

## **Balance**

The topic allows affirmatives to delve into a variety of core topic controversies about different nations, creating a flexible stasis point that negative teams can engage with. They have access to both core generics like diplomatic capital trade off or backlash disadvantages and area specific disadvantages. There are nuanced debates to be had about the role of the US government and whether US influence and engagement with the region is a better or worse option. Simultaneously, there are debates about the characteristics of the countries in the region and whether taking a realist approach to international relations is reasonable when dealing with countries and leaders whose ideals do not align with traditional American values. Debates about fundamental questions of what principles should govern and guide American foreign policy are a core part of the debating this topic.

The wide range of affirmatives discussed here all generally provide links to some core disadvantages and kritiks around US engagement, as well as affirmative-specific case and disadvantage positions. Counterplan ground around agents is particularly rich as well.

## **Novice Packet Guidance**

The reality of these three countries does pose challenges for a durable novice packet. Hopefully the conflict in Sudan will come to end and Libya will make progress towards reunification, which would substantially change the topic. There are several core issues in this topic that are likely to remain constant over the next couple of years, through the life of this paper.

### **Novice Affirmatives**

Affirmatives that are likely to remain consistent focus on several of the core issues in the region. The migrant and displaced populations remain a constant concern for regional stability and put pressure on neighboring countries as well as Europe. Finding solutions to this ongoing challenge represents important affirmative ground. Similarly, affirmatives around agriculture or water represent very real regional concerns that have significant impacts on the population and regional stability. Energy production, whether Libyan fossil fuels or renewable energy throughout the region will continue to be a core issue. Most importantly for this topic, all of these possible affirmatives discuss what are essentially existential questions for the regional populations.

### **Negative Arguments**

The UN counterplan represents a durable and effective negative strategy. The UN remains highly engaged in these three countries, and there is a real debate about whether the UN or the US should lead in any kind of new policy or program development. There are also drawbacks and solvency deficits to attempting to address these issues through the UN, especially given that they have all received significant attention from the UN in recent years with minimal progress to date.

Disadvantages around increasing the US role in the region, whether sparking a backlash from China, Russia, fundamentalists, or Israel, or implicating US domestic politics, can be run either independently or as a net benefit to the UN counterplan.

Some version of a kritik of Imperialism or Orientalism would offer a solid novice K strategy and provide a good way for new(er) debaters to begin discussing kritiks directly related to how the US engages with the world, and in particular, the North African region.

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## Appendix 1: Definitions

### Cooperation

**Cooperation is a legal agreement to work on a shared goal**

**IGI Global, No Date**, "What is Cooperation",

[https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/investing-trust-relationships-healthcare-network/5861#google\\_vignette](https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/investing-trust-relationships-healthcare-network/5861#google_vignette) //;D

Cooperation denotes the relationships between two or more organizations or parts thereof, which aim at fulfilling some shared goal, are based on written or oral (legal) agreements, and keep the partners legally independent. (Kethers, 2000)

**International cooperation is humanitarian aid, development and peace promotion**

**Cinfo No Date**, "What is international cooperation",

<https://www.cinfo.ch/en/individuals/get-informed/what-is-international-cooperation> //;D

International Cooperation: **International cooperation encompasses all professional activities aimed at supporting people in need and promoting economic, social and cultural development around the globe. International cooperation covers the fields of humanitarian aid, development cooperation and peace promotion.** Once clearly distinct, activities in these fields are now converging, often making the boundaries between them unclear.

**International cooperation is collaboration between nations to tackle a shared goal**

**TRT World Research Centre, No Date**, "International Cooperation: Definition,

Conceptual Context & Why It Matters",

<https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/dictionary/international-cooperation/> //;D

Definition

Collaborative efforts among states to achieve common goals, particularly in addressing global challenges.

**What Is International Cooperation?**

**International Cooperation is the collaborative efforts among states to achieve common goals, particularly in addressing global challenges. It involves various forms of partnerships, agreements, and alliances that transcend national boundaries to tackle issues such as climate change, security, and economic development.**

By fostering dialogue and mutual understanding, international cooperation enhances global stability and prosperity. It is a cornerstone of international relations, enabling states to work together towards sustainable solutions and shared progress.

## Diplomatic

### Diplomatic is relating to diplomacy

Defined by Merriam-Webster: “of, relating to, or concerned with the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations : of, relating to, or concerned with diplomacy or diplomats.”

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diplomatic>

## Diplomatic Engagement

### Diplomatic engagement seeks behavior shifting

**Takeyh 09 - Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies** [Ray Takeyh, October 7, 2009, The Essence of Diplomatic Engagement,

<http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy-and-statecraft/essence-diplomatic-engagement/p20362>]

Such views miscast the essence of diplomatic engagement. Diplomacy is likely to be a painstaking process and it may not work with every targeted nation. However, the purpose of such a policy is not to transform adversaries into allies, but to seek adjustments in their behavior and ambitions. North Korea, Cuba, Syria, and Iran would be offered a path toward realizing their essential national interests should they conform to global conventions on issues such as terrorism and proliferation.

### Diplomatic engagement is capacity building and strengthening

Kacho Tebo **Dikole**, 11-xx-2018, "Role of Foreign Policy Diplomatic Engagement In Promoting Development in Africa: A Case of Botswana", University of Nairobi Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies,

<https://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/server/api/core/bitstreams/6926b24f-8edb-4beb-81b2-d0479b5defc4/content> //;D

O'Brien found that it is through diplomacy that peace, collaboration, integration, growth development, and economy are promoted amongst interacting States. **Diplomatic engagement is a result meant to spur States to focus on capacity building and encourage each other to invest in an effort to build strong foundations. In the process, State interests such as exports, trade, development, and security are usually advanced in a practical manner.**

Diplomatic engagement is associated with the approach to foreign policy that some have dubbed smart power. The essence of diplomatic engagement could be a cause effect on the perception of the target State across multiple issue areas. According to Carrie, foreign policy **diplomatic engagement is a process in which the States develop increasing interdependence on each other.**

Foreign policy diplomatic engagement is therefore considered a form of mutual relationship where the State that is considered the target State would like to be associated with the prestige, plus materials resource which would result from the contact with targeted States. Hence, foreign policy engagement is usually geared to non-State and State actors so they can actualize the objectives of the State.

## **Displaced Populations**

**Defined by the UNHCR as including refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons.**

### **UNHCR No Date**

UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, "Refugee Data Finder."

<https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/insights/explainers/forcibly-displaced-pocs.html>

At mid-2025, the total number of forcibly displaced people was estimated to be 117.3 million, while the total population that UNHCR protects and/or assists stood at 121 million people. The total number of **forcibly displaced people** (117.3 million) **encompasses refugees, asylum-seekers, other people in need of international protection and internally displaced people. It includes refugees and other displaced people not covered by UNHCR's mandate and excludes other categories such as returnees and non-displaced stateless people.** The total population that UNHCR protects and/or assists (121 million) includes those who have been forcibly displaced (refugees, asylum-seekers, other people in need of international protection and internally displaced people); those who have returned home within the previous year; those who are stateless (most of whom are not forcibly displaced); and other groups of concern to whom UNHCR has extended its protection or provided assistance on a humanitarian basis.

## **Economic**

Defined by Merriam-Webster: "of, relating to, or based on the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services."

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/economic>

### **Economic engagement includes aid**

**Nasr 13** Vali Nasr, , Dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; from 2009 to 2011, he served as Senior Advisor to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat 2013  
<http://books.google.com>

Holbrooke believed all along that by showing Pakistan a road map to a deeper relationship with America you could distract attention from the intelligence relationship. **The key to winning over Pakistan was simply giving Pakistan more** (much more) **aid for longer (far longer), in order to change the dynamic of the relationship through economic engagement.** If Pakistani leaders had a good story to tell their

people, the CIA's job would become easier, and in time Pakistan would become vested in a different relationship with America. Average Pakistanis had to see a benefit in having a relationship with America, and in 2009 they didn't. It is easy to be angry at America if you think you don't get anything from the relationship other than drone strikes and retaliations for them in the form of devastating suicide bombings.

### **Economic engagement includes energy production**

**CDKN 11** Climate & Development Knowledge Network, "Brazil's economic engagement with Africa", May 11, 2011

<http://cdkn.org/resource/brazils-economic-engagement-with-africa/>

Brazil's economic engagement with Africa. Africa offers Brazil an opportunity to expand its bilateral technical cooperation and to revolutionise renewable energy production – in particular biofuels, where it has assumed a global leadership. Given Brazil's technical expertise in a range of areas relevant to Africa's development needs (e.g. agricultural research, social protection, anti-retroviral treatment), it can play an important role in contributing to the continent's socioeconomic development. This paper explores both the current nature and possible future orientations of Brazil's economic, commercial and financial relationships with the African countries. The focus of the paper is to assess the volume and trend of trade commodities between Brazil and African countries; to determine the nature of Brazilian investments in Africa; and to scope the benefits of Brazil's technical cooperation.

### **Economic engagement includes work on biofuels**

**Sullivan '8** Daniel S. Sullivan, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, Statement Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Addressing Energy Issues In The Western Hemisphere", August 4, 2008 Press Release: US State Department, <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0808/S00038.htm>

Our two countries have also benefited from a candid exchange of views on biofuels through other channels, including the U.S. - Brazil CEO Forum, and meetings of business people, academics, and citizens groups. With Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Tom Shannon, I co-chair an Economic Partnership Dialogue with Brazil. Other members of the economic team at the State Department also have traveled on numerous missions to Brazil to talk with government and business groups about the whole range of our economic engagement, including biofuels. The Deputy Secretary of Energy departs for Brazil shortly to continue this broad and deep engagement.

### **Economic engagement includes infrastructure development and finance**

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan '10** ("Joint Statement Vision for Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership in the Next Decade", [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pm1010/joint\\_st.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pm1010/joint_st.html), October 25, 2010)

The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction at the steady growth of political exchanges, dialogue and policy coordination at all levels. They positively evaluated Ministerial-level annual dialogues and exchanges between Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan and External Affairs Minister, Defense Minister, Commerce and Industry Minister and Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of India and noted that all these exchanges were successfully accomplished in 2010. They also supported the establishment of a Ministerial Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and India to give strategic and long-term policy orientation to their bilateral economic engagement, taking into account the regional and global context and to coordinate economic issues of cross-cutting nature, including infrastructure development and financing. They welcomed the launch of the '2 plus 2' dialogue at Subcabinet / Senior Official level and the launch of a dialogue on Africa at the official level in 2010 as a reflection of wider policy consultation and coordination on foreign policy and security issues.

The two Prime Ministers welcomed the successful conclusion of negotiations on a balanced and mutually beneficial Japan-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). They directed their relevant authorities to work towards early entry into force of CEPA and its smooth implementation. They expressed optimism that Japan-India CEPA will deepen their economic engagement, in terms of trade in goods and services, investment and cooperation and contribute to mutual prosperity. They hailed CEPA between these two leading economies of Asia as an important step for regional integration. They noted with satisfaction the recent growth in Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) into India and hoped that CEPA and the Memorandum on Simplifying Visa Procedures, the latter signed today, will further facilitate the presence of Japanese businesspersons in India.

### **Economic engagement includes trade, grants and loans, and investment**

**GAO 13** United States Government Accountability Office, Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement

February 2013      <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-199>

Since 2001, China has rapidly increased its economic engagement with sub-Saharan African countries. The United States has increased aid to sub-Saharan Africa and in 2010 provided more than a quarter of all U.S. international economic assistance to the region. According to some observers, China's foreign assistance and investments in Africa have been driven in part by the desire for natural resources and stronger diplomatic relations. Some U.S. officials and other stakeholders also have questioned whether China's activities affect U.S. interests in the region.

GAO was asked to review the nature of the United States' and China's engagement in sub-Saharan Africa. This report examines (1) goals and policies in sub-Saharan Africa; (2) trade, grants and loans, and investment activities in the region; and (3) engagement in three case-study countries—Angola, Ghana, and Kenya. GAO obtained information

from, among others, 11 U.S. agencies, U.S. firms, and host-government officials. GAO was not able to meet with Chinese officials. GAO did not include U.S. and Chinese security engagement in the scope of this study

### **Economic engagement includes trade, investment, and assistance**

**GAO 13** United States Government Accountability Office, Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement February 2013 <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-199>

China's economic ties with sub-Saharan Africa, including its rapidly rising trade and investment in the region, have drawn global attention. While U.S. trade with the region has also increased, the United States has generally focused on providing development and humanitarian assistance to African countries, directing more than a quarter of its foreign economic assistance to the region in 2010. Since 2001, China has substantially increased its economic engagement with sub-Saharan African countries, with strong growth in both imports and exports. According to some observers, China's foreign assistance and investments throughout Africa since that time have been driven in part by the Chinese government's desire to obtain a share in Africa's natural resources as well as by its interest in establishing diplomatic relations with countries in the region. Various U.S. officials and members of the U.S. business community have questioned whether China's role in the region is affecting U.S. interests and opportunities for U.S. firms in sub-Saharan Africa.

### **Economic engagement includes aid, charity, remittances, and private capital**

**Adelman 12** Carol Adelman, directs Hudson Institute's Center for Global Prosperity, Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2012 Executive Summary <http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/2012ExecutiveSummaryIndexofGlobalPhilanthropyandRemittances.pdf>

As seen in Figure 1, total U.S. ODA was \$30.4 billion in 2010, a 4.2% increase from 2009. The U.S. remains the highest net donor of aid in absolute dollar amounts, providing more than twice the amount of the next highest donor, the United Kingdom. As a percentage of GNI, as seen in Figure 2, U.S. aid amounts to 0.21%, making the U.S. fifth from the bottom following Korea, Italy, Greece, and Japan. As the Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances has demonstrated, government aid is no longer the only player in global poverty reduction, and ODA is no longer the sole measure of countries' generosity. U.S. private philanthropy, remittances from migrants living in the United States to their home countries, and private capital flows each exceed U.S. ODA. The more complete way of measuring donor involvement with the developing world is to look at a country's total economic engagement—including official aid, philanthropy, remittances and private capital flows. Table 1 provides this more complete picture of American investment and generosity to the developing world.

## **Economic engagement includes ability to compete in markets**

**Colvin 13** Jake Colvin, USA\*Engage 2013 About us  
[http://archives.usaengage.org/about\\_us/index.html](http://archives.usaengage.org/about_us/index.html)

US economic strength is integral to our nation's security and worldwide leadership. In an integrated, globalized economy, positive US economic engagement -- including the ability of American farmers, workers and businesses to compete in emerging markets -- is central to our own economic prosperity and to the worldwide growth of democracy, freedom, and human rights.

## **Economic engagement can be conditional or unconditional.**

**Kahler 6** Miles Kahler, Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations at the school of International Relations and Pacific Studies and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California-San Diego, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, and Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Maryland, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2006 ("Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait," *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 43, Number 5, JSTOR

**Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid pro quo on the part of the target country and policies that are unconditional.**<sup>1</sup> **Conditional policies, sometimes labeled linkage or economic 'carrots', are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with economic loss (sanction) in the absence of policy change, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic benefits in return for desired policy change.** Drezner (1999/2000) has proposed several plausible predictions regarding the employment of conditional [end page 524] strategies and the conditions of their success. He argues that the successful use of economic engagement is most likely between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used. The success of a conditional engagement strategy should also be contingent on a state's influence over domestic firms. If those firms find market-based transactions with the target state unappealing, a government pursuing a conditional strategy must convince them to deal with the target when desired change occurs. On the other hand, if domestic firms have strong economic incentives to conduct economic transactions with the target state, a successful conditional strategy must prevent them from pursuing their economic exchange in the absence of the desired change in a target state's behavior. In this regard, democracies may have a harder time pursuing a conditional strategy: in a democratic setting, firms are likely to be openly critical of politicians who try to restrict their commercial activities and will support candidates who do not place such demands on them. Our first hypothesis (H1),

therefore, is that conditional engagement strategies will be less likely to succeed if the initiating state is a democracy, especially when underlying economic incentives to trade with or invest in the target state are strong.<sup>2</sup>

**Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive than conditional variants in that they do not include a specific quid pro quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, change the target's foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict.**

How increased economic integration at the bilateral level might produce an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus explanation exists (e.g. Russett & Oneal, 2001; Oneal & Russett, 1999; for less sanguine results, see Barbieri, 1996). At a minimum, state leaders might seek to exploit two causal pathways by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that reshapes the goals of the target state.

## Engagement

Engagement can be defined broadly or narrowly, across a range of actions and recipients. It is primarily defined as state-to-state engagement, but could also be state-to-society. The inclusion of the US federal government in the resolution means the engagement needs to be by the USFG, which provides some limits on how to interpret engagement.

### Engagement is influencing other nations

Faizullaev 2022

Alisher Faizullaev, Scholar, Author, and former Ambassador of Uzbekistan, *Diplomacy for Professionals and Everyone*. Brill | Nijhoff. August 4, 2022, pp. 247-8.

<https://brill.com/display/book/9789004517356/APP000001.xml>

The term “engagement” frequently appears in official documents, scholarly literature and news headlines. However, **the concept of engagement in the context of international diplomacy is not yet sufficiently developed. Sometimes it points to the interaction with problematic or adversarial states, states that need international assistance, or fresh involvement in a certain region or with a new state. We could also see the use of the concept of engagement in an international warning context.** Thus, Miloslav Mincic **defines positive engagement “as a way of influencing the behavior of regimes considered threatening to the United States and the international community.” But the concept of diplomatic engagement could be used as a platform or starting point for the interactional practice of**

developing relationships or relational practice of the actor with other entities. By initiating and conducting engagement with others, diplomats can act as leaders of engagement, interaction and relationship-building. Alan Henrikson noted that although “engagement” is a very broad concept that covers everything from military interactions to civilian involvement abroad, it “has primarily a diplomatic meaning, specifically implying a willingness to talk directly with those with whom it may not be possible, or even desirable to agree.” This term describes “the new emphasis on diplomatic outreach in American foreign policy.” An engagement policy concept took hold when Barack Obama was elected US president in 2008. In contrast to such strategic concepts as military, economic and political “containment” that dominated during the Cold War, this policy focuses on establishing and maintaining firm contact, efficient communication and, when possible, friendly relationships. Engagement diplomacy of the United States can be conducted through a variety of methods, “sometimes alongside US military operations, mixed coercion with outreach in a complex and shifting pattern of intended persuasiveness.” According to Henrikson, such practices encompass not only traditional diplomacy with resident ambassadors at foreign capitals, but also special representatives and special envoys to deal with particular problems and thematic issues as well as multifaceted involvement with other countries’ ngos and populations. Therefore, although it remains mainly state-to-state diplomacy, it also involves state-to-society interaction and even society-to-society interchange.

**“Diplomatic engagement” is the attempt to influence the political behavior of a nation through membership of institutions and summit meetings which is distinct from “military engagement”**

**Resnick 01** – Assistant Professor of International Relations, Political Science, and national security expert @ Yeshiva University

(Evan Resnick, March 1 2001, Journal of International Affairs, **“Defining Engagement”**, <http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=b09da7b8-6c66-4034-930f-5031462059c9%40sessionmgr115&vid=4&hid=125>)

**While the term “engagement” enjoys great consistency and clarity of meaning in the discourse of romantic love, it enjoys neither in the discourse of statecraft.**

Currently, practitioners and scholars of American foreign policy are vigorously debating the merits of engagement as a strategy for modifying the behavior of unsavory regimes. The **quality of this debate, however, is diminished by the persistent inability of the US foreign policy establishment to advance a coherent and analytically rigorous conceptualization of engagement.** In this essay, I begin with a brief survey of the conceptual fog that surrounds engagement and then attempt to give a more refined definition. I will use this definition as the basis for drawing a sharp distinction between engagement and alternative policy approaches, especially appeasement, isolation and containment. In the contemporary lexicon of United States foreign policy, few terms have been as frequently or as confusingly invoked as that of engagement.<sup>(n1)</sup> A growing consensus extols the virtues of engagement as the most promising policy for managing the threats posed to the US by foreign adversaries. In recent years, engagement constituted the Clinton administration’s declared approach in the conduct of bilateral relations with such countries as China, Russia, North Korea and Vietnam. Robert Suettinger, a onetime member of the Clinton administration’s National Security Council, remarked that the word

engagement has "been overused and poorly defined by a variety of policymakers and speechwriters" and has "become shopworn to the point that there is little agreement on what it actually means."<sup>(n2)</sup> The Clinton foreign policy team attributed five distinct meanings to engagement:<sup>(n3)</sup> 1) A broad-based grand strategic orientation: In this sense, engagement is considered synonymous with American internationalism and global leadership. For example, in a 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake observed that American public opinion was divided into two rival camps: "On the one side is protectionism and limited foreign engagement; on the other is active American engagement abroad on behalf of democracy and expanded trade."<sup>(n4)</sup> 2) A specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state through the unconditional provision of continuous concessions to that state: During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized the Bush administration's "ill-advised and failed" policy of "constructive engagement" toward China as one that "coddled the dictators and pleaded for progress, but refused to impose penalties for intransigence."<sup>(n5)</sup> 3) A bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to a target state: The Clinton administration announced in May 1993 that the future extension of Most Favored Nation trading status to China would be conditional on improvements in the Chinese government's domestic human rights record.<sup>(n6)</sup> Likewise, in the Agreed Framework signed by the US and North Korea in October 1994, the US agreed to provide North Korea with heavy oil, new light-water nuclear reactors and eventual diplomatic and economic normalization in exchange for a freeze in the North's nuclear weapons program.<sup>(n7)</sup> 4) A bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of mutual interest with a target state: Key to this notion of engagement is the idea that areas of dialogue and fruitful cooperation should be broadened and not be held hostage through linkage to areas of continuing disagreement and friction. The Clinton administration inaugurated such a policy toward China in May 1994 by declaring that it would not tie the annual MFN decision to the Chinese government's human rights record.<sup>(n8)</sup> Similarly, the administration's foreign policy toward the Russian Federation has largely been one of engagement and described as an effort to "build areas of agreement and...develop policies to manage our differences."<sup>(n9)</sup> 5) A bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to facilitate economic and political liberalization in a target state: In its 1999 national security report, the White House proclaimed that its "strategy of engagement with each of the NIS [Newly Independent States]" consisted of "working with grassroots organizations, independent media, and emerging entrepreneurs" to "improve electoral processes and help strengthen civil society," and to help the governments of the NIS to "build the laws, institutions and skills needed for a market democracy, to fight crime and corruption [and] to advance human rights and the rule of law."<sup>(n10)</sup> Unfortunately, scholars have not fared better than policymakers in the effort to conceptualize engagement because they often make at least one of the following critical errors: (1) treating engagement as a synonym for appeasement; (2) defining engagement so expansively that it essentially constitutes any policy relying on positive sanctions; (3) defining engagement in an unnecessarily restrictive manner. One serious flaw in scholarly conceptualizations of engagement is the tendency to view engagement as simply a synonym for appeasement, a policy approach that has fallen into disrepute since the late 1930s. In their book, *Force and Statecraft*, Gordon Craig and Alexander George make the following case: "constructive engagement...is essentially a policy of appeasement, though the term itself cannot be used."<sup>(n11)</sup> Similarly, in a recently published article, Randall Schweller and William Wohlforth refer to engagement as "simply a new, 'more acceptable' term for an old policy that used to be called appeasement."<sup>(n12)</sup> Another scholar, Victor Cha, does try to differentiate appeasement from engagement, though he does so in a manner that nevertheless renders the two policies indistinguishable. Cha claims that engagement occurs when "non-coercive and non-punitive" means are employed by a strong country toward a weak country, while appeasement is the use of the very same means by a weak country against a strong country.<sup>(n13)</sup> This suggests that only the strong can engage and only the weak can appease, though the actual means deployed are virtually identical in both cases. **A second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of**

**engagement is the tendency to define the concept too broadly to be of much help to the analyst.** For instance, Cha's **definition of engagement as any policy whose means are "non-coercive and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive sanction could be considered engagement.** The definition put forth by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross in their

edited volume, *Engaging China*, is equally nebulous. According to Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's behavior."<sup>(n14)</sup> Likewise, in his work, *Rogue States and US Foreign Policy*, Robert Litwak defines engagement as "positive sanctions."<sup>(n15)</sup> Moreover, in their edited volume, *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy*, Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan define engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives."<sup>(n16)</sup> As policymakers possess a highly differentiated typology of alternative options in the realm of negative sanctions from which to choose—including covert action, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, containment, limited war and total war—it is only reasonable to expect that they should have a similar menu of options in the realm of positive sanctions than simply engagement. **Equating engagement**

**with positive sanctions risks lumping together a variety of discrete actions that could be analyzed by distinguishing among them and comparing them as separate policies.** The third trap that has ensnared numerous scholars is the tendency to needlessly circumscribe the

parameters of engagement. This results from attempts to: define engagement as ends rather than means; stipulate the types of states that can engage or be engaged; restrict the types of behaviors that comprise engagement; and limit the types of behaviors that can be modified through engagement. Each of these restrictions hampers the task of evaluating the utility of engagement relative to other policies objectively accurately. Some scholars have excessively narrowed the definition of engagement by defining it according to the ends sought rather than the means employed. For example, Schweller and Wohlforth assert that if any distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement, "it is that the goal of engagement is not simply tension-reduction and the avoidance of war but also an attempt to socialize [a] dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order."<sup>(n17)</sup> Such ends-based definitions hinder the study of engagement in two ways. First, because the act of policymaking consists of selecting

from a variety of alternative means in the pursuit of a given end(s), it stands to reason that policy instruments are more effectively conceptualized in terms of means rather than ends. When defined as different means, policies can be more easily compared with one another across a whole spectrum of discrete ends, in order to gauge more accurately the circumstances under which each policy is relatively more or less effective.(n18) Second, scholars who define engagement as the end of peaceful socialization inevitably create a bias for future empirical research on engagement outcomes. This is because it is difficult to imagine a more ambitious foreign policy objective than the peaceable transformation of a revisionist state that rejects the dominant norms and practices of the international system into a status-quo state that embodies those same norms and practices. The equation of engagement with socialization alone forecloses the possibility that engagement could be employed to accomplish more modest goals such as tension-reduction. Therefore, all else being equal, scholars using this loaded definition will be predisposed to conclude from examination only of the hardest cases of attempted socialization that the policy is ineffective.(n19) Considering engagement as a set of means would enable analysts to more fairly assess the effectiveness of engagement relative to other policies in achieving an array of ends. Scholars have also inappropriately narrowed the scope of engagement by unnecessarily limiting the types of states that can pursue engagement or the types of target states that can be engaged. Cha's conceptualization posits that only powerful states can engage and that only weak ones can be engaged. This forecloses alternative examples of weak states' initiating engagement and strong states' being engaged. As a result, Cha's interpretation risks biasing subsequent empirical studies of engagement, as one would typically expect powerful states to engage more successfully than weak states, and for weak states to be engaged more successfully than strong states. On the other side of the coin, Johnston and Ross define engagement as the effort to ameliorate the revisionist elements of "a rising major power's behavior." This conceptualization is equally biased; rising great powers are probably the hardest types of states to socialize as opposed to declining great powers or smaller regional powers.(n20) Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the scope of the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastner define engagement as the attempt to integrate a target country into the international order through promoting "increased trade and financial transactions."(n21) However, limiting engagement policy to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that were an integral part of the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic, military and cultural arenas. Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact, promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and potential effectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas. Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively evaluating its effectiveness in achieving only some of its professed objectives. Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek merely to examine the "security implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that "[m]uch of the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the effects of engagement versus containment on human rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need to acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept any verdict rendered concerning its overall merits. **In order to establish a more effective framework** for dealing with unsavory

regimes, I propose that **we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state** across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic,

cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: **DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS**

**Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations**

**Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions** and regimes **Summit meetings** and other visits by the head of state and other senior government

**officials of sender state to target state** and vice-versa **MILITARY CONTACTS** **Visits of**

**senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa** **Arms**

**transfers** **Military aid and cooperation** **Military exchange and training programs**

**Confidence and security-building measures** **Intelligence sharing** **ECONOMIC**

**CONTACTS** **Trade agreements** and promotion **Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants** **CULTURAL CONTACTS** Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport,

artistic and academic exchanges(n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall

magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions. In contrast to many prevailing conceptions of engagement, the one proposed in **this essay allows a substantive distinction to be drawn between engagement and**

**appeasement.** The standard **definition of appeasement**--which derives from the language of classical European diplomacy, namely **"a policy of attempting to reduce tension between two states by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict between them"** (n29)--is venerable but nevertheless inadequate.(n30) It does not provide much guidance to the contemporary policymaker or policy analyst, because it conceives of a foreign policy approach in terms of the ends sought while never making clear the precise means involved. The principal causes of conflict between two states can be removed in a number of ways.(n31) A more refined definition of appeasement that not only remains loyal to the traditional connotations but also establishes a firm conceptual distinction from engagement might be: the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state by ceding territory and/or a geopolitical sphere of influence to that state. Indeed, the two best-known cases of appeasement, Great Britain's appeasement of the United States at the turn of the 20th century and of Nazi Germany in the 1930s, reveals that much of this appeasement adopted precisely these guises. The key elements of the British appeasement of the US--acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine--permission for the US to build and fortify a Central American canal, and acquiescence to American claims on the border between Alaska and the Yukon--consisted of explicit acknowledgement of American territorial authority.(n32) Meanwhile, the appeasement of the Third Reich by Great Britain was characterized by acquiescence to: Germany's military reoccupation of the Rhineland (1936); annexation of Austria (1938); acquisition of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia as decided at the Munich Conference; and absorption of the remainder of Czechoslovakia (1939).(n33) A more contemporary example of appeasement is the land for peace exchange that represents the centerpiece of the on-again off-again diplomatic negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Thus, a rigid conceptual distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. **Whereas both policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state--engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than**

**appeasement.** In addition, engagement differs from appeasement by establishing an increasingly interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.(n34) Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state. The proposed definition of engagement helps clarify the distinctions between alternative foreign policy approaches that rely on positive sanctions and also makes understandable distinctions among some frequently mentioned alternative approaches that rely on negative sanctions. **In current discussions on US foreign policy toward rogue states, and**

**especially on US foreign policy toward China, engagement and containment are paired as antipodal policies.** In fact, one recent scholarly article addressing US-P.R.C. relations decries the fact that "the media and many pundits have constructed US choices as limited to 'engagement' and 'containment.'"(n35) However, in light of the distinction I posit between engagement and appeasement, one could more intuitively construe containment to be the opposite of appeasement rather than engagement. Containment has been traditionally construed as the attempt to prevent the geopolitical expansion of a target state.(n36) If appeasement constitutes the cession of territory and/or spheres of influence to a target state, containment might more appropriately be considered the policy of preventing a target state from expanding its territorial scope and/or sphere of geopolitical influence. Thus, whereas a sender state can expand contacts across multiple issue areas with a target state while simultaneously deterring it from committing aggression and/or expanding its geopolitical influence by allying with its neighbors (engagement plus containment), it would be impossible for a sender state to cede territory and/or a sphere of influence to a target state while simultaneously preventing that same state from expanding its territory or sphere of geopolitical influence (appeasement plus containment). The opposite of a policy of engagement would be one in which a state comprehensively diminishes and withdraws contacts across multiple issue areas with another state. Although such a policy would be considered a negative sanction, it does not attempt to do so through direct geopolitical means, as does a containment policy. One could label such a policy as disengagement or isolation.(n37) Thus, whereas a state can yield another state territory or an enlarged sphere of influence while simultaneously abrogating contacts with that state (appeasement plus disengagement), it is impossible for a state to expand and diminish contacts with another state across multiple issue-areas (engagement plus disengagement). The distinctions

drawn between engagement, appeasement, containment and isolation allow for a more focused and coherent discussion of some of the options available for dealing with rival states. For example, current US policy toward China can be depicted as engagement plus containment. Efforts in recent years to liberalize trade with China, integrate the P.R.C. into international institutions and regimes, facilitate numerous diplomatic visits and summit meetings, and conduct bilateral exchanges of senior military personnel and academics are representative of engagement. However, at the same time, the US has elected to contain rather than appease China by taking steps to prevent the P.R.C. from expanding its territory or sphere of influence in East Asia. Most important, the US has signaled that it would not stand aside if Beijing tries to absorb Taiwan by force. Toward this end, the US has continued to sell large quantities of arms to the Taiwanese government, and, in 1995 and 1996, it played high stakes gunboat diplomacy with China in the Taiwan Straits.<sup>(n38)</sup> In addition, the United States has retained its Cold War military alliances with both South Korea and Japan and has maintained a strong troop presence in both countries.<sup>(n39)</sup> The US has also expressed grave concern about "Chinese intrusions" into disputed island territories in the South China Sea.<sup>(n40)</sup> Taken together, these steps exemplify Columbia University Professor A. Doak Barnett's 1966 injunction to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that American policy toward China should constitute "containment but not isolation."<sup>(n41)</sup> In matters of national security, establishing **a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research.** Hence, **if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.**

### **Engagement is not a policy – it is a tool, a means to an end**

**Sadjadpour 9** Karim Sadjadpour, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs July 21, 2009 I RAN: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY <http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/sad072209.pdf>

**Engagement is not a policy in itself, but rather a tool** that seeks, among other things, to curtail Iran's nuclear ambitions and moderate its regional policies. Premature engagement, however, could have precisely the opposite effect, by sending the signal to Tehran that its nuclear program is of such paramount importance to Washington that it can act with impunity. Iran would not be incentivized to limit its nuclear ambitions, but rather to expand them.

### **Engagement should not be limited only to ends rather than means**

**Resnick 1** Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, "Defining Engagement", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, (Spring 2001), pp. 551-566, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357749>

**The third trap that has ensnared numerous scholars is the tendency to needlessly circumscribe the parameters of engagement. This results from attempts to: define engagement as ends rather than means;** stipulate the types of states that can engage or be engaged; restrict the types of behaviors that comprise engagement; and limit the types of behaviors that can be modified through engagement. Each of these restrictions hampers the task of evaluating the utility of engagement relative to other policies objectively accurately. Some scholars have excessively narrowed the definition of engagement by defining it according to the ends sought rather than the means employed. For example, Schweller and Wohlforth assert that if any distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement, "it is that the goal of engagement is not

simply tension-reduction and the avoidance of war but also an attempt to socialize [a] dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order."<sup>17</sup> **Such ends-based definitions hinder the study of engagement in two ways. First, because the act of policymaking consists of selecting from a variety of alternative means in the pursuit of a given end(s), it stands to reason that policy instruments are more effectively conceptualized in terms of means rather than ends.** When defined as different means, policies can be more easily compared with one another across a whole spectrum of discrete ends, in order to gauge more accurately the circumstances under which each policy is relatively more or less effective.<sup>18</sup> **Second, scholars who define engagement as the end of peaceful socialization inevitably create a bias for future empirical research on engagement outcomes.** This is because it is difficult to imagine a more ambitious foreign policy objective than the peaceable transformation of a revisionist state that rejects the dominant norms and practices of the international system into a status-quo state that embodies those same norms and practices. The equation of engagement with socialization alone forecloses the possibility that engagement could be employed to accomplish more modest goals such as tension-reduction. Therefore, all else being equal, scholars using this loaded definition will be predisposed to conclude from examination only of the hardest cases of attempted socialization that the policy is ineffective.<sup>19</sup> **Considering engagement as a set of means would enable analysts to more fairly assess the effectiveness of engagement relative to other policies in achieving an array of ends.**

**Engagement is non-coercive – it uses only rewards and not punishment**

**Schweller 99** Randall L. Schweller, prof of political science Ohio State University, 1999, Engaging China: the management of an emerging power, eds. Alastair Johnston and Robert Ross, <http://books.google.com> p. 14

**The policy of engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising major power's behavior.** This goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order. The most common form of engagement is the policy of appeasement, which attempts to settle international quarrels "by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody, and possibly very dangerous." Typically, this process requires adjustments in territory and "spheres of influence" and the reallocation of global responsibilities and other sources of prestige commensurate with the growth in power of the rising state. Engagement is more than appeasement however. It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order. **In practice, engagement may be distinguished from other policies not so much by its goals but by its means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the target's behavior.**

## Foreign Aid

**Foreign aid is the transfer of capital, goods, or services from a country to another country as a form of aid**

Victoria **Williams**, **No Date**, "Foreign aid", Encyclopedia Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/money/foreign-aid> //;D

**foreign aid, the international transfer of capital, goods, or services from a country or international organization for the benefit of the recipient country or its population.** Aid can be economic, military, or emergency humanitarian (e.g., aid given following natural disasters).

### Types and purposes

Foreign aid can involve a transfer of financial resources or commodities (e.g., food or military equipment) or technical advice and training. The resources can take the form of grants or concessional credits (e.g., export credits). The most common type of foreign aid is official development assistance (ODA), which is assistance given to promote development and to combat poverty. The primary source of ODA—which for some countries represents only a small portion of their assistance—is bilateral grants from one country to another, though some of the aid is in the form of loans, and sometimes the aid is channeled through international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have provided significant amounts of aid to countries and to NGOs involved in assistance activities.

### What is U.S. Foreign Aid?

**Foreign aid encompasses the transfer of resources—money, goods, or services—from the U.S. government to other countries or international organizations.** These resources support a wide array of objectives, from humanitarian relief in times of crisis to long-term development aimed at fostering economic growth, improving health and education, and promoting democratic governance.

The U.S. government defines foreign assistance as a key instrument of its foreign policy. This assistance can manifest in numerous forms, including grants for projects implemented by non-profit organizations, businesses, U.S. government agencies, foreign governments, and multilateral organizations.

The scope of these projects is vast, covering everything from tangible assets like vaccines, food, and infrastructure to intangible support such as technical advice, training, and research. In some instances, aid is provided as direct budget support to foreign governments or multilateral organizations.

**Foreign aid encompasses multiple categories, including humanitarian aid, development aid, economic aid, political aid, health aid, and education and social services aid**

Shibley **Telhami**, 9-12-2024, "What is US foreign assistance?", Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-us-foreign-assistance/> //;D

### Types of Foreign Aid

U.S. foreign aid is diverse and can be broadly categorized to better understand its specific aims and applications. According to the Council on Foreign Relations and other sources, U.S. foreign aid generally falls into these categories:

### **Humanitarian Aid**

This type of assistance is provided to people in need due to man-made or natural disasters, such as wars, famines, earthquakes, or extreme weather events. It aims to address the immediate, life-saving needs of populations in crisis.

Examples include providing food, shelter, clean water, and emergency medical care. In 2020, the U.S. committed \$4 billion in humanitarian assistance to an international partnership for COVID-19 vaccines for low- and middle-income countries. The U.S. Department of State categorizes Humanitarian Assistance as supporting disaster and emergency relief efforts, including programs that save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity.

### **Development Aid**

This focuses on long-term economic development in a country or community. The goal is to provide the foundational elements for sustainable growth, enabling people to develop their own businesses and secure ongoing income.

An example is USAID's 2016 initiative in Bangladesh, partnering with local banks to offer loans to low-income farmers to expand their businesses. This aligns with the State Department's "Economic Growth" category, which includes areas like climate change adaptation, infrastructure, and environmental programming.

### **Economic Aid**

This category includes broader support for economic stability and policy reforms. The Economic Support Fund (ESF) provides grants to foreign governments to support economic stability. While often used for non-military purposes, ESF grants are sometimes viewed as a way to help key security allies offset military expenditures.

The State Department's Office of Foreign Assistance broadly categorizes "Economic and Development Assistance" as advancing national security by helping countries meet near-term political, economic, and development needs.

### **Political Aid**

This type of aid supports political stability, democratic institutions, human rights, and good governance. It can fund activities like peace talks, human rights advocacy, judicial reforms, and election monitoring.

For example, USAID provided political development aid to local organizations in Georgia in 2014 to train election monitors. The State Department's "Democracy, Human Rights and Governance" category reflects assistance supporting the establishment and protection of democratic institutions and values.

## Health Aid

This comprises foreign assistance supporting countries in improving the health of their populations, particularly vulnerable groups. Key components include expanding basic health services, strengthening national health systems, and addressing global health issues like HIV/AIDS.

The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is a prominent example, having provided care to over 20 million people and trained hundreds of thousands of health workers globally.

## Education and Social Services Aid

This category includes assistance to nations for sustainable improvements in the well-being and productivity of their populations through investments in education and other social services.

These categories are not always mutually exclusive, and many aid programs have cross-cutting objectives. For instance, an education program might also contribute to long-term economic development and promote democratic values. The complexity of these categories and their interrelations underscores the multifaceted nature of U.S. foreign assistance.

## Foreign Assistance

### Foreign aid is both tangible and intangible

**Congressional Research Service**, 1-22-2022, "Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy", January 1, 2022.

[https://www.congress.gov/crs\\_external\\_products/R/PDF/R40213/R40213.32.pdf](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R40213/R40213.32.pdf)

In its broadest sense, **U.S. foreign assistance, or foreign aid, is defined** under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195, as amended, FAA), the primary legislative basis of these programs, **as any tangible or intangible item provided by the United States Government [including "by means of gift, loan, sale, credit, or guaranty"] to a foreign country or international organization** under this or any other Act, **including but not limited to any training, service, or technical advice, any item of real, personal, or mixed property, any agricultural commodity, United States dollars, and any currencies of any foreign country which are owned by the United States Government....** (§634(b))

### Foreign assistance is humanitarian, development, or security

Shibley Telhami, 9-12-2024, "What is US foreign assistance?", Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-us-foreign-assistance/> //;D

**Foreign assistance falls into one of three basic categories:**

Humanitarian assistance (food, medical care, shelter, security) for life-saving relief from natural and manmade disasters.

Development assistance that promotes the economic, social, and political development of countries and communities.

Security funding that helps strengthen the military, police, and other security forces of a country.

The relative proportions vary each year. The 2022 budget of \$70 billion was representative of the split, with humanitarian assistance accounting for approximately one-quarter, development assistance for almost two-thirds, and security assistance less than one-fifth.

## **Migrant**

**Broadly defined by the UN as anyone who has moved across an international border.**

### **United Nations, No Date**

United Nations, "Migrants: Protect Not Marginalize."

<https://www.un.org/en/fight-racism/vulnerable-groups/migrants>

**The UN Migration Agency**, International Organization for Migration (IOM), **defines a migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of:**

- **the person's legal status**
- **whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary**
- **what the causes for the movement are**
- **what the length of the stay is**

## **Military Assistance**

**Military assistance is the transfer of defense related services or goods to another nation**

**Govfacts**, 6-5-2026, "Understanding Foreign Aid vs. Military Assistance", GovFacts, <https://govfacts.org/policy-security/international-relations/foreign-aid-development/understanding-foreign-aid-vs-military-assistance//;D>

### **What is U.S. Military Assistance?**

**U.S. military assistance refers to the provision of defense-related articles, services, training, or financing to foreign countries and international**

**organizations.** It is a distinct but sometimes overlapping component of U.S. foreign engagement, primarily aimed at bolstering the security of the United States and its partners, promoting regional stability, and supporting broader U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

Defining U.S. military assistance precisely can be challenging, as various terms are used across different government agencies and legislative acts. There isn't one single, universally accepted definition for "foreign military aid" or "military assistance."

The U.S. Code authorizes the President to furnish military assistance to friendly countries or international organizations if it is found to strengthen U.S. security and promote world peace. This assistance can include providing defense articles and defense services, assigning U.S. military personnel for noncombatant duties, or transferring funds for the procurement of defense articles and services.

#### Security Cooperation vs. Security Assistance

The Department of Defense often uses the broader term Security Cooperation, which comprises all DoD activities undertaken to encourage and enable international partners to work with the U.S. towards strategic objectives. Security Cooperation includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, encompassing DoD-administered Security Assistance programs, military-to-military engagements, exercises, and capacity building.

**Security Assistance itself is a group of programs, typically authorized under Title 22 of the U.S. Code (governing foreign relations), by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military education and training, and other defense-related services through grants, loans, credit, cash sales, or leases.** Security Assistance programs administered by the DoD are considered a subset of the broader Security Cooperation activities.

The Department of State plays a crucial supervisory role, directing U.S. Government security sector assistance programs, including key Title 22 programs like Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and Peacekeeping Operations support.

The preference for the term "Security Cooperation" by the DoD, which is more encompassing than "Security Assistance" or "military assistance," is significant. Security Cooperation includes a wider array of interactions, such as joint military exercises and strategic dialogues, that go beyond the direct provision of material or training.

#### **Military assistance is the transfer of grants, loans, or training to foreign governments**

William H. **Lewis**, 8-6-1987, "U.S. Military Assistance to Africa", CSIS North Africa Notes,

[https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy\\_files/files/publication/notes\\_0887.pdf](https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/notes_0887.pdf) //;D

- **Grant Military Assistance (MAP)**, the oldest and most venerable segment of the program, was launched as a temporary expedient in the late 1940s to meet the perceived Soviet threat to Western Europe and the eastern Mediterranean region.

- **Foreign Military Sales (FMS)** provides direct and guaranteed loans to foreign governments purchasing U.S. arms, equipment, and support services. FMS loans may be direct (i.e. government-to-government) or guaranteed. The latter are guaranteed by the Department of Defense and are financed by the Federal Financing Bank with funds that the Treasury Department borrows from the financial markets.

- **The Economic Support Fund (ESF)** provides grants and loans to "proven friends" that do not meet criteria for economic development assistance but seek and receive U.S. aid to meet pressing budgetary or security needs.

- **Military Education and Training (IMET)** provides instructional opportunities to foreign military personnel at service schools in the United States, underwrites mobile U.S. training teams for selected countries, and provides specialized training aids and equipment for foreign military training centers.

- **Peacekeeping Operations (PK)** is a channel through which the United States contributes to the financing of international peacekeeping forces such as United Nations forces in Lebanon and Cyprus. In addition to these five categories, several other instrumentalities can be utilized for the provision of military aid to friends and allies. In Africa, the Central Intelligence Agency, for example, is providing "covert" arms assistance to the UNITA movement in Angola and was instrumental in placing President Hissene Habre in power in Chad during the Reagan administration's first term. Along more traditional lines, the U.S. Air Force has been called upon to transport the military forces of other nations to crisis points in Africa (e.g., during the 1977 and 1978 Shaba crisis in Zaire, in 1983 in Chad, and to rescue various refugee populations). Other ad hoc cooperative ventures with selected African nations include the sharing of intelligence information (e.g., with Morocco), exchanges of views through joint military committees (e.g., Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt), and joint training exercises (e.g., i

**Military assistance is the provision of defense articles, equipment, and services to allies and partners**

**Congressional Research Service, 1-10-2022, "Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy",**

[https://www.congress.gov/crs\\_external\\_products/R/PDF/R40213/R40213.32.pdf](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R40213/R40213.32.pdf) //;D

**Military Assistance**

**U.S. military assistance provides defense articles and equipment, military training, and other defense-related services to the national-level security forces of U.S. allies and partners.** At \$13.9 billion, military assistance accounted for about 29% of total U.S. foreign aid in FY2019. The Department of State administers three accounts that fund programs implemented by DOD's Defense Security Cooperation Administration: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Other military assistance is funded and implemented directly by DOD. The bulk of military assistance is used to train and equip foreign militaries. FMF, by far the largest of these three State-managed military assistance accounts, provides primarily grant assistance to foreign governments for the purchase of U.S. defense equipment and military training under the Foreign Military Sales program. 17 FMF supports U.S. foreign policy and the U.S. defense industry, while helping ensure the interoperability of weapons systems among allies and partners. In FY2019, FMF assistance primarily supported the security needs of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan. Since 2002, DOD appropriations have also supported FMF-like programs, training and equipping security forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. These programs and the accounts that fund them are called the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and, through FY2012, the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). Beginning in FY2015, similar support was provided Iraq under the Iraq Train and Equip Fund. DOD also funds train and equip efforts under a global capacitybuilding program.<sup>18</sup>

### **Defense assistance is the transfer of funds to foreign nations**

**Nina M. Serafino**, Specialist in International Security Affairs, 4-4-2016, "Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense", Congressional Research Service, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1013554.pdf> //;D

#### **Department of Defense assistance defined**

In this section, the term Department of Defense assistance means funds provided during fiscal year 2013 to Afghanistan by the Department of Defense, either directly or through grantees, contractors, or subcontractors.

### **Natural Resources**

**Natural resources are assets originating from nature without human intervention** **Britannica**, 5-26-2026, "Natural resource", Encyclopedia Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/science/natural-resource> //;D

**natural resource, any biological, mineral, or aesthetic asset afforded by nature without human intervention that can be used for some form of benefit, whether material (economic) or immaterial.** What is considered a "resource" (or, for that

matter, “natural”) has varied over time and from one society to another. Examples of assets that can be considered natural resources include forests, surface water and groundwater, and the fertile lands or the soil and minerals within them (rather than the crops that grow on them), as well as energy resources (such as petroleum, natural gas, and heated water [that is, geothermal energy]) contained within layers of rock.

### **A natural resource is a material supplied by nature**

**Merriam Webster, No Date**, "Definition of NATURAL RESOURCE",

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/natural%20resource> //;D

natural resource

noun

1

natural resources plural : industrial materials and capacities (such as mineral deposits and waterpower) supplied by nature

## **North Africa**

**North Africa is Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Western Sahara**

**Nations Online, No Date**, "Political Map of Northern Africa and the Middle East", <https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/north-africa-map.htm> //;D

**In the United Nations classification of geographical regions, the following countries belong to Northern Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan** (and eventually South Sudan), Tunisia, and Western Sahara.

The Maghreb or Maghrib is a region of North Africa, the term refers to the five North African nations of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Libya.

### **North Africa is Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya**

**Encyclopedia Britannica No Date**, "North Africa." *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 17 Jan. 2024, [www.britannica.com/place/North-Africa](http://www.britannica.com/place/North-Africa). -WR

**“North Africa, region of Africa comprising the modern countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. The geographic entity North Africa has no single accepted definition.** It has been regarded by some as stretching from the Atlantic shores of Morocco in the west to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea in the east, though this designation is more commonly referred to as northern Africa.”

### **North Africa includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Sudan**

Elizabeth Murigi **March**, 3-19-2021, In World Facts, "Countries Of North Africa", WorldAtlas, <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-of-north-africa.html> //;D

North Africa refers to a group of countries and territories occupying the northerly region of the African continent. There is no clear definition of the extent and boundaries of

**North Africa. It is often defined as the part of Africa stretching from the Atlantic shores in the west to the Red Sea coast and Suez Canal in the east, and including the 6 countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Sudan .** Some sources, however, equate North Africa to the Maghreb region which includes Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco. The Arabs considered it the western part of the Arab world. Hence, when referred to in the context of Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it includes only the Maghreb countries.

**North Africa is the northernmost region of Africa including Egypt, Libya, and Sudan**

**New World Encyclopedia, No Date, "Northern Africa",**  
[https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Northern\\_Africa](https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Northern_Africa) //;D

**Northern Africa** is generally accepted to refer to the northernmost region of the African continent, stretching from the Atlantic shores of Morocco in the west to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea in the east. By this definition, the nations included are:

- Algeria
- Egypt
- Libya
- Morocco
- Sudan
- Tunisia
- Western Sahara \*

**Egypt is Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Sudan**

**American Heritage Dictionary, No Date, "The American Heritage Dictionary entry: North Africa", No Publication,**  
<https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=North%20Africa> //;D

**A region of northern Africa generally considered to include the modern-day countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and often Sudan.**

## **Regional Security**

**Regional security policy is diplomacy, trade, and international law**

Dr. Christopher **Snedden**, 12-xx-2016, "Regional Security Architecture: Some Terms and Organizations", Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,  
<https://dkiapcss.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Regional-organizations-Snedden.pdf>  
//;D

Nations deal with their security issues, insecurities and neighbors by voluntarily engaging, cooperating and competing unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally. They utilize a variety of methods and practices, including diplomacy, trade, international law, involvement with other bodies or entities (such as international nongovernmental organizations, domestic non-governmental organizations, multi-national corporations) and other exchanges to create “an integrated international society.”<sup>2</sup> Collectively, **these actions and networks, which often are state-centric, comprise regional security architecture.** A grand architect has not designed this schema. Rather, it is chiefly the result of nations’ voluntary actions, their interactions and cooperation, and their ongoing selforganization into various bodies and entities. This document details some of these aspects.

### **Regional security cooperation is the reduction of armed violence in a region**

Amandine **Gnanguênon** and Stephanie C. **Hofmann**, xx-xx-2024, “7.Regional security cooperation,” Geneva Graduate Institute, 9781800373747-book-part-9781800373747-15.pdf //;D

Based on these observations **we define regional security cooperation as any attempt to reduce armed violence, either within or at the borders of what multiple actors agree to be a region.** There are at least four types of regional security cooperation that we can envisage (see Table 7.1): (i) task-specific regional security cooperation within a formalised regional security organisation; (ii) formalised security cooperation within a general purpose regional organisation; (iii) informal security cooperation; and (iv) informal security cooperation within general purpose regional informal cooperation.

### **Regional Stability**

**Regional means relating to a particular area of a country or of the world**

**Collins Dictionary, No Date, “Regional Stability,”**

[https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/regional-stability#google\\_vignette](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/regional-stability#google_vignette) //;D

regional

(ri:dʒənəl IPA Pronunciation Guide)

adjective [usually ADJECTIVE noun] B2

Regional is used to describe things which relate to a particular area of a country or of the world.

**Regional stability is economic and development assistance, humanitarian relief, resource transfers, and preventative diplomacy**

**Department of State**, 1-20-2009, "06. Regional Stability", U.S. Department of State, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfrpt/2001/html/9825.htm> //;D

The Department of State has a wide variety of tools that may be used to prevent or resolve conflict and contribute to stability around the world. In FY '01, **we promoted regional stability through a number of diplomatic strategies—economic and development assistance, humanitarian relief efforts, regional management of transboundary resources such as water, military security assistance, preventive diplomacy, confidence building measures, and international information sharing.**

## **Stabilization**

**Defined by the US State Department as a combined strategy and effort.**

**US State Department 2018**

US State Department, "A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO STABILIZE CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS."

January 2018. <https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/SAR-Final.pdf>

**Stabilization is an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning U.S. Government efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—toward supporting locally legitimate authorities and systems to peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence. Stabilization requires adaptive and targeted engagement at subnational and national levels. More important than dollars spent is having a singular, agreed-upon, strategic approach to unify efforts in support of a consolidated local impact executed through sequenced and contextual assistance.**